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PART II: THE 'SIXTIES: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, LOCAL PATTERNS
INTRODUCTION
In Part I, it was shown that Modern flats, originally introduced to
Britain by avant-garde designers, were enthusiastically taken over for
production purposes, despite the opposition of many of these designers;
the reasons for this decisive and intentional policy step were
explained, as were the steps taken by sympathetic forces within
Government and building industry to reinforce this initiative. Part II
will pass on to the next stage in this process: to describe, in
its mature and fully developed form, the Modern housing drive which
followed. Here it is important, above all, to trace the activities and
governing values of those who sustained large-scale Modern building: the
housing 'crusaders' and output-minded officers of the major urban
municipalities.
How were these groupings and authorities organised and associated, to
produce this decisive initiative across the entire country? Over the
preceding chapters, it has become clear that the organisational
structure of Modern housebuilding across Britain was roughly pyramidal
in form. The apex of this pyramid was occupied by the great cities. It
was their decisions, during the 1950s, that first began the crusade to
revive the ' numbers game' in the face of the land trap and other
obstacles, erected by the town and country planners and design-minded
Government factions. The political drive of a relatively few municipal
housing leaders, and the energy of their production-orientated engineers
and architects, was echoed and supported within the building industry
and output-orientated circles in the Government. These latter
groupings, through organisational, financial and contractual assistance,
made possible a renewed push for production, but now using Modern types
of flats.
The example of the great cities then stirred the leaders of second-rank
municipalities to embark on their own housing 'crusades'. Hutchison
Sneddon, leader and Housing Convener of the Scottish steel town
Motherwell during the 1960s, recalls his struggle during those years:
'Many people thought I was daft. For instance, I was once at a meeting,
describing our proposal for Muirhouse, with its seven 18-storey blocks
and so on, then one of the ward councillors got up and said, "All that
sounds very nice, but Hutchie Sneddon's made it all up!" He was an
older man, who didn't have much vision!' At the base of the
organisational pyramid, finally, lay a subsidiary assortment of smaller
urban authorities, whose participation was recognised by all as a 'spin¬
off effect' from the 'great drive' of the cities, and which were egged
on in the 1960s by professional, official and industrial publicity
campaigns such as ' system building' . '
In Part I, the origins and establishment of Modern housing production
were considered in a chronological and thematic manner, tracing the
influences and pressures which built up progressively, to the point
where high flats could suddenly proliferate across Britain. In Part II,
by contrast, this housing drive is dealt with in its fully formed state.
Now the aim is to describe the particular characteristics - constraints,
key groups and individuals - of the various regions and conurbations
where most Modern housing was built: lesser towns and rural areas will
be somewhat summarily treated. In organisational, administrative and
cultural terms, the most significant and coherent variations are those
between three major regional, or national subdivisions or groupings
within Britain: Scotland; the English provinces and Wales taken
together; and Greater London. The next three chapters therefore follow
these overall subdivisions.
In dissecting the local and regional driving forces of this loosely-
federated, yet mighty movement across Britain, it is most appropriate to
start, in Chapter 6, with by far the most dramatic single episode of the
entire adventure: the sudden counterattack by which Glasgow
Corporation's Housing Committee parried the onslaught of decentralism,
and, in so doing, set in motion a great multi-storey municipal housing
campaign across the whole of Central Scotland. Then we will pass on to
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examine the Modern housing production of England and Wales (the
provinces in Chapter 7, Greater London in Chapter 8).
Within this overall national structure, we will find a contrast between
the unified Scottish drive, always dominated by the Government-Glasgow
power-struggle, and the much larger, polycentric English and Welsh
element. This latter contained convoluted regional groupings, with
dominant cities or groups of boroughs, and subsidiary building industry
and Government regional offices. The English picture was further-
complicated by numerous tensions and rivalries within particular
regions: for instance between Birmingham and the Black Country boroughs.
So the production record of England and Wales varied from the excellent
(in the case of cities such as Liverpool or late-1960s Birmingham) to
the mediocre. The output of Greater London was initially the most
unsatisfactory of all, as a result of the divisive organisational
framework which prevailed before the 1965 local-government
reorganisation. However, once the dead hand of LCC interventionism was
removed for ever in 1965, some of the new London Boroughs proved
themselves able to unleash fairly forceful building programmes.
Between these groupings and areas, there was a constant cross-
fertilisation, both at councillor and officer level, particularly at
national events such as housing conferences, A former leader of
Hounslow LBC recalls, 'I would talk to people from Birmingham - our
problems were the same! There was a great mingling and a great talking
to each other, in the bar at night - that's when the hairs get let down!
You'd get tips, you'd come back and say to the officers: "Let's have a
report on this!"' ^
Although the local initiatives of British municipalities added up to a
'national housing drive', it is essential not to judge this tremendous,
production-orientated enterprise solely according to the pejorative
evaluations of the national professional groups of the time, such as
architects, planners or sociologists. It was, after all, these very
groups that the production drive had displaced from centre-stage within
Modern housing: a centre stage that they continued to occupy in other
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Welfare State building programmes, such as hospitals or schools. Such
hostile evaluations included claims that initial praiseworthy ideals of
'mixed development' or 'community' had been 'debased' into 'mere' 'mass
housing' or 'numbers'; 'off-the-peg statistical stacks... inhuman,
towering tenements. . . this gratuitously brutal cut-price unite
d'habitation. . . who is all this building for?' 3. Such invective
against the values of production must always be placed in its proper
historical context, as a key part of the arguments of defeated designer-
'providers' - or, later, as part of the new invective turned against
public housing provision as a whole, by a fresh generation of
professional commentators in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Just as the preceding chapters showed that contemporary designers'
discussions were marginal or hostile to the rising tide of housing
production in the early '60s, so the evidence to be presented in the
next three chapters will hammer home the message that contractors and
other groups simply could not have sparked off and sustained the main
1960s multi-storey boom across the country - so dominant, so
unrestrained in their decision-making were the municipal 'crusaders' .
It is the activities of these men and women with which we will be
constantly concerned in the pages below.
Undoubtedly, many housing leaders in British cities were at first
dubious or nervous about the unfamiliar multi-storey blocks which were
the mainstay of their great push for output. Yet the housing schemes
created by their energy did not appear, to them, to be some kind of
parody, half-realisation or perversion of the theories set out by
somebody else - whether Abercrombie, the LCC Architect's Department, or
the Architectural Review. Instead, this housing seemed, within the
severe constraints of the time, to represent a complete fulfilment of
their own overriding aspiration; to provide as many new dwellings for
'their' people as could be built within their boundaries in the shortest
possible time. Whereas the course of other programmes, such as school,
hospital and road building, was fundamentally determined by professional
groups and policies of national coordination, postwar public housing in
Britain, almost uniquely in the ' Western' world, was inextricably bound
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up with municipal political power. The 'housing problem' - or, rather,
the unending effort to solve it - was the lifeblood of the mid-20th
century British city, the source of much of its civic pride and sense of
independence. For the more the large authorities built, the more
autonomy they gained, in building and letting policy. Regarding postwar
Scotland, for instance, it was stated above that 'Glasgow Corporation
was the power in the land - no Minister sitting in Edinburgh could do
much about Glasgow. No one would dare interfere with this great machine
producing houses!' Whatever the fate of local authorities and public
housing in the future, the Modern flats erected in such large numbers in
the 1950s and 1960s will remain as permanent monuments to a golden age
of municipal power and endeavour. A
3Z3
FOOTNOTES: PART II, INTRODUCTION
1 'Many people': int. Sneddon. 'Spin-off': int. Mellish.
2 'People from Birmingham': int. King.
3 'Off-the-peg': AR 9-1970 pp. 137, 147, 148, 179.




CHAPTER 6: DAVID GIBSON: SCOTLAND'S HOUSING CRUSADER
'I can remember an endless stream of older women coming to the office
around 1957-9, all with the same question: "When's ma hoose comin'
down?" They just couldn't get out of the old condemned houses fast
enough!' I. M. T. Samuel 1
'In the next three years the skyline of Glasgow will become a more
attractive one to me because of the likely vision of multi-storey houses
rising by the thousand. .. The prospect will be thrilling, I am certain,
to the many thousands who are still yearning for a home. It may appear
on occasion that I would offend against all good planning principles,
against open space and Green Belt principles - if I offend against these
it is only in seeking to avoid the continuing and unpardonable offence
that bad housing commits against human dignity. A decent home is the
cradle of the infant, the seminar of the young and the refuge of the
aged!' Cllr. D. Gibson
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the powerful alliance of planners and
sympathetic officials within Glasgow Corporation and DHS had attempted
to box in Glasgow's Housing Committee. Their efforts, part of a grand,
Government-endorsed movement of regional planning and modernisation,
culminated in the 1957 Report on the Clearance of Slum Houses,
Redevelopment and Overspill prepared by Nicoll's team in Glasgow. This
proposed to squeeze the Committee's building programme in an inexorable
pincer movement comprising, on the one hand, a vast redevelopment
programme under close planning control, and, on the other, sweeping
overspill provisions intended to absorb almost all the decanted
population.
Seven years into the period covered by this plan, around 1965, Glasgow's
housing had certainly undergone an extraordinary physical change. As
anticipated in the 1957 Report, some fairly sizeable swathes of the slum
belt had been torn down, and developments comprising high and low blocks
of flats were in course of erection to replace them. But beyond the CDA
zone, there was a startling and awesome sight. Away Into the far
distance, groups of colossal multi-storey blocks were rising - twenty,
twenty-five, thirty or more storeys high. These were not located in
planned redevelopments, but were instead planted haphazardly on gap-
lie
sites anywhere in the suburbs: on pockets of waste-ground, corners of
golf-courses, redeveloped prefab-sites. This tremendous forest of high
blocks brazenly defied the planners' prescriptions in its form and, more
important still, its effect. The 1957 Report had recommended the
building of 40,000 new dwellings in Glasgow and 60,000 overspill houses
by 1980: but, by 1972, no less than 48,000 new dwellings would in fact
be built within the city boundaries, while a mere 25,000 planned
overspill dwellings would be provided. Of course, very many higher—
income households were also leaving the city in 'unplanned' overspill,
largely to commuter suburbs - but this movement was opposed just as
vigorously by the planners. 3 In 1964 the young architectural critic
Nicholas Taylor, soon to be transformed into a bitter opponent of Modern
housing, hailed this astonishing rebuff to the planners: 'The fight back
in the past three years has been exhilarating. No visitor to
Glasgow this year can fail to marvel at the towers of flats shooting up
in every direction' .
What was the cause of this eleventh-hour reversal to the Abercrombie
pincer strategy of redevelopment and overspill - a reversal which was to
banish forever the possibility that much of the population of this great
city might one day be scattered by Government edict into an array of
garden suburbs or New Towns? Astonishingly, the salvation of the cause
of the Housing Committee was brought about, in the first instance, by
the initiative of one man: David Gibson, its Convener from 1961 to 1964.
The replacement of the fragmented Victorian housebuilding process by the
municipal leviathan had created the possibility that influential
individuals might alter the entire course of major cities' housing
policy. But it was only now, when the future of Glasgow's programme was
so delicately balanced, that this potential was at last realised in the
most dramatic way possible.
The irony of the career of David Gibson, that most remarkable of
Britain's municipal housing leaders, was that he was by origin an
outsider to Glasgow Corporation's Labour political apparatus. At first
glance, he seemed an anachronism, having been one of the last
Independent Labour Party stalwarts to capitulate to modern Socialism,
Ill
62 David Gibson (standing, at top right) and his wife Sadie (at bottom
left), seen on a Renfrew ILP Guild of Youth ramble in 1930.
63 David Gibson (centre), seen c. 1935.
joining the mainstream Labour Party only in 1954. He had spent the
previous 33 years steeped in the fiery idealism of the ILP, holding its
national chairmanship in the 1950s, losing innumerable deposits at
Parliamentary elections, authoring countless obscure tracts on global
disarmament and land nationalisation, and serving as councillor from
1934 until 1949, when the Dollanite ' Murphia' and the Roman Catholic
Church finally succeeded in sweeping the ILP off the Corporation. But
Gibson's own passion was the housing question, and had been ever since
his arrival in Glasgow from Springside in Ayrshire in 1919 at the age of
16, when he had been plunged into the City's slumdom, living in huts and
overcrowded tenements in the East End. In contrast to the theoretical
preoccupations of the Communist intelligentsia of the LCC Architect's
Department, Gibson's radical Socialism was built on direct involvement
in the housing problems of his fellow working-class Glaswegians. They
flocked in their hundreds to his weekly ward advice bureau, or to his
home in a modest three-roomed East End council house, itself situated in
an appropriately noxious setting, cheek-by-jowl with a bone-boiling
works and a piggery. s (Frontispiece, Ills. 61-64)
By the late 1950s, the impassioned yet homespun values of the ILP now
seemed a thing of the past, even in Glasgow. The Labour Group and
Corporation leadership under Peter Meldrum had come, on balance, to
accept Abercrombie's grand framework of planned decentralisation, and to
look on housing as just one facet of the modernisation of Glasgow and
Central Scotland. Typically, Meldrum had participated in the concerted
attempt in 1958 by the Corporation-DHS planning grouping to 'puncture
the Bunton thesis' of anti-overspill multi-storey building. Gibson
stood completely aside from this 'vertical coalition' of regional
planning and reconstruction. He focused solely on what was still the
paramount municipal political issue - the housing question - bringing to
bear on this single subject all the uncompromising intensity of the ILP
tradition. But whereas the ILP's original housing campaigns around the
time of the First World War had been particularly associated with the
housing interests and grievances of the skilled working class and lower
middle class, these groups were now well provided for in existing
Corporation schemes. Gibson's own 'crusade' was therefore almost
&0
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exclusively concerned with slum conditions. In his view, 'the
unpardonable offence that bad housing creates against human dignity'
made it morally imperative to build as many new dwellings for slum
decanting as quickly as possible, whatever the effect on any scheme of
regional planning. 6
Unsurprisingly, Gibson was implacably opposed to the 1957 Report's
redevelopment and overspill programme, because he believed that this
plan would not only fail to rehouse slum-dwellers directly into new
houses (at least until the mid-sixties), but would also stop the Housing
Committee from doing so. To Gibson wholesale planned overspill seemed a
cruel fantasy: 'To delete a quarter of a million people from the city,
he was completely opposed to that, he thought it was ridiculous!' But,
fantasy or not, he was determined to resist. 'There is enough land in
Glasgow to build all the houses we need - if only we can find it!' 7
Gibson occupied a somewhat isolated position within the Corporation's
Labour Group as an ex-ILP 'rebel' figure, standing aloof from
traditional power-blocs such as the trade-unions and the Roman Catholic
Church. However, the unrivalled authority and autonomy of the Housing
Committee enabled him rapidly to build up a sufficient level of support
to launch, whatever the views of the Group leadership, a counter-
strategy opposed to overspill. Glasgow Corporation, through its sheer
size, 'had a problem as to who was its most important person, and
housing, because of its spending requirements, invariably assumed an
importance out of all proportion to other departments. You get
councillors clashing: some people don't emerge in debates, and they
attach themselves to those who do. When they want something for their
area, they'll speak to that guy sideways and he'll help, fixing a
tenancy and so on. He then expects them to follow him in his wider
cause - rebuilding Glasgow housing!' Gibson's fusion of ILP zealotry
and incisive intellect set him apart from the stolid Conveners of the
'fifties. Although schooled from infancy in the ILP tradition of fire-
eating rhetoric, he was a quietly-spoken man, and his impact in
committee derived from the power of his argumentation. A senior DHS
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Administrator recollects: 'I remember that eloquence. It was impossible
not to admire it, and impossible to stand out against it!' 13
His rise to ascendancy within the Housing Committee was meteoric: by
1958 Sub-Convener, by 1960 acting Convener, and finally full Convener
the following year. (111. 65) Whereas Bunton's airy proposals had
failed to deflect the advance of the apparently potent decentralist
'vertical coalition', Gibson had by 1961 accumulated a powei—base from
which he could launch a stunning counter-blow against the Clyde Valley
Plan strategy. The planners soon sensed the danger: 'Gibson was the man
we regarded as the frightening one - a white-faced, intense, driving
idealist, absolutely fanatical and sincere, of a kind you couldn't help
admiring in a way. He was white with passion about the housing problem
- one knew he was a man in a hurry! He saw only the one thing, as far
as we could see: how to get as many houses up as possible, how to get as
many of his beloved fellow working-class citizens decently housed as
possible. We all agreed, but the question was, where, how, and at what
speed!' 3
The origins of Gibson's campaign of resistance to the national movement
of planned reconstruction lay in the heated debates which followed the
publication of Nicoll's 1957 report. The initial outcry was led by
Councillor James Duncan, who raged that 'we won't get 60,000 houses out
of Glasgow - and we don't need to do so! We should use every available
site in the city at all costs - including all the gap sites!' The
interim response was a compromise solution which attempted to fudge the
issue for a little longer. The planners were placated by an agreement
that Hutchesontown-Gorbals, despite its massive decanting liability,
should be designated as the first planner-controlled Comprehensive
Development Area (CDA) - while Duncan and the old-guard 'housers' were
appeased by the promise of a new gap-site programme to exploit every
available site. In 1957 and 1958, however, it became clear that the
planners would seek not just to maintain, but to reinforce their control
over the CDAs: DHS refused a Corporation request to relax the 165 p.p. a.
planning ceiling for the Anderston Cross CDA, and Grieve began to lobby
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for a cut in the maximum density of Hutchesontown from 165 to around 135
p. p. a. 1 °
From that point Gibson, exasperated, began to press for a complete
revolution in land policy. Outside the 'planned' CDAs, there were no
blanket density restrictions, but merely ineffective area ' cartograms'
expressing notional overall populations for entire districts, including
existing housing. Gibson seized upon the idea that, if the multi-storey
blocks proposed by the planners for mixed development use in the CDAs
could instead be used outside those areas on gap sites, the Committee
would be able to build much higher blocks, unencumbered by density
restrictions and acquisition problems. This would make possible a cycle
of decanting within the city's boundaries without resorting to
overspill. It was at first fondly hoped that it might prove possible to
decant slum families to relatively new but underoccupied interwar
cottages, allowing the inhabitants of the latter to be moved to smaller
flats in nearby new multi-storey blocks. Later, when this was found to
be impracticable, direct decanting of slum-dwellers to new multi-storey
flats would become the mainstay policy. But, even if the tactics
changed over time, the overall strategy remained the same: to tide the
Committee over the critical 5-6 year gap before worthwhile cleared areas
became available. By this means, overspill from slum-clearance would be
neatly bypassed and the planners' 1957 proposal would be blocked. 11
The Corporation's move to large-scale multi-storey construction was
intimately bound up with Gibson's shift of emphasis away from the
Comprehensive Development Areas. In 1962, after several years when most
of Glasgow's high-flat approvals were located in these areas, this
proportion would nosedive to only 2%. To start any concerted move away
from the CDAs, the Committee had only a few substantial vacant sites to
hand, and these were all beset by difficulties such as reclamation from
noxious industrial uses: as in the case of the areas at Sighthill,
Cranhill and Toryglen North. And most smaller gap sites were needed for
direct labour tenement construction, to placate the Housing and Works
Department. By mid-1958, use of point blocks on outer-suburban gap
sites was already under discussion with DHS. However, the real
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breakthrough in the Committee's land supply came with the evolution of
an altogether new policy in 1959. This involved the rezoning of some
public open spaces such as golf-courses, and the demolition of the
city's large estates of prefabricated bungalows: in both cases, the
sites released would be redeveloped as intensively as possible using
high blocks. (111. 66)
The original impetus behind this rezoning policy came from Gibson, who
won round the Parks Committee Convener in September 1959 and
relentlessly pursued this and comparable initiatives with his fellow
councillors and with the officers. One former official recalls: 'In
those days, he was threatening to fire us about once a fortnight!'. The
overwhelming power of the Housing Committee within the Corporation meant
that the committee structure could not be used to obstruct Gibson's
reforms: 'If the Housing Committee approved it, the Labour Group would
tell the Planning Committee to endorse it - the Planning Committee was a
weak committee!' But even Gibson entertained no hopes of securing
release of further Green Belt land for housing use, so entrenched was
this particular policy by then: so it was suggested that Green Belt
sites could be used to accommodate displaced golf-courses. Jury
provided Gibson with supplementary architectural argumentation to help
justify the massed building of high blocks in Knightswood - that they
would add visual variety to a sprawling cottage estate. Gibson
certainly endorsed this view: he believed high flats, as an arresting
Modern image, would provide a clear visual signal that the sharpest
possible break was now being made from the clutter and squalor of the
slums. But, to repeat, his overriding motivation in seeking their
construction was of course the drive for numbers. In comparison with
the clamour of Glasgow's slum-dwellers for new houses, as many as
possible, as quickly as possible, all other factors seemed to him
inconsequential. 1:3
To get his multi-storey drive under way, Gibson had to convince not only
the Corporation but also the Department of Health for Scotland (Scottish
Development Department from 1962). These negotiations with Central
Government were handled jointly by Gibson and a few senior Corporation
66 Aerial view (1989) of Wirnpey multi-storey developments,
Knightswood. From foreground to background: Lincoln Avenue (1962),
Kirkton Avenue (1965), Scotstoun House (1962), Blawarthill (1964).
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officials. Gibson, working closely with the Housing Town Clerk Depute,
Jim Hood, personally conducted most high-level negotiations with
Ministers or senior officials. Any Glasgow Convener of Housing
commanded an automatic respect in St. Andrew's House; but his own
personal auctoritas was unique: ' DHS were in awe of Gibson, they saw him
as some kind of crusading angel, bulldozing his way through Glasgow! '
DHS's disapproval of high flats and general needs building in the late
1950s had been nothing more than a show of restraint, to appease the
Treasury. Once the economic situation started to ease around 1961-2,
Housing Administrators' reservations about high flats vanished
overnight, to be replaced by fresh anxiety to raise output. In the
absence of a healthy speculative housebuilding industry in Scotland, any
renewed Government emphasis on housing completions could only reinforce
its political dependence on Glasgow to deliver much of the required
total. Gibson's own hand was also soon strengthened by hard statistics
which demonstrated the total failure of expanded-town overspill to offer
any direct help in decanting the slum areas. Exploiting these findings
to the full, despite the embarrassment this inflicted on the Planning
and Overspill Committees, he began to press more and more forcibly for
release of particularly controversial sites. Here, he found ready
cooperation from the Undei—Secretary in charge of public housing
administration, J. Callan Wilson. Several hundred dwellings were added
to the Corporation's annual total from 1963 onwards, as a result of the
success of DHS, in 1960, in persuading the Treasury to allow the SSHA to
build 3,500 dwellings in the city. This programme, which was tightly
controlled by the Housing Committee to prevent any suggestion of
colonial-style interference by the Association within the City, was of
course entirely Exchequer-financed, and was thus a welcome gift to the
Glasgow's hard-pressed ratepayers. ,A
Although there had been much agonised discussion in 1958-9, the
reluctance of the Housing Committee to turn its back on the tried and
tested tenement formula had impeded any immediate change to a multi¬
storey programe on gap sites. But, the following year, Gibson's
argument had been won for him by the first, electrifying demonstration
of the potential of point blocks in high-speed piecemeal development:
 
68 The same view in August 1960.
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Wimpey's erection of the structure of three 20-storey blocks at Royston,
Area A, in a mere eight months, This development started construction
at the same time as Spence's elaborate Hutchesontown slabs, which
contained roughly the same number of dwellings: it was finished and
fully let before even the foundations of Spence's scheme were complete!
(Ills. 67-69)
Now Gibson could unleash the most concentrated multi-storey building
drive experienced by any British city, with high flats accounting for
nearly three-quarters of all completions in the years 1961 to 1968,
compared with less than 10% for all other postwar years. Far more of
Glasgow* s multi-storey flats were in very large or very high blocks than
those in other cities. For instance, the percentage of Glasgow high
flats in blocks over 20 storeys high was three times that of London and
18 times that of Birmingham. Through Gibson's multi-storey building
campaign, the decline in the city's output as a whole was rapidly
arrested, and completions speedily began to pick up once again: from
1, 902 in 1962 to 4,318 in 1964; starts reached 6,309 in 1963 (74% multi¬
storey). Now, at last, Glasgow's first concerted counterattack against
the Clyde Valley Plan was underway in earnest! (111. 70)
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69 Royston Area 'A': topping out the first point block, 1960. In
foreground Cleft to right), A. G. Jury (City Architect), R. W.
Marwick (Manager for Scotland, George Wimpey), Cllr. W. S. Campbell
(Convener of Housing). At right background, Cllr. E. D. Clark.
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HOUSE CONSTRUCTION & DEMOLITION 1945 to 1979
HOUSES Municipal Houses built 1945-79: 119,554
YEARS
70 Postwar housing output and demolitions in Glasgow: the two major
'peaks' represent the tenement-building push of the 'fifties and
Gibson's multi-storey drive of the 'sixties. Gibson's success in
uncoupling housebuilding from the CDA programme is indicated by the
way in which his drive preceded the biggest spurt of clearance.
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LEWIS CROSS: GLASGOW'S 'HOUSING PROGRESS OFFICER'
'He was the one, he was the key man... he was the person who did all the
beavering away behind the scenes. He was given carte blanche!' Former
Glasgow Corporation planner
'Lewis would say, 'If you want work, you've got to get your finger out!'
T. Smyth 1S
Gibson's counterparts in other large cities such as Leeds, Sheffield and
Birmingham were fortunate, in that multi-storey building had already
eased their land shortage by the time that building shortages began to
bite in the early 1960s - so, to a certain extent, they were only faced
with one serious problem at a time. In Glasgow, by contrast, owing to
the gravity of the city's housing situation and the delay in turning to
multi-storey flat-building in the 1950s, Gibson was simultaneously faced
with a serious building-industry capacity shortfall, and the worst land
crisis experienced since World War II by any major British city.
Luckily, however, the Convener had available to him, in both these
problem areas, the outstanding services of Lewis Cross, a senior
engineer in the Architecture and Planning Department who oversaw the
progress of all housing sites and contracts. (111. 71) Cross, a blunt
yet jovial Yorkshireman, was one of the most skilful negotiators
employed for housing purposes by any large municipality. He ensured,
with relentless efficiency and integrity, that Gibson's demand for
maximum production was given absolute priority over all other
considerations affecting the location, design and building of housing:
he rode roughshod over any attempt to curtail or obstruct the City's
decision-making autonomy by external or 'national' forces. Cross's
administrative forcefulness, and Gibson's fervent advocacy of high flats
at a political level, proved irresistible in combination. Jury, well
aware of the power of the Housing Committee, was happy to balance his
planners by allowing Cross much autonomy: during the early 1960s, he was
promoted to Depute rank (along with Nicoll) and designated 'Housing
Progress Officer'. The City Architect only found it necessary to
intervene occasionally in matters of detail: for instance, to curb the
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small jokes and facetious observations which peppered Cross's
correspondence. 1,3
Of Gibson's two most pressing problems - land and building resources -
the first was the more fundamental, as nothing at all could be done
without suitable sites. In this vital area of land assembly and
exploitation, Cross brought to bear a systematic, matter-of-fact
competence, which he had acquired in road and bridge building in the
Royal Engineers and the colonial service in Kenya. During the 1950s, he
had exercised day-to-day responsibility for the building of tens of
thousands of flats on Glasgow's peripheral schemes, laying out roads and
sewers on which standard three or four storey tenement types could be
erected as fast as possible in the required numbers. Now the Housing
Committee's call was for multi-storey blocks: so Cross quite
straightforwardly translated his tried and tested approach to this new
field.
Gibson's multi-storey ' crusade' represented, in many ways, a striking
break with the past: but Cross's organisational policies were
essentially an extension of the methods of the tenement-building years.
Gibson, fired with enthusiasm for his new soaring towers, shared much
common ground with the architectural ideals of Modern design - although
his homespun ILP rhetoric was very different in language to, say, the
socio-psychological intricacy of the speculations of theoreticians such
as the Smithsons. Cross, by contrast, saw blocks of dwellings,
tenements and point blocks alike, as being no more complicated than his
own field of technical knowledge: drains and roads. He had risen to
power over Corporation housebuilding not through expertise in the
structural engineering of dwellings, but by his own administrative
competence, through an ability to marshal other people - designers and
builders - so as to fill gaps with numbers as quickly and simply as
possible. There were thus surprisingly few links between his outlook
and expertise, and even the most matter-of-fact, technical aspects of
the 'Modern Dwelling' debates of the LCC school of designers. In his
capable hands, Gibson's demand for the large-scale building of Modern
high blocks was fulfilled: yet, paradoxically, these blocks were built
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in a manner which consciously discarded key aspects of Modernity - as
defined by national or local 'designers' - and perpetuated the older,
more elemental ways of municipal flat-building. 17
From 1958, once the political pressure for initiation of large-scale
multi-storey building was becoming unmistakeable, Cross quietly began to
lay the groundwork for such a change, selecting viable sites for high
blocks from the Committee's piecemeal land supply. In contrast to
Gibson's socialist fanaticism, Cross was solely motivated by the
technical requirement of exploiting sites, filling gaps with numbers, as
quickly and simply as possible. Gibson's urgent demand for maximum
production, whatever the cost, was always uppermost in his mind.
Cross's answer to the multi-storey challenge posed by Gibson was very
straightforward. A rapidly increasing number of specific 'multi-storey
sites' was designated. The actual 'yield' of these would be maximised
by use of 100% high flats, between 20 and 30 storeys high: sites which
were too small or awkwardly shaped even for point blocks were used for
DLO tenements (usually of three storeys). Especially outside the CDAs,
there was virtually no attempt to provide 'mixed developments' of high
flats, maisonettes and low flats (still less cottages) to supposedly
cater for different household sizes, as the current architectural
orthodoxy ran. Instead, there was a policy of segregation: almost all
one and two bedroom flats were amassed in separate developments of point
and slab blocks, while most larger dwellings were at first contained in
the scattered tenemental developments.
We will see in the following pages that Cross chose not only to neglect
but even to antagonise some of the key values or 'standards' of Modern
design, when they seemed likely to stand in the way of output. He was
prepared to accept unquestioningly only the most established
constraints, such as daylight and sunlight factors - which, on their
own, did not favour Modern blocks rather than the four-storey tenements
of the 'fifties. But the 'standard' which seemed most threatening to
unbridled exploitation of 'multi-storey sites' was that of 'density'
itself. In contrast to the architect's or planner's view of density
levels as recipes denoting precise combinations of building types and
locations. Cross saw density simply as a potential obstruction to his
building of high blocks, as many as possible, on any particular gap
site. In his view, multi-storey blocks could equally well be built on
any available site within the city boundaries, central or suburban.
Here the planners' definitions of 'appropriate' relations between
density and building form posed a constant threat: this might at any
time require ad-hoc adjustments to 'the box with the figures in the
corner' of layout plans, in order to produce a notional density to
satisfy planning objections. In the outer suburbs, although the
cartogram system allowed much flexibility, by preventing any precise
calculation of the effect of a multi-storey scheme on the net density of
its immediate environs, the planners could still make generalised claims
that massed high blocks represented an inappropriately 'high density'
for such areas. Alternatively, if the 'box with the figures in the
corner' were doctored in order to obtain, say, a notional enlargement of
the site area, the planners could then retort that high blocks were not
necessary at such a ' low density' . In the inner redevelopment areas, by
contrast, the main obstacle was the planners' strictly enforced 165
p.p.a. blanket density maximum - although this could partly be
outmanoeuvred by redefinition of the phasing of a Comprehensive
Development Area. 113
Cross's lack of regard for the notion of 'density' must be sharply
distinguished from the contemporary arguments of those architects and
planners who began, during the early 1960s, to question the usefulness
of notions such as density or light angles. The two views were
diametrically opposed. To these architects, density had come to seem
yet another quantitative obstruction to the pursuit of creative
'design'; to Cross, all theoretical definitions of the relationship of
buildings to land threatened to become potential obstructions to output.
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In his single-minded pursuit of production, Cross saw not only the
values of design, but the designers themselves, as a potential
obstruction. Around 1950, the LCC's Valuer had seemed impotent in the
face of the attacks by Richards and Matthew's designers, and, at the end
of the 1960s, younger design critics would enjoy the same kind of free
range - now to ridicule the 'Failure of "Housing"' as a whole. But in
Glasgow, for a few years in between, the tables were turned, as one
hard-nosed engineer succeeded in throwing the architectural and planning
establishment on the defensive - including, ironically, the by then
eminent Sir Robert Matthew himself. Cross's aim was to exclude or
subordinate any designers whose main allegiance seemed to be to the
external, national values of the architectural or planning professions:
instead, he wished to deal as far as possible with contractors' staffs,
who 'spoke the same language as him', and whom he felt he could trust to
handle the entire design process, expeditiously and without
complication, We will deal with the contractors' role shortly; what
concerns us here is Cross's attitude to output and design, and the way
in which he deliberately polarised the two, to the designers'
disadvantage.
By the late 1950s, Cross had acquired oversight of the Architecture and
Planning Department's own housing architects, engineers and surveyors.
After a period of innovativeness in the 'forties, the architects' role
and status had become somewhat limited. A senior quantity surveyor in
the Department recalls: 'They were a small section, virtually run by the
Clerk of Works, Joe McGuinness. . . all they'd been doing was taking the
standard tenement types and shoving them on to the road patterns built
by the DLO' . This well suited Cross, who ' certainly didn't want any
comments from his own designers!' However, in the early 1960s, one
innovative chief architect, A. A. Wood, in collaboration with the
planners, briefly and unsuccessfully set himself up in opposition to
Cross's package-deal high flats, advocating instead the building of deck
blocks. Cross had little difficulty in suppressing this uprising, and
Wood left to become City Planning Officer in Norwich; however, deck-
access type-plans were designed and built in limited numbers, initially
at Springburn ' B'. (Ills. 72-74) A planner recalls, 'We'd meet and see
if we could modify this great machine for bigger and bigger blocks... he
was the one bright hope, but he was massacred and slapped down - he
became so unhappy he left in a matter of months!' The Corporation
y&
72 A. A. Wood (left) and two Planning Division colleagues inspect a
model of the Corporation's Inner Ring Road proposals in 1964.
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73 Model of Springburn CDA Area ' B* (1963). Here, at the instigation
of A. A. Wood, most of the site was taken up by a newly designed
type of deck access block, up to six storeys in height; point




74 Springburn Area * B* : deck access blocks (photographed 1987).
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planners themselves, under the forceful direction of Nicoll, were a far
more organised force, and were outside Cross's control. Here the
appropriate solution seemed to be to go round rather than over.
Although the planners produced many impressive reports, their real power
to alter or even obstruct housing proposals was limited by the system of
'joint reporting', under which Jury's reports on proposals to the
Housing Committee incorporated both housing and planning observations:
the planners could not challenge any scheme independently, on grounds,
say, of non-conformity to density zoning. Cross could often deny them
even the opportunity to make observations, by starving them of
information - for instance by excluding them from regular gap-site
meetings with DHS, at which he habitually dealt alone with a bevy of
Government administrators and professional staff. When the planners had
to be invited, Cross warned his allies, such as contractors or
Administrators, that this would be purely a formality: 'He would hardly
have them in the room. He'd say to you, "Well, I suppose I'll have to
get those idiots up here now - but don't pay any attention to what they
say. It'll get built!"' The planners reciprocated the sentiment: 'He
had no conscience, no soul, no heart - just a machine for producing
numbers! ' 20
Cross was equally distrustful of private architects. The overspending
of the early multi-storey projects gave him just the excuse he needed to
postpone a group of private-architect-designed schemes, creating even
further room for his beloved package-deals. For instance, the architect
Baron Bercott, working in 1962 on the design of point blocks later built
at the Sandyhills House site, recalls that 'we were told to put the
drawings back into the drawer and forget about them - we were never told
why!' Cross was particularly unhappy about a proposal that repeats of
Matthew's costly Hutchesontown blocks should be built by the DLO on gap-
sites at Springburn 'A' (Wellfield Street) and Royston ' B'. He was
alarmed not only by the delays and overspending of Hutchesontown ' B' ,
but by Matthew's undisguised attempts to extend the scope of the
Springburn project to encompass 'comprehensive' redevelopment of a much
larger area. This would undoubtedly sterilise an entire string of
useful gap-sites for several years. But such was Cross's power by this
stage, that he was able in 1963 to persuade Gibson and the Committee
(despite the DLO Manager's bitter opposition) that Matthew, doyen of the
British public-architectural establishment, should be unceremoniously
sacked from both projects in favour of Reema package-deals - in the case
of Royston, after the piling for the first two blocks had been
commenced! The Corporation paid Matthew enormous fees for the abandoned
work, and 25-storey Reema blocks rose on the foundations designed for
the Hutchesontown repeats. 21
We saw above that Gibson handled most 'strategic' contacts with DHS/SDD,
Cross, on the other hand, was responsible for most day-to-day land
negotiations with the Department: Jury only became significantly
involved in the case of the most important schemes, such as the
Hutchesontown-Gorbals CDA. The Housing Progress Officer made it his
business to form a close tactical alliance with the DHS/SDD
Administrators with immediate territorial responsibility for Glasgow in
the early 1960s, who were both of a temperament congenial to him: an
Assistant Secretary, H. F. G, Kelly (a no-nonsense Roman Catholic
Glaswegian) and a Principal, Ian Hamilton (an efficiency-minded
accountant). This was of great importance, as the only real potential
obstruction to Cross's attempts at 'site cramming' with high blocks, was
posed by the Government loan sanction procedure, which stipulated that
the Department's planners and Housing Architects should appraise and
criticise the plans of proposed schemes: and the only way to get round
this obstacle was to befriend the Administrators. Cross won the
latter's trust through his combination of efficiency and an apparently
easy-going negotiating manner. One recalls: 'Lewis was a great joker:
he could never resist a wisecrack. But the flippancy was superficial,
and belied the strength of the underlying purpose!' 22
With the assistance of Kelly and Hamilton, Cross was able to circumvent
the reluctance or opposition of the DHS/SDD Housing Architects and
Planners, elegantly diverting them into the same remote siding into
which he had already shunted their Corporation counterparts. The main
vehicle of Cross's collaboration with Administrators was a joint gap-
site review procedure, which Kelly's predecessor, Ronald Fraser, had
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established in 1957 as an offshoot of the main multi-storey flats
working party, with the aim of providing a restraint on Glasgow; this
was chaired by the territorial DHS/SDD Principal (Hamilton and his
predecessor Jack Fleming). The Corporation was here represented solely
by Cross, who soon managed to turn the procedure completely on its head,
and use it to reinforce the City's power. The principle of suburban
high flats had already been conceded in 1958 by Fleming, who clearly did
not realise the site-cramming potential implicit in cartogram zoning.
He merely commented that the use of high flats to infill suburban gap-
sites 'will not, in general, make very much difference to the densities,
although they may enable the Corporation to get in a few more houses
than they would otherwise do. The main justification for them would
seem to be that they will provide some relief from the deadly monotony
of the ordinary Glasgow housing development'. A year later, the
possibility of rezoning open space for housing was broached by Cross at
the gap-site review meetings: the Administrators gravely assented,
although they were well aware that there were furious objections among
certain groups for some reason not present, such as Nicoll's planners.
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By the early 1960s the review procedure had become, quite
straightforwardly, an open conduit for pressure by Cross on the
Department. He might, for instance, choose to secretly race ahead with
the preparations for a major scheme, such as the gigantic Sighthill
development, keeping Administrators informally appraised behind the
scenes but, publicly, saving it up to be lobbed at them in the form of
an indignant last minute ultimatum. These negotiating tactics were then
immediately transmitted onwards as Administrators eagerly browbeat the
architects and planners, arguing for example that delay in approval
would cause the Department to lose face.
Among DHS designers, the planners, led by West Coast men such as
McGuinness and Grieve who were well aware of Glasgow's problems, was at
first less inclined towards confrontation with the Housing Committee.
This may have been partly a result of a naive assumption that the
Committee would play the multi-storey game according to the rules
vs
defined by the planners, by building largely in the Comprehensive
Development Areas: a limited amount of CDA activity and accompanying
discussion was thus useful to Gibson, to distract attention from the
real thrust of his programme. Some DHS Architects, on the other hand,
attempted to offer more vociferous opposition. Cross's aim of
neutralising any obstruction from them was assisted by the existing
tension, not to say hostility, over Glasgow high flats within the
Department between Administrators and Housing Architects. These
concerned matters such as the supposedly slapdash handling of
correspondence from Jury by the Architects, and their attempts at
'child's guide' vetting of proposals, even those emanating from the
SSHA. It seems that, at first, the DHS Architects genuinely did not
appreciate the violence of the storm which was about to break about
their heads. In their appraisal of proposals, some initially adopted a
jocularly patronising attitude to Gibson's emerging housing policy: 'It
is doubtful if much serious planning damage would be done by letting the
Housing Committee loose in this area'. The DHS-SSHA Joint Development
Unit, at its foundation in 1959, was given the opportunity to assume
responsibility for several of Cross's suburban multi-storey sites, but
its architects flatly turned these down and demanded instead central
'high density' sites in which multi-storey blocks would be more
'appropriate'. Then, when several such sites were offered to them,
these in their turn were scornfully rejected as being too piecemeal in
character, unsuitable for an architect-designed 'comprehensive' scheme.
Under the apparent impression that, if they turned down a site, the
Housing Committee would then respectfully leave it vacant for all time,
the JDU architects dismissed, for instance, the Wellfield Street and
Bluevale Street sites (part of future CDAs proposed by the planners):
'This site is not suitable for the group as it would be unfortunate to
prejudice a comprehensive redevelopment... by casually filling in an
arbitrary gap'. Ironically, of course, the Wellfield Street site was
then offered to Matthew, with the consequences already outlined above.
From 1961, however, the DHS Architects rapidly became aware of their
exposed, not to say impotent position. On the one side, the Housing
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Progress Officer's first big package-deals were beginning to funnel
through; on the other side, even more extravagant ideas were gushing
from that rival power-source, the DLO-Bunton axis, Architects such as
Stuart Gourlay could hardly conceal their rage when Bunton triumphantly
came through to a meeting with DHS at York Place carrying an initial 35-
storey model of the proposed development at Red Road, Balornock. With
or without the Architects' approval, Glasgow's housing drive was
accelerating into top gear, as massive multi-storey blocks began to
sprout from sites all over the city - including those shunned by the
Joint Development Unit (thus, two 31-storey blocks at Bluevale Street,
two 26-storey Reema blocks at Wellfield Street). It was now that open
conflict began to flare, with the initiative being taken not by the
designers (as in the case, say, of Cleeve Barr and Salford) but by
Cross. His increasingly confident denigration of design and designers
was indiscriminate, directed at the ideas of Gropius as much as those of
Osborn: the Housing Progress Officer was only, of course, familiar (even
at the most superficial level) with the values and language of the
relatively early Moderns, up to around 1950. To the DHS designers, it
seemed intolerable enough that Glasgow's programme was in key respects
being shaped by an engineer, who was set on building as many multi¬
storey blocks as he could, on any site, in defiance of the most basic
principles of design or planning. But, worse still, this man had the
effrontery to argue back, even to poke fun at their careful comments and
objections. The focus of most conflicts between Cross and the DHS
architects was the latter's appraisals of Glasgow schemes. A contractor
recalls, 'He'd say, "We're Glasgow, we're the biggest, we're not going
to be shoved around by little tinpot architects in Edinburgh!" Then
you'd get the Department's people taking the architect line back,
standing on their dignity: "Upstart Cross!", and so on. But Lewis was a
man of action - he had no time whatever for people like that!' A
typical case was that of Wimpey's proposals for Scotstoun House and
Lincoln Avenue. In June 1961, the DHS architect Stuart Gourlay prepared
a memorandum demanding numerous small changes in Wimpey's plans, on
grounds that there had been neglect of various accepted 'standards' of
Modern design: he pointed to alleged space shortage, lack of kitchen
equipment, cramped dwelling plans, blocks set too close together,
insufficient daylight, inadequate fire-escape provisions, and so forth.
He highlighted the fact that there had been no full architectural
briefing as a key cause of various 'shortcomings' in design. True to
his refusal to dilute package deals by 'briefing', Cross did not even
bother to reply to this memo. Instead, he sent Wimpey a sarcastic
commentary on it, with a copy to DHS Administrators. The Modern
architectural 'standard' that high blocks should be set in light, open
settings, was flippantly tossed aside: ' I do not see, with the panoramic
views they get, why the higher flats should not be just as close as four
storey blocks'. As for overshadowing: 'this sort of thing is accepted
by the majority of Glasgow folk - in fact they seem to enjoy it'. In
response to Gourlay's assertion that omission of a wash tub would have
to be approved by the Medical Officer of Health, Cross quipped that
'this is as much outside the province of the Medical Officer of Health
as the question of whom in the Corporation administration structure we
consult is outside the province of the Department of Health' . When a
copy of this report eventually reached Gourlay, he exploded in
frustration: 'The tone of his letter is even more needling than we have
come to expect of him of late. . . there would seem to be something very
wrong with an engineer expressing opinions on matters, some of which are
very largely those of design, acting as a progress office:—cum-postbox
and behaving in what can only be described as a high-handed fashion!'
By 1961, therefore, it had become starkly obvious to architects and
planners - Government or municipal, public or private - that the
alliance of designers and sympathetic Administrators which had seemed so
strong only a few years before, was now, suddenly and unexpectedly,
fighting for its life: 'We were nearly having apoplexy every week!' Now
an alternative alliance, between Gibson, Cross and Kelly, was making
much of the running. In 1961, indeed, Kelly went so far as to openly
condone Cross's rule-bending, and hailed ' the energetic approach of the
Housing Committee to the solution of Glasgow's immense problem... the
Committee are scouring the city for sites and building on them at the
highest density they can get away with. ' 27
If Cross's inexorable pursuit of site 'yield' laid the groundwork for
the City's great surge in output of Modern housing, his relentless
negotiating and monitoring of contracts ensured that the sites concerned
were filled with dwellings as rapidly as possible. To him, Gibson's
turn to multi-storey building seemed a heaven-sent opportunity to break
the grip of the DLO and the local consortium; the latter's members had
shown themselves ill-prepared for rapid high-flat construction in such
schemes of around i960 as Blairdardie South, Dougrie Road and
Hutchesontown ' B'. Cross aimed instead to bring in efficient firms from
outside the West Coast, even outside Scotland, without departing from
Glasgow's tradition of negotiated contracts. In this context, there was
no place for such ideas as architectural oversight of the building
process, detailed architectural briefing of contractors, or LCC-style
authority-contractor 'teamwork'. All of these Cross rejected as
weakening the authority's hand in negotiation with the contractor - a
view which was only reinforced by the delays and overspending of the
Spence and Matthew Hutchesontown schemes. Here Cross's attitude was
diametrically opposed to that of, say, North in West Ham, who was so
concerned to maintain power over design that he was prepared to
seriously compromise his negotiating position on production. Cross saw
design not just as an irrelevance, but as a potential obstruction to his
unfettered decision-making authority in what he regarded as the truly
vital area of contract negotiation. Accordingly, he rejected even the
approach favoured by Leeds, Sheffield and, later, Maudsley in Birmingham
- repeat contracts to standard Departmental designs, on the basis of
layouts prepared by the authority's architects - as this seemed to him
to represent an insufficient segregation of the responsibilities of
client and builder.
Package-deal competition was, instead, Cross's preferred approach. He
would specify the numbers required on each site, at a figure which often
made difficult any pattern other than 100% multi-storey blocks, but
otherwise would allow contractors complete freedom. This, he hoped,
would attract as many firms as possible - national, local, or consortia
of both - to invest in initial contracts. Then he could monitor their
performance and weed out those which failed to come up to his standards
of efficiency and punctuality. In this way, a range of reliable
contractors would be established, as the basis for a long-term
programme. Initially, Cross had some difficulty in persuading the
Committee to admit outside firms, especially English contractors: 'Lewis
took the Committee with him, though they didn't like it at times - an
Englishman among Scots! But he had a dilettantish way of speaking, he
made jokes with them. A very blunt man, but very charming - he could
get away with telling them, "You're a load of fools!"' 2S
Among 'national' firms hoping to break into the closed Glasgow market
through multi-storey building, Wimpey had already got something of a
head start, through excellent progress at Royston 'A'. This initial
contract had been secured through negotiation in 1958-9. Wimpey had
previously tried, vainly, to get into the Glasgow 'consortium',
suggesting the building of experimental point-blocks based on its
Kirkcaldy and Birmingham ' Y' plan prototypes. By 1958, however, with
large-scale multi-storey building in Glasgow now being energetically
advocated by prominent councillors, the firm had tried its luck again.
The firm's Scottish Principal Architect at the time, Tom Smyth,
recollects:
'I went along to Glasgow one day with our Public Relations Officer,
Brigadier Prentice, a highly respected man - he got the front door open
to many town halls! He knew Macpherson-Rait tan influential Progressive
Party ex-Housing Convener], who felt that the City was having problems
with its proposed multi-storey housing - it hadn't really got off the
ground! The prototype scheme, Moss Heights, was plagued by problems and
scandals, and the Glasgow consortium were ganging up to shut out other
firms. Through his good offices, we had an off-the-record interview
with Jury. He asked us what we could do for Glasgow. So we did some
work at our own risk, and designed a new point-block type. Then finally
we were asked to submit a scheme for Royston A'.
Wimpey was the first 'national' firm to leap aboard Glasgow's multi¬
storey bandwagon, and gave the latter, in its turn, a further powerful
push,
The opening of this first crack in the armour of the consortium had been
a matter of haute politique within the Corporation, although Cross gave
the decision every encouragement, From that point on, however, he
decisively took the initiative, riding roughshod over DHS's worries
about building-industry overheating and excessive costs, and lured a
range of other large firms to enter the Clydeside housebuilding market.
This led, for instance, to the construction of Reema and Bison
precasting factories: the latter was built as part of a very large
contract negotiated in 1961 by Cross, against the opposition of DHS
Housing Architects, for the staged construction of nearly a thousand
dwellings at Pollokshaws CDA Unit 2. 30 (Ills. 75, 76)
In July 1961 Cross crisply summed up the initial progress of his hard-
headed multi-storey negotiating strategy:
'We have a number of package deals and negotiated tenders for large
projects under way, for whole multi-storey schemes and for frames only.
All of them except two are initial projects. I think that all these
agencies must prove themselves capable of getting reasonable progress
and costs on these large initial schemes before getting repeat orders.
The aforementioned two exceptions are Lincoln Avenue and Scotstoun
House, which are repeat orders negotiated with Wimpey because of their
good progress and costs for Royston A. Even in this case a repeat of
this firm's previous good performance is to my mind an essential
prerequisite for a further repeat order. The only reasonable exception
to this general rule, to my mind, is where a contractor offers a site.'
Wimpey's Tom Smyth expressed it more succinctly: 'Lewis would say, "If
you want work, you've got to get your finger out!"' 31
Within five years, a 'stable' of reliable contractors had been
established, leaving Cross and his successor as Depute Housing Officer
(from 1965), James Kernohan, in a position of almost unconstrained power
over the builders - the very reverse of the picture claimed by Dunleavy.
Kernohan recalls: 'I had five large-panel firms situated round the
perimeter of Glasgow - all sitting on my doorstep demanding a chance to
build flats!... What Glasgow wanted, it got!' While Cross was all the
time working to expand the share of private contractors at the expense
of that of the DLO, the former were by no means exempt from
organisational problems. In his attempt to play the local and
'national' firms against one another, Cross had to balance the generally
lower productivity, the conservatism and the higher costs of the
Clydeside builders against English firms' unfamiliarity with Scottish
building regulations and conditions. Within his most favoured group of
contractors, Wimpey remained 'in a class of their own', followed by the
75 Pollokshaws CDA Unit 2 during construction (1965): Concrete
Limited's first really large contract for 'Bison' multi-storey
construction. This scheme, built from 1961, was a precursor to the
firm's Wall-Frame 'system'.
Pollokshaws CDA, seen in 1989, Unit 2 occupies the foreground;
Unit 1 (four point blocks, background) was built from 1966 in full
Wall-Frame construction.
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forceful East Coast-based Scots firm Crudens, and, some way behind,
Concrete (Scotland); but other large 'national' English firms such as
Tersons and Laing, unfamiliar with Scotland, performed indifferently and
won few or no further contracts. 3:2
Even in the case of his established contractors, however, Cross was all
the time careful to maintain near-absolute control. He dealt with each
personally and in isolation, and kept them all in ignorance of his land
bank. Smyth recalls that 'we never discussed any overall programme.
Each site came out of the blue, was almost a job by that stage, Cross
would ring up: "We've got a site, there's going to be multi-storeys on
it, can you do it?"' Cross's briefing technique with contractors, and
his scrutiny of the resulting drawings, were both quite simple: 'He'd
give you an Ordnance Survey map and he'd say, come back in a month!
Then all he did when I produced a layout with say five multi-storeys -
he just looked at the box with the figures in the corner, took out his
slide rule and if it was wrong he'd just finish a meeting there and then
- he'd say, "Come back when you've got it right!" His attitude was,
"You are the designers!"' In the case of gap sites, Cross might string
several contractors along for a while and then without warning drop all
but one. Smyth again: 'He would never tell you he was negotiating with
someone else about a job. Management would hit the roof and say,
"Someone else has got that big multi-storey job! How did that happen -
you're in touch with Lewis Cross!" I'd say, "He's the last person to
tell me!"' 33
In the case of large staged developments, Cross might reach an initial
informal understanding with a single firm and would then feed the job
section by section, in order to keep as much control as possible. Such
a case was Crudens's Sighthill development, a majestic array of ten 20-
storey slab blocks in the stark setting of a reclaimed chemical
wasteground. This job arrived from Cross in the usual precipitate
manner. George Bowie, Crudens's former Chief Architect, recollects:
'My Managing Director came along with a piece of tracing paper, with
what turned out to be the final shape of Sighthill on it, and a scale -
it was ridiculous! - and he said, "How many dwellings can you put on
this site?" I replied, "You've got access roads, daylight and sunlight
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77 Councillor David Gibson and George Bowie, Chief Architect of
Crudens Ltd., inspect a model of Cranhill Extension development in
1962. This scheme, comprising three 18-storey blocks and low
flats, was built from 1963. Development of the site, a former
industrial wasteground acquired by Crudens, was rapidly pushed
through to compensate for delays in the preparation of the much
larger Sighthill site.
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to consider!" He said: " Just put rnultis on it and some low rise." So
in a day I knocked together some thoughts, and then he asked, "Could you
make a model?" I said, "There's nothing to make a model of!" But we
put together this thing with matchboxes, and he went away with it. A
few days later, he took me over to Sighthill in his Jag, and asked,
"What do you think?" I said, "Jesus Christ!!"' [Then the project]
'went on ahead, and when the first multis were done, providing we
weren't naughty boys, there were several phases. So. . . [in due course]
you'd say, "It's about time we were thinking of Phase 3, Mr Cross".
He'd say, "Just leave it with me", then he'd ring up one day and say "If
I were you I should be putting in Phase 3 submissions now!"' 3rf (Ills.
77-79)
But there was one substantial area of contracting policy which Cross
could not bring under his control: the activity not of private firms
but, ironically, of the DLO, a separate department of the Corporation,
Arguably, he derived some benefit from the fact that he was unable to
influence DLO operations: its incessant overspending scandals and its
bull-in-china-shop approach to organisational or technical matters
provided him with a bogeyman-figure which he could use in attempts to
secure a maximum share for private contractors in multi-storey building.
However, the scandal to crown all DLO scandals - the saga of the
colossal Red Road development, built in 1962-9 - itself sprang from the
turn to multi-storey construction, and from the anxiety of the DLO
Manager, George Campbell, not to be excluded from high building. Red
Road originated in Campbell's fear that Gibson's turn to multi-storey
building might lead to large-scale redundancy among bricklayers and
might begin to undermine and destroy his department's patronage and
power base. Campbell was deeply impressed, but also worried by what he
termed the 'literally fantastic' progress made by Wimpey at Royston 'A'.
He anxiously pressurised Gibson that he should be allowed to devise a
'package-deal' of his own, in collaboration with Sam Bunton, a second
local architect and some of the consortium firms. Although Campbell was
an ostentatious supporter of the City's entrenched Labour Party elite,
Gibson's own relations with the DLO were, to say the least, delicate:
his ILP background distanced him from the Corporation's Labour Group and
trade-union establishment. Gibson was torn between his idealistic
opposition to large private contractors, his impatience with the
inefficiency of the DLO, and his exasperation at the slowness of
78 Gibson examines proposed and existing views of Sighthill at his
home, 5 Cardowan Road (1961). The vast and desolate Tennant 'soda
waste' was redeveloped in 1963-9 with 10 massive, parallel 20-
storey slabs (instead of the point blocks originally envisaged),
and several lower buildings, containing a total of almost 2, 500
dwellings.
 
traditional contractual methods. Bunton's involvement may also have
roused the Convener's suspicions that this project might generate much
more controversy than quickly-let table housing. By 1961, however, the
threat to bricklaying jobs, and the more general temporary reduction in
completions during the changeover to multi-storey building, had left him
in a position of some political weakness. Therefore, despite
misgivings, Gibson yielded to Campbell's pressure, and the prototype DLO
scheme, at Red Road, rapidly turned into a major project in its own
right. 35 (111. 80)
At Red Road, it was soon discovered that poor site conditions had
limited the area of the site suitable for building. In 1962, following
pressure from the local steel industry, Bunton, sensing an opportunity
to 'build the highest blocks in Europe', suggested the jettisoning of
the original plans to build modest crosswall structures. Instead, he
now projected a mighty outcrop of steel-framed towers between 26 and 31
storeys in height. The autonomous status of the DLO prevented Gibson,
Jury or Cross from bringing Campbell to heel as the project steadily
escalated - athough Gibson valiantly fought to keep control during the
development stage: 'He made sure Red Road went through the Corporation
like a dose of salts!' The exclusion of Jury's staff from involvement
at Red Road could hardly have displeased Cross: in view of the project's
control by Bunton and Campbell, he might have seen it as doomed from the
start. However, the calamitous delays and overspending which later
overtook Red Road were the result not only of its magnificent scale and
experimental nature, but also of the fact that the scheme was, according
to the anonymous testimony of former Corporation officials,
systematically made into a scapegoat to conceal wider DLO deficiencies:
'The millions of feet of copper pipe that disappeared off that job...
every day, materials arrived at our site on a lorry, were signed for,
and went straight out of the gate at the other side off to another
site!' Unfortunately, there is now no way of conclusively proving or
disproving these allegations, as the DLO site records for the whole pre-
1975 period - three roomfuls of files and card indexes in the basement
of the District Council Building and Works Department's George Street
headquarters - were removed and destroyed several years ago. By the
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80 Red Road development, seen almost completed In 1969,
merest coincidence, this happened the very day after I was granted
access to them by the Town Clerk, for the purposes of this research!
Even the cursory glance at the Red Road files which I was permitted,
before they disappeared, showed a project in total chaos from beginning
to end, with the architects and the DLO management constantly at
loggerheads over the cause of its problems. At any rate, from the mid
1960s the DLO, chastened by the Red Road debacle, scaled down its
expectations. Its bricklayers and the City's architectural staff now
satisfied themselves with new, more modestly scaled types: deck-access
blocks for redevelopment areas, and an 8-storey 'Block 84' point-block
for gap-sites, both in loadbearing brick, and a 22-storey 'SSSB' slab-
block built by Leggat (r,c. frame), and DLO (the rest). 3e
There was no hard-and-fast demarcation line between Gibson's and Cross's
responsibilities. But the latter remained the organisational mainstay
of the building programme - not least because he alone could stand up to
the Convener's passionate argumentation: 'They had some blazing rows!'
Cross's everyday circumstances - his avoidance of public life in order
to look after a handicapped wife, his journeys to work or site meetings
on a small sputtering motor-scooter - were characterised by a degree of
asceticism, not dissimilar (as will be shown below) to that of Gibson's
own lifestyle. While the Housing Progress Officer left design work and
layouts to contractors or his own architectural and engineering
subordinates, he and Gibson all the time worked closely on the 'tactics'
of defining, negotiating and pushing through schemes: 'Gibson would
discuss everything in detail with Lewis Cross. There's no doubt Lewis
would say to him, "If you do this, you can get X number of houses here"
- and then Gibson would say to him, "All right, go ahead!" They lived
in each other's pockets for years!' 37
It was ironical that Cross should have played such a trenchantly anti-
designer role in Glasgow, in view of the fact that the point and slab
blocks which he forced through were types which, only a decade
previously, had been devised and vigorously promoted by the most avant-
garde public housing architects in London! His position in Gibson's
housing drive was antithetical to that of Matthew's designers, who
insisted above all on individual architect design for each site. With
his package deals and gap sites, his meticulous black notebooks and
filing systems, his 'languid style... with steel beneath', Cross's
ascendancy represented the triumph of action over socio-stylistic
debate, and of ' roads and sewers' over Architecture. 3e
2?
BREAKTHROUGH!
In the political arena, the only criticism of Gibson's multi-storey
revolution came, at first, from those arch-apostles of Osbornite
decentralism, Dollan (in 1959) and Mann (in 1960). The old ILP 'rebel'
seized with relish a golden opportunity to slap down his Labour
adversary of the 'thirties, by pointing to the land profligacy of her
cottage estates: 'I don't want to be uncharitable, but Mrs Mann should
remember that she was housing Convener at a time when we should have
been foreseeing these things'. But by late 1961 and early 1962, as a
result of the continuing shortfall in completions during the changeover
to multi-storey flats, public unease was growing, and Gibson's postbag
was bulging with letters crying for action. For instance, a slum-
dweller in Whiteinch pleaded with him to 'demolish prefabs all over the
city, get on with the high flats - never mind gardens. Homes are what
the people want. Let us see some action in 1962 for God's sake, and let
mothers have peace of mind with a decent home!' As a result, although
now offered the chance he had been waiting for all his life - a
Parliamentary nomination, at Bridgeton - he turned it down to see
through his reforms in Glasgow. 351
By this stage, although Gibson was by nature animated and gregarious,
his untiring pursuit of his housing strategy, and the myriad individual
housing problems of his constituents, had gradually drawn him into a
life of gruelling endurance. Other than periods helping out in his
wife's Springfield Road sub-post office, or carrying out his occasional
duties as a magistrate, his weekdays were spent at the City Chambers
until late at night. 'He cut himself off, didn't occupy himself with
anything else, even eating - just cups of tea, with plenty of sugar'...,
' He was a very heavy smoker and ate next to nothing - all David ever had
was tea. At night he'd come home starving and I'd make him a plate of
porridge'. Early mornings, late nights and weekends were spent driving
round in his old car, checking on the progress of existing sites and
prospecting for new ones: 'Glasgow is facing a shortage of land, and I
spend my weekends looking round the city for gap-sites and any odd bit
of land that we can put a house up on'. . . . ' My idea of fulfilment is to
372,
draw up the car and see the lights of Knightswood or some other scheme
shining out and think of all the families translated from gloom to
happiness! '
During 1962, the Housing Committee launched itself into the building of
very high blocks, on a scale never seen before anywhere in Britain. In
that year, contracts for 30 blocks of 20 or more storeys were commenced
or let in the City, containing 3,783 flats - well over half the
cumulative total of dwellings in blocks of such height, built or
authorised to that date in the whole UK! Throughout the year, Gibson
relentlessly forced through scheme after scheme, wearing down often
coordinated opposition from SDD architects and planners. For instance,
in April, despite vehement protests from the planners, he wrested
approval for a large development of high blocks and other flats at
Toryglen North, on a site immediately adjacent to railway sidings, clay
workings and a refuse destructor. In meetings with Housing
Administrators, he had successfully pressed the argument that the
inadequacies of the expanded-town overspill programme made it
'absolutely essential' to develop Toryglen North, even if the physical
setting of that project was inimical to what he perceived as basic
'standards' of Modern design. Although seemingly torn (in a way that
Cross would not have been) between a 'practical' eagerness to get on
with building and an idealistic yearning to break absolutely free from
the reality and the image of the 'slums', he still resolutely came down
in the end on the side of output: 'The Convener emphasised that...
Glasgow in its present shortage of sites could not afford the luxury of
avoiding the development of places like Toryglen North. Glaswegians had
been accustomed to living within walking distance of industry and would
tolerate similar conditions in their new houses. While he appreciated
the ideals motivating the criticism of the Toryglen North site, he said
that as a practical man he must bear in mind that conditions there, if
not ideal, were infinitely better than those being endured by the
families living in slums'. 41
By August 1962, SDD was becoming aware that this tremendous burst of
contract-letting had pushed Glasgow's housing drive past the point of
breakthrough, in numbers reaching tender stage: production was now well
back on course (2, 900 since January 1962 compared with only 803 in the
whole of 1961). But, in the political world, the figures which mattered
were those of completions. As it emerged that completions for 1962
would drop below 2,000 for the first time since 1947, heated debates
flared in Glasgow, within the Labour Group, the City Labour Party and
elsewhere, In May 1963, Gibson stood for the Group leadership in
competition with William Taylor, a man who, although firmly committed to
tackling the city's slums, was also particularly sympathetic to the
cause of regional planning and decentralism. The shortfall in
completions undermined Gibson's argument for a self-contained, rather
than regional solution to Glasgow's housing problems - and Taylor won
the contest. (ill. 81) By autumn 1963, however, the rapid progress of
his first big schemes had brought about a miraculous about-turn in
Gibson's political and public standing. In September a public talk he
gave at Perth Street School on the Anderston Cross redevelopment
proposals drew over 400 'eager, excited people' rather than the 20
expected, leading him to comment that ' you'd have thought there were
tickets for the Real Madrid-Rangers game on sale!' With a five-year
programme of 30,000 starts now firmly in prospect, two-thirds of which
were multi-storey flats, prospects for Glasgow's Housing Committee now
once again appeared bright.
William Taylor
1963), seen in




SCOTLAND: SPREAD OF THE MUNICIPAL 'CRUSADE'
By 1963, Glasgow's multi-storey programme was now well established.
Therefore, Gibson's mind was increasingly able to range further afield.
Having renounced a Parliamentary career the year before, the direction
of his thinking was now obvious: to disseminate across Central Scotland
his own uncompromising strategy of multi-storey building within existing
municipal boundaries. Not surprisingly, this wider vision of a Central
Scottish public housing drive was diametrically opposed to the grandiose
proposals of regional reconstruction then evolving within SDD. Where
the Department's mandarins believed in a 'rationally' planned solution
to be imposed on the obsolete old towns, Gibson envisaged a municipally-
based housing strategy, to be built from the foundations upwards, by
drawing in other production-minded cities and large burghs. While many
SDD planners saw locally-based housing as an awkward anachronism, he and
his counterparts in other burghs viewed planning as little more than an
embellishment, extraneous to what seemed their principal task of
physical development - the building of dwellings.
The chief forum of this municipal world-view was the annual conference
of the Scottish National Housing and Town Planning Council at the
Peebles Hydropathic. In 1964, Gibson was appointed conference chairman.
Although this was normally a ceremonial position, he used his opening
address to launch a withering denunciation of SDD's emergent regional
planning policy: the Department, he asserted, was 'floundering around in
White Papers and hot air!' Mercilessly, he exposed the anti-municipal
assumptions underlying the notion of centrally-planned economic growth:
'Unless it pays the people of Scotland, it's a dead loss! The Central
Scottish programme for development and growth is based on 'growth
points' - that's good, indeed marvellous if your town happens to be a
'growth point' ! But few if any would relish living in the towns and
burghs for whom the bell tolls, and... which are to see only decay and
stagnation!' It was now obvious that Gibson was moving rapidly from a
defensive to an offensive stance. Having blocked the planners' advance
within Glasgow by launching a multi-storey drive which symbolised
municipal power and decision-making autonomy, in the face of external
S?4
82 Muirhouse Area development, Motherwell; 18-storey point blocks and
low flats built from 1964- by Wimpeyj photographed in 1989. The
most ambitious achievement of Hutchison Sneddon's period as Housing
Convener and leader of the Burgh Council. Also visible at left are
several blocks of the Flernington Area development, built by Wirapey
from 1966. The Ravenscraig steelworks is seen in the background.
Ill
83 Motherwell, Parkhead Street/Macdonald Street development, seen c.
1963, A 17-storey steel-framed slab block, built by Crudens (with
a local steel consortium, MSC, as structural subcontractors).
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pressures, he was looking to spread this gospel to other towns. If a
locally-based housing countei—strategy could be sparked off throughout
Central Scotland, there beckoned the opportunity of knocking away one of
the main supports of the entire regional planning movement. A'3
This plan was helped by the relative absence of tension between Glasgow
and the other major Clydeside towns - a situation which resulted from
the Corporation's lack of interest, during the first three postwar
decades, in obtaining boundary extensions. (Map 1) As no other
authority in Scotland faced planned overspill or wholesale sterilisation
of building land, there would be little difficulty in rapidly cranking
up output outside Glasgow. So once his own programme had begun to seem
assured, Gibson was able to begin building up a degree of direct
influence over housing in Clydeside and beyond, in collaboration with a
handful of other politicians. Of these men, the most energetic and
original was Hutchison Sneddon, Motherwell's Council Leader and Convener
of Housing from 1960. Sneddon pushed through a house-by-house survey of
the entire Burgh, followed by redevelopment of a swathe of land
immediately to the south and east of the town centre. At the same time,
decanting was secured by the building of a 1, 344-dwelling suburban
scheme, including seven 18-storey point-blocks, in 1963-4 by Wimpey at
Muirhouse, the Burgh's last virgin site. AA (111. 83)
Gibson, Sneddon and the housing 'leaders' of the other major Clydeside
authorities were in constant contact. 'All these people were on very
familiar terms - we were friends, we picked up the telephone, we talked
- I was always invited to the Glasgow housing inspection, for instance!'
In the view of one senior SDD Housing Administrator, 'These were the
leaders of their generation!'. The only large burgh that stood apart to
a certain degree was Paisley: this was because of its extreme proximity
to the City and the influence of its redoubtable Burgh Engineer, John
McGregor, remembered by one contractor as 'greatly feared... one of
those chaps with a red light at his door!'. However, Paisley, along
with the others, joined in Gibson's great initiative of October 1963,
the establishment of the Scottish Local Authorities Housing Group
(SLASH). He hoped and anticipated that SLASH would propagate multi-
y)?
storey building throughout Central Scotland, and increase Scottish
housing output by 10% while further blunting the impact of the Clyde
Valley Plan: 'No-one is going to invest money in a factory to build
component parts unless he has a steady demand. Our Group will give this
guarantee.'
Despite the East-West divide, the effect of Gibson's campaign spread
like wildfire across the country, through initiatives such as the
founding of SLASH, or through his chairmanship of the annual Peebles
conference. In Edinburgh, for instance, as a result of a politically-
deadlocked Town Council, the housing chair passed in 1962 for the first
time to a Labour member, Councillor Pat Rogan. He was a bricklayer who
shared Gibson's unswerving conviction that tearing down the slums and
directly rehousing their occupants was an overruling moral necessity,
and who greatly admired the daring of initiatives such as Red Road in
attacking Glasgow's problems head-on. The Corporation's somewhat meagre
previous output, which repeatedly slipped below 1,000 annual
completions, had left Edinburgh a substantial legacy of 18th and 19th-
century slums in Leith and elsewhere: their clearance was not
facilitated by the early growth of conservationist ideas within the
municipal establishment. As a result the waiting list had shot up from
6,000 in 1958 to a peak of 11,000 in 1964. In opposition, Rogan had
constantly harried the Corporation on behalf of his Holyrood ward
constituents, seeking demolition and rehousing. In 1959, for instance,
he had secured the declaration of two major clearance areas (Carnegie
Street Areas 'A' and 'B'), and the rehousing of 101 families in nine
days following a gable-end collapse in Beaumont Place: 'It was a
magnificent thing to watch, as I did many times, whole streets of
tenements being demolished! ' It may be that some among the Progressives
had tolerated Rogan's accession to the housing chair in 1962 in the
expectation that he would be unable to come up with the results
necessary to fulfil his earlier fiery rhetoric in opposition, and that
he would therefore fall flat on his face. If this was the case, they
were to be disappointed. The moment he took office, Rogan decisively
seized the initiative. He found that the Progressives' reluctance to
build had a silver lining for him: their financial cautiousness had left
no
84 Councillor Pat Rogan, Edinburgh Corporation Housing Committee
Chairman, seen c. 1965 in front of St, Margaret's Church, Arthur
Street clearance area. This redevelopment, Rogan's own brainchild,
was delayed by wrangling with SDD over the size of blocks, and with
the Cockburn Association concerning the demolition of this church.
SAl
85 Tour of slum housing at Jamaica Street, Edinburgh, by Harold Wilson
(when Leader of the Opposition), on 2 April 1964: walking beside
Wilson is Pat Rogan (then Housing Chairman).
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arnple scope for the substantial rises in rate-fund contributions
necessary to support a sudden acceleration in the City's housing drive.
There was little land problem, as Edinburgh had the most extensive
'prefab* estates in the country. There were 24 sites, on which 3,616
bungalows were removed and replaced by 9,272 permanent houses, many in
high blocks, by 1967. Accordingly, in his single term of office, ending
in 1965, Rogan was able almost to treble the City's programme:
completions soared from 1,000 in 1962 to almost 3,000 in 1967. He also
took Edinburgh into SLASH in 1963 as a founder member. Edinburgh's
equivalent of Cross, Deputy City Architect (Housing) Harry Corner,
recalls that 'we had a wonderful book of contracts when Pat left the
chair!' After 1965, Rogan's Progressive Party successor as Chairman,
Councillor Adolf Theurer, proved keen, despite uncertain support from
his own party, to sustain momentum and enlist Rogan's advice and
assistance. ae- (Ills. 58, 84-87)
So as the 1960s wore on, a whole range of authorities in Central
Scotland was beginning to follow in Glasgow's wake, by commencing large
programmes dominated to varying degrees by high flats. Indeed, between
1963 and 1967, Scotland's per-capita rate of multi-storey building began
to catch up even with that of Greater London. This was a trend which
SDD Housing Administrators were only too glad to accommodate. Their
goodwill partly resulted from Ministers' political anxieties concerning
the housing figures - despite the continuing prominence of the rhetoric
of regional planning in the Department's public pronouncements.
Ministers were now firmly trapped in a cycle of dependence upon Gibson
and his counterparts, and Glasgow had begun to assume a degree of
hegemony over 'national' housing policy. By the early 1960s, the
campaign to push rents upwards had fallen fairly flat, and numbers were
just about the only policy left: 'The Tories were frightened - they'd
never tackled low rents! The one thing the Government could do was dole
out the multi-storey subsidy. . . and multi-storey flats were the symbol
of local-authority independence! '
But many civil servants, such as R. D. Cramond, Assistant Secretary in
charge of the Division handling public housing in the mid-' sixties, were
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86 Housing Progress Chart 1959-71, Edinburgh Corporation. The central
peaks of contracts let, and (2 years later) completions, directly
reflect the impact of Rogan*s housing drive in the City.
87 Wester Hailes, Edinburgh's last major peripheral site, developed
from 1967: 1987 view of Contract 4 (staircase access Bison blocks),
built from 1969.
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also influenced by an instinctive sympathy for Gibson's crusading
ideals: 'To someone coming out of the slums of the Gorbals or Leith -
and I was born in a tenement in Leith - the idea of going into a house
with a bathroom, a proper kitchen, hot water - it was the millennium for
them, it was their dream, and it didn't matter a b to them if it
was in a multi-storey block or a cottage - they wanted as many dwellings
as quickly as possible!' And whatever the personal views of
Administrators, there was the sheer practical difficulty of imposing any
contrary view, on even medium-sized municipalities - let alone Glasgow
Corporation! Cramond explains:
'In the Department, we were in a reactive situation... it wasn't for us
to tell the local authorities where to build houses - we put out
standards and subsidies but what they did was up to them. Authorities
built according to their inclinations, and most of the big authorities
were building hell for leather because that was the thing to do. I can
remember going through to Ayr Burgh. We'd rejected a tender for a
series of multi-storey blocks on the grounds that the price was
excessive, and I went through to explain to the Town Council. I was
filleted at that meeting! They pushed the argument: "We're building
houses for the people - we know what the people of Ayr want - why the
hell shouldn't we build in multi-storey, everybody else is! You're
holding us back, what's it to you if it costs too much?" I came out of
that meeting feeling as if I'd been put through the washing-machine and
wrung dry! And that was just Ayr! If we'd thrown out Red Road the
ceiling would've come in - we wouldnt*ve dared!'
1%
Glasgow's and Gibson's broad sphere of influence failed to encompass
only four important groupings of authorities within Scotland: the New
Towns, the larger County Councils, and the cities of Aberdeen and
Dundee. All these groupings, as a result, enjoyed a very substantial
degree of policy autonomy.
All the first four Scottish New Towns - East Kilbride, Cumbernauld,
Glenrothes and Livingston - built on a substantial scale in the 1960s,
but only the first two erected significant numbers of high flats. In
East Kilbride, these were mostly made up of small groups of Wimpey
point-blocks for higher-rent letting, inserted into existing estates in
1965-70. In Cumbernauld, high flats were envisaged from the start:
groups of Bison point-blocks, in Scandinavian-style forest landscaping,
were built on an escarpment along the north-west edge of the town, and 6
and 7 storey slab blocks were fitted into other areas. Most of the
remainder of Cumbernauld Development Corporation's housing was made up
of two-storey terraces of 'traditional' appearance - apart from, of
course, the 35 penthouse flats which crowned the acropolis-like town
centre megastructure, an isolated architectural tour de force designed
by Geoffrey Copcutt and built in 1963-7. (111. 88) The New Towns'
policies, being largely exempt from established local political
pressures, were influenced by professional groups (especially
architects) to a much greater extent than those of the municipalities.
Many of the County Councils maintained substantial and coordinated
housing programmes, in self-conscious isolation from the activities of
the large burghs and cities. In contrast to the hole-in-corner rural
housing of England, Wales and Northern Ireland (where the county
boroughs looked on the landward areas as glorified land-banks), the
Scottish counties viewed themselves as considerably higher in status
than the burghs dotted within their territory. The counties could only
build outside the boundaries of large burghs, and so clashes of the
London kind over concurrent powers did not occur: but there was more
than enough tension in other fields, such as education, where 'the
burghs were inclined to look on us as Big Brother!'
1*7
88 Cumbernauld New Town, view from east c. 1967. At centre, Town
Centre Phase 1 almost completed, Phase 2 under construction. In
background: low housing and Bison point blocks, Seafar and
Ravenswood areas.
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Lanark County Council was by far the most populous and powerful of the
big, Labour-controlled county authorities of Central Scotland. Under
the enterprising direction of Hugh Brannan, Housing Convener from 1958
and Council Leader from 1973, it embarked on much the most vigorous
housing drive of any rural or semi-rural area in the UK. Lanarkshire
regarded itself as a top-rank housebuilding authority, equal in
importance to Edinburgh, the SSHA, even Glasgow. The county was studded
with dilapidated mining villages, and its population was in slight
decline (although not, of course, subject to the threat of overspill).
Most active counties were pursuing programmes centred on the piecemeal
redevelopment of village slums with cottages and low flats, and the
building of new cottage schemes in villages or just outside burgh
boundaries. Lanarkshire, however, also built a number of multi-storey
blocks, all in the town of Cambuslang. This latter area, although
without burgh status, was represented on the Council by several forceful
members: they pressed with success for an 'urban renewal' town centre
redevelopment in 1963, including two Laing high blocks, and then
persuaded Brannan to authorise a package deal in 1967-8 for eleven 13-
storey point blocks. Here, Brannan had come under pressure from SDD to
join the consortium of Lanarkshire large burghs, with its bulk order for
Camus low and high blocks. He flatly refused, and instead secured a
separate package-deal with Reema (which, like Mitchell-Camus, also had a
precasting factory in Lanarkshire): 'I was approached, they tried to
draw me into it. But I said, as Housing Convener, "We're not
interested!" We had the means to deal with our own problems, on our
own!' In design terms, Brannan made sure there was a balance between
schemes designed by his own architectural staff (until 1968 under Samuel
McColl, County Housing Architect and Engineer; thereafter under D.G.
Bannerman, County Architect) with a high proportion of package deals. 50
Although its population was no higher than cities such as Coventry or
Leicester, Lanarkshire maintained a standing 2,000 annual target. By
1966, the Council had accumulated the eighth largest stock of postwar
local-authority housing in the United Kingdom (28,627 - only exceeded by
Birmingham, Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield and the
GLC). Then, in 1967-71, output shot up to an astonishing yearly average
of almost 2,200. After the County Council was abolished in the 1975
local-government reorganisation, Brannan was able to boast, with little
exaggeration, that 'we'd completely solved the housing problems of our
villages - we were housing young people a month or two after they'd
moved! You'd find it hard now to discover a "slum" in rural
Lanarkshire. We'd almost completely cleared the old miners' rows, and
most pre-World War I property that wasn't owner—occupied!' S1
The two smaller cities, Aberdeen and Dundee, also stood slightly apart
from the Glasgow-centred 'national' housing drive - not least because of
their geographical separateness. Neither was subject to overspill
pressure; indeed, both Tayside and the North-East were visualised by the
planning mandarins as 'growth' areas during the 1960s. The population
of both cities grew slightly in the years after the war - in the case of
Aberdeen, from 182,000 in 1951 to 186,000 in 1964, and, in that of
Dundee, from 177,000 to 185,000. Yet both started energetic multi¬
storey building campaigns during the 1960s and later - providing yet
further evidence of the by now 'routine' status of high flats.
Aberdeen's geographical isolation was exploited to the full, in any
negotiations with SDD, by its formidable City Architect, George Mcl.
Keith, who was a master at arguing for ad-hoc subsidy allowances on
grounds of the city's exposed climate. The acumen and 'sea-green
incorruptibility' of Councillor Robert Lennox, the longstanding City
Treasurer, laid exceptionally sound financial foundations for the city's
programme. Although Aberdeen had no overcrowding or slum problem on the
scale of Clydeside or Dundee, the Corporation's Housing Committee
(usually Labour-controlled but every so often led by the popular Tory
'Battling Baillie' Frank Magee), had nevertheless set their hearts on a
major multi-storey drive after visits to Roehampton and Glasgow in 1959.
Almost none of the city's high flats were package-deals: virtually all
were designed by Keith's staff and built by local contractors. There
were two distinct categories of type and location: suburban point block,
and slum-clearance slab block. The former group originated in 1959-61
with the isolated schemes at Ashgrove VIII and Mastrick 1, building up
to larger mixed developments at Hazlehead (explicitly modelled on
¥\o
Roehampton), Cornhill-Stockethill, and Tillydrone-Hayton; it culminated
in the Seaton development of 1969-74, which included 1, 247 multi-storey
flats. The inner slum-clearance schemes commenced with Chapel
Street/Skene Street in 1961 and built up to the massive 15 and 19-storey
blocks of the Hutcheon Street CDA (1973); all these were clad with
highly distinctive pebble-faced slabs and featured a very high level of
finish and services. In contrast to Dundee and large authorities in the
central belt, Aberdeen's only tangible 'housing problem' was its waiting
list. The Corporation's multi-storey drive slashed this from 7,300 in
1960 to 3,700 in 1971. Even so, the Housing Committee's most
'crusading' Convener, Councillor Jock Greig, would still from time to
time accost the Deputy City Architect: 'Here's a bit of ground, Tom, how
about a multi-storey here?' (111. 89)
The separateness of Dundee was slightly different in character. For the
city had long enjoyed (or suffered) a colourful reputation as 'the
Chicago of the North' , and its business community had 'learned to grit
its teeth against all the tired jokes from their counterparts the length
and breadth of Britain'. A former senior SDD Administrator quipped that
'you always took a witness when you went to Dundee!' Allegations
concerning rampant corruption in the allocation of contracts and sub¬
contracts for public building projects - the so-called 'Dundee Dossier'
- culminated in a much-publicised court case of 1980. But from the
point of view of this account, Dundee's racy reputation, whether
justified or not, is somewhat incidental. What is of much more
relevance is the striking fact that the city's Modern housing drive was
by far the most vigorous, in per capita terms, of any local authority
over 100,000 population in the United Kingdom. Over the years 1960-72,
Dundee's output per 1,000 population exceeded its nearest UK rivals
(Lanark County Council and Salford CBC) by 23% and 44% respectively;
during the city's most dynamic period of output, 1967-71, it bettered
the same two runners-up by 53% and 82%! 53
The story of Dundee's Modern housing provides an unparalleled
illustration of the way in which multi-storey blocks, originally
introduced to high-output use in the 1950s by authorities faced with the
3.^1
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menace of the 'land trap', could then be adopted by cities with no such
problems, purely and simply as a way of raising output. Although Dundee
had a severe slum problem, accentuated by the precipitous topography of
the inner areas overlooking the Tay, it had a plentiful supply of
peripheral building land within its boundaries: therefore the city had
the luxury of being able to provide for both a steadily rising
population, and vigorous slum-clearance. This fortunate situation had
resulted from the defeat of a postwar overspill proposal. Around 1950,
the removal of 17% of Dundee's population to 'satellite' towns had been
mooted by the Tay Valley Plan, a Tayside imitation of Abercrombie. But
the Corporation hit back immediately with an advisory plan prepared in
1952 by its own consultants, W. Dobson Chapman & Partners: this flatly
ruled out overspill, on grounds of the alleged unwillingness of industry
and working-class inhabitants to move. Instead, it advocated the zoning
of large peripheral housing areas within the city boundaries, which
would allow the entire population to be retained. Dobson Chapman's
recommendations were pushed through by the new City Engineer, John
Armour, and were incorporated in the city's Development Plan (approved
in 1959). S4
Dundee Corporation's 'turbulent' political life was characterised by a
relatively even balance between Labour and Moderates. Labour held power
from the mid-1950s until 1967, a period during which the Labour Group
was dominated by three exceptionally strong personalities, Bailie Harry
Dickson, Bailie James Stewart, and Councillor Tom Moore: the three
successively held the post of Housing Convener from 1959 to 1966, and
Dickson was Convener again for two years after Labour's return to power
in 1971. The combined political and executive power wielded by these
members can only be compared to that of Watton in Birmingham up to 1966:
in Glasgow terms, it amounted to a combination of Gibson and Cross. It
was made necessary, and was facilitated, by the understaffing and
frequent personnel changes in the City Architect's Department: here the
Corporation at one point even had to reappoint an elderly former City
Architect, Robert Dron, after five years' retirement.
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90 1988 aerial view of Dundee inner-area redevelopments: at lower left
the four 15-storey blocks of the Dallfield CDA (built from 1964 by
Scotcon), at centre the four 23-storey slabs of Maxwelltown CDA
(from 1965; Gray).
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Between the wars, and again in the 1950s, the City had maintained a high
level of output through suburban schemes of tenements and cottages, In
the late 1950s, however, the complicated process of slum-clearance was
looming on the horizon. Accordingly, Dundee's Labour triumvirate began
to consider multi-storey building - a policy already hinted at by Dobson
Chapman. Isolated blocks were erected during Dickson's Convenership, in
1959-62, and large-scale slum-clearance was got underway in the Hilltown
area. But the most daring steps were taken under Stewart and Moore
(Conveners 1962-4 and 1964-6 respectively). The controversial and
flamboyant Stewart represented a unique driving force on the Council:
'brilliant in debate, without equal in his municipal lifetime'. During
his Convenership a series of dramatic housing projects was undertaken:
these would treble the City's building rate from well below 1,000.
Preparations were undertaken for large schemes on CDA gap sites, such as
the four 23-storey towers of the Maxwelltown CDA, and the two massive
Camus blocks later built at Derby Street, towering above the Hilltown.
(111. 90) In the suburbs, several large multi-storey schemes were
awarded to Crudens - culminating in the six mighty 17-storey slab blocks
of the Ardler Phase I development, each of which contained no less than
298 flats!
f
Crudens occupied the pivotal position in Dundee's high-flat building
drive, as did Bryant in Birmingham. But the firm's in-situ building
capacity in Dundee was insufficient to satisfy the city's voracious
appetite for production in the mid-1960s. Therefore, as in the case of
Bryant and Bison, the firm offered a prefabricated supplement: a bulk-
order Skarne contract negotiated in 1966 by Moore. The Housing
Committee committed itself, all in all, to a 5, 000-dwelling addition to
'traditional' output, and confidently promised to build 'approximately
750 Crudens Skarne houses per annum... for as long as possible'. With
this assurance, the firm immediately put up a Skarne factory in the city
at Longhaugh Quarry. The following year, construction began of the
City's most prodigious housing project: Whitfield. This development was
built on a large area at the north-east edge of the city, adjacent to
Crudens's Skarne factory: the site, originally owned by the firm, was
transferred to the Corporation as part of the deal. Whitfield's
91 Whitfield Industrialised (Skarne) development, Dundee, built from
1968 by Crudens: 1967 perspective prepared by contractor.
'traditional' component, divided between Crudens, the DLO and local
builders, was substantial enough: 360 flats in two 16-storey slab blocks
and 1, 700 in low flats and cottages. But the scheme was dominated by
the two-stage Skarne contract, which was erected in 1968-72 along its
north side. This comprised over 130 deck-access blocks of 4, 5 and 6
storeys (containing 2,459 flats and maisonettes), arranged in an
extraordinary and relentless honeycomb pattern of hexagonal courtyards,
and dramatically juxtaposed with the stark moorland to its north. This
vast scheme was almost unparalleled in other municipal authorities of
Dundee's size. One could perhaps cite Ellor Street in Salford, but this
was a redevelopment scheme built over many years. Or there was Heath
Town in Wolverhampton and Aylesbury in Southwark, again redevelopments,
but built quickly: however, both authorities were considerably larger
than Dundee. On the basis of this audacious achievement, Dundee's
output surged to a tremendous maximum of 2,794 in 1970: 88% higher, in





During the mid 1960s, the Scottish public housing drive experienced a
sudden convulsion. This resulted in a change of leadership and of some
superficial features of policy, but nonetheless confirmed its principal
direction for a further decade.
This crisis was initially sparked off by a public controversy in Glasgow
over Gibson's high blocks, resulting from their sheer size and sudden
appearance, and their increasingly close association with slum clearance
tenants. It will be shown in a later chapter that the policy of
providing new dwellings for slum-clearance tenants, promoted by Gibson
and others, was eventually undermined by its own sheer success:
increasingly the diminishing political urgency of the 'housing problem'
cleared room for the management problems of the new blocks to come to
the fore. An early and ominous pointer towards this 'new slums' debate
occurred in 1963. It resulted from the Convener's policy of evading
density restrictions by slipping point blocks into suburban gap sites.
This had begun to threaten, for the first time, to colonise middle-class
areas with large groupings of slum-dwellers. The matter came to a head
in the case of Hillpark, a sedate area of bungalows where a proposal to
erect eight 26-storey point blocks by direct labour was refused in 1964
at public enquiry. This was the first time that the ' cartogram' method
of density determination outside the CDAs (which lumped new and existing
developments together in an overall area density) had seriously
rebounded against Gibson. As it happened, cartograms in previous areas
such as Knightswood had been very large, but the cartogram area in which
Hillpark was located was so small (264 acres) that the eight blocks
alone would have raised the cartogram density from 33 p.p.a. to 47
p.p.a.! No longer could the Convener assume that he simply needed to
stop his little car beside any scrap of suburban wasteground, wave his
magic Cross, and instantly turn the site into a planning 'black hole'
which would miraculously gobble up enormous multi-storey blocks without
anyone noticing. The scheme's articulate local opponents also put
forward arguments echoing Jean Mann's opposition to high flats on the
grounds of undesirable juxtaposition of the classes: 'They will
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naturally form themselves Into a separate community and resist
integration. They were going to be a different sort of people from
those who lived in houses with their own gardens. They would be people
coming from a different way of life, coming from Glasgow's tenements,
into houses which were the modern concept of the tenement. . this was an
attempt to mix oil and water... and is a bad planning project', Such
arguments now read somewhat ironically, in view of later critics'
contention that high blocks were responsible for the suppression rather
than the perpetuation of existing working-class 'community'!
In defence, Gibson chose not to emphasise the site-cramming potential of
high blocks, but, instead, borrowed standard Modern architectural
arguments. He claimed that the blocks were intended to provide the
clearest visual contrast to the old tenements, and to create the minimum
of overshadowing: the scheme represented 'the most intelligent and
tasteful use of the site... it had none of the solid foui—storey type of
development for which [the Committee] had been criticised in the past.
It used slender high blocks, so that there was minimum interference with
daylight, amenity, and privacy of the adjoining proprietors' . However,
the inquiry inspector turned down the scheme, and called for greater
planning control over Glasgow's programme.
Naturally, this sudden outbreak of public controversy and middle-class
political opposition to multi-storey flats shone a ray of hope on the
SDD and Corporation planners, who had been battling gamely, but with
little success, against Gibson's policy of unbridled high building. The
personal opposition of men such as Grieve, Wylie and Nicoll to massed
multi-storey blocks was of a visual, sociological and moral nature.
Grieve recalls his visceral feelings on the matter: 'I felt an
unscientific hatred of them and was looking for scientific material to
use against them: it was their appearance, they were inhuman!' At the
time, he asserted that 'too high a density is too high a cost in social
morality, in my opinion'. Now SDD and Corporation planners, with TCPA
support, began to assemble a new strategy to regain their lost ground
and, if possible, win even greater overspill. The promised rosy future
of decentralised 'regional' economic growth was pressed into service as
the basis for a new density 'league table' of 'competing' British
provincial centres, with Glasgow, as always, occupying the bottom of the
list. In truly Osbornite fashion, the 'competitive social environment'
required of Glasgow and the 'region' of Scotland in the new world of
economic development was defined by reference to the assumed preferences
or prejudices of the Chestertonian English 'common man': 'The problem...
is not the artificial nightmare of academic planners. It turns on what
people want or will accept... If Birmingham, Leeds and Sheffield do this
better than Glasgow, the best efforts of the Secretary of State to help
Glasgow to secure its proper place in the economy can be only very
partly successful... It may well be that, for the time being at least,
many Glaswegians like their flats, but we must not be misled by initial
acceptance on the part of people who have only emerged from the worst of
existing slums' . Implicit here was the assumption that the views of
Gibson's 'clients' , the slum-clearance tenants, were marginal; the new
norm was the skilled Midlands car-worker. Thus the schism between the
two sets of values, those of the planners and the housers, was further
deepened. Even the aim of output was implicitly criticised by the
argument that if, to get maximum production, it was necessary for this
to take the form of high blocks, this investment might be 'wasted' in
simply building ' new slums' . eo
If the housers had continued to enjoy Gibson's leadership, these
arguments might have been parried and the Hillpark setback reversed.
But a second, seemingly even more devastating blow to the Scottish
housing drive fell on March 27th 1964. On that afternoon, Gibson,
admitted to hospital for checks following chest pains, died suddenly of
a heart attack. This resulted directly not only from his lifetime
addiction to cigarette smoking, but also from the overwork of the
immediately preceding years. In the opinion of his Motherwell
counterpart, Hutchison Sneddon, 'he was very strict in respect of the
morality of people living in terrible conditions - typical ILP in his
absolute sincerity. He saw the clear need that this had to be altered,
and worked night and day to this end. Gibson killed himself trying to
solve Glasgow's housing problem!' Now not only his national initiative,
spearheaded by SLASH, but also even the continued massed building of
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multi-storey flats in Glasgow itself was suddenly thrown into question.
There followed a seven-month interregnum, during which the housing and
planning factions within SDD remained at odds over high flats; within
Glasgow Corporation, the planners marshalled their forces, housing
approvals plummeted and Cross stoically held the fort. s'
At the end of this period, the threat of a permanent decline in output
was averted, when a new leader of Scottish housing finally emerged,
eager and able to resume the Gibson 'crusade', in a modified form.
Following Labour's national election victory, Dr. J. Dickson Mabon was
appointed Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (junior Minister
with responsibility for SDD). (111. 93) To a greater extent even than
Mellish in London, Mabon was ceded autonomy in the conduct of housing
matters by the Secretary of State, William Ross. He won the immediate
admiration of housing Conveners of all political persuasions up and down
the country, not only for his infectious enthusiasm - 'a great little
guy!' - but for the fact that, perhaps uniquely among postwar Scottish
Housing Ministers, he had devised a coherent housing strategy, and was
absolutely determined to implement it. Like Sandys in England in the
mid-'50s, Mabon believed that output should be sustained, even expanded,
but that quantitative success made desirable some changes of emphasis.
62 Mabon's emergence seemed to reflect a shift in power over housing
from Glasgow back to the Government. In fact, however, the essential
features of Gibson's policy were preserved and in some ways even
reinforced.
Briefly, Mabon's plan was to redirect slightly the efforts of the
cities, to accommodate the planners' objections, but at the same time to
broaden the new housebuilding drive out from Glasgow and the central
belt into a 20% increase across the entire country. His overall target
was 50,000 completions a year by 1970, of which some 38-40,000 would
come from the public sector. In this he was not successful, but a
substantial increase was still recorded: between 1965 and 1968, public-
sector output rose from 27,500 to 33,500. Mabon's campaign, directed at
counties and burghs up and down the country, resembled Gibson's in
combining contemporary rhetoric - system building, five-year plan,
Dr. J. Dickson Mabon, Minister of State for Scotland, opens the
first house completed by Irvine Development Corporation (18
Ardmillan Square, Pennyburn) on 15 August 1969. Here Dr. Mabon is
seen with the first tenants, Mr. and Mrs. Taylor and Helen Taylor
(aged 5 months), and with the General Manager of the Development
Corporation.
SLASH, consortia, and so forth - with a continuing underlying reliance
on organisational and personal factors. The most important of these
were Mabon's own personal charisma and willingness to undertake
barnstorming tours of local areas; and the 'absolutely crucial'
administrative support provided by Assistant Secretary R. D. Cramond and
his staff.
The effectiveness of Mabon's policy was greatly increased by the
centralised character of Scottish housing administration - similar to
that in Northern Ireland, but quite different from the polycentric, at
times chaotic organisation of housebuilding in England and Wales.
Mabon's nationwide drive against rural slums, through the powerful
county councils, chiefly took the form of cottage-building. However,
unlike Crossman, with his disapproval of 'American' prestige-building of
high blocks by small towns, Mabon was quite prepared within reason to
allow small burghs to build high flats - for instance, Saltcoats BC, who
pleaded with him at least to sanction a 'wee multi-storey' - believing
that this would provide a valuable competitive spur.
However, the growing conflict between Gibson's strategy and that of the
SDD planners could not be ignored - especially as the rhetoric of
Mabon's own party laid great emphasis on planned economic growth.
Mabon's solution was to compartmentalize the problem: to settle the
current setpiece battles between housers and planners in the latter's
favour, and from then on to nip in the bud any friction between the two
activities. In two key disputes he came down on the planners' side: in
Glasgow, to settle Hillpark (which he saw as 'not quite King Charles's
head, but an absolute pain in the neck!'), and in Edinburgh, concerning
a proposal by Rogan to build 22-storey Wimpey point-blocks adjoining
Holyrood Park. 6fr'
In Glasgow, Grieve attempted a more general counterattack. In
collaboration with Nicoll's team in the Corporation, a model was
prepared out of matchsticks, indicating the 'forest' of high blocks
completed, building or planned in Glasgow. Mabon was staggered: 'That
was a dramatic piece - it looked unbelievable!' Grieve boasted: 'I had
belled the cat!' (111. 94) But even here, while Mabon sought to
placate the planners by removing the confrontational aspects of Gibson's
policy, he nevertheless ensured that output - Gibson's paramount aim -
was safeguarded: 'I could've come in with Davie Gibson and I'd've been
building multi-storeys as fast as him! I happened to come in when
things had almost peaked and we were beginning to see the consequences!'
Accordingly Mabon endorsed, in very general terms, the planners' demands
for oversight over the location and development of housing sites, and
authorised toothless studies into a further expansion of Glasgow
overspill. At the same time, however, he took care to ensure that
multi-storey construction proceeded at an undiminished, even increased
pace, in less sensitive locations - all the time paying careful lip-
service to the planners' disapproval of unrestrained gap-site
exploitation. For example, some substantial gap-sites could be be
conveniently included in the notional area of nearby CDAs (such as
Maryhill and North Kelvin). Gradually, however, a simpler way of
maintaining output emerged. It became clear that any site in a Glasgow
CDA, although supposedly under blanket density control, could easily be
converted into the equivalent of a gap site for 'cramming' purposes, by
the device of balancing immediate multi-storey development of available
sections against the lower density of vaguely-promised later phases -
often destined never to be built! By the later 1960s, so many of these
piecemeal cleared sites were available in some CDAs that the proportion
of Glasgow high-flat approvals in CDA locations shot upwards, averaging
82% during this period, compared to only 43% in the first half of the
decade. Mabon adopted a pragmatic approach to this more sophisticated
policy on the part of the Housing Committee: 'I didn't mind that. I
didn't mind the gap sites being filled, so long as they did the things I
wanted as well!'
While Mabon's redefinition of the Scottish housing programme safeguarded
the essential thrust of Gibson's policy, it is certain that the
Convener, had he still been alive, would have vigorously opposed the
extension of planning controls, however nominal these were to prove in
many cases. But his successor Clark was less disposed to confront the
Department over the processing of proposals. Instead, Glasgow's resolve
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during the turbulent year after Gibson's death was stiffened by Cross.
He filled the political vacuum by arguing with Mabon for the sanctioning
of a further five years' multi-storey output: the aim was to get high-
flat starts securely back above 3,000 in 1965 in order to secure the
City a measure of 'elbow room'. Cross was only too happy that much of
the planners' fire had been drawn by Hillpark: for this, as a DLO
scheme, would in all likelihood have been of little assistance, in terms
of any quickly realisable output. Behind a smokescreen of indignant
public argumentation over the delays to Hillpark, he therefore quietly
pursued with Kelly a vital series of Wimpey gap-site schemes, intended
to restore programme continuity. Of these, the site promising the most
straightforward yield was a narrow and sinuous strip of ground at
Kirkton Avenue, in the centre of the outei—suburban Knightswood cottage
estate. Here, Cross proposed the erection of a line of 24-storey point-
blocks, at a notional density of 196 p. p.a. The newly-confident SDD
planners pressed for reduction of the nine blocks originally proposed to
two, or even none, on grounds of allegedly inadequate open space
provision, and of the blocks' visually 'dominating effect on the
surrounding development': the revised density would then have been a
more 'appropriate' 59 p.p.a. Cross conceded the deletion of four
blocks, but obdurately held his ground on the remaining five, which
would still realise 690 dwellings. SDD's Housing Administrators
obligingly transmitted his arguments to the Department's planners,
scolding them that the Housing Progress Officer 'simply cannot
understand on what basis we arrive at the conclusion that the scheme
fails on amenity and space for ancillary purposes', and suggesting a
compromise on 'tactical' grounds, to safeguard SDD's position on the
supposedly all-important question of Hillpark. By January 1965, Cross
accurately sensed that resistance was crumbling. Jauntily, he wished
Kelly a Happy New Year and informed him that if final clearance could
now be secured for the compromise Kirkton Avenue scheme, which was his
'most important, programme-wise', he would 'promise not to make nasty
remarks about the Department for six months'. (111. 95)
In July 1965, with a level of output stability at last restored, Cross
had earned a rest, and he moved to the much more tranquil post of SSHA
95 Knightswood, 1989 aerial view: Kirkton Avenue at top, LincolnAvenue at bottom,
General Manager. His vigorous controls had not only raised output, but
had boosted the percentage of Glasgow multi-storey contracts running on
time or early from 33% in 1961 to 83% in 1965. His successor, James
Kernohan, as an architect, was not temperamentally inclined to continue
Cross's unbending pursuit of numbers or emulate his battering-ram
approach towards the architectural profession. However, such a policy
would in any case have rapidly become more difficult, as the
Corporation's own designers became increasingly confident. On the one
side stood his own ever more assertive younger housing architects,
pressing for adoption of the deck-access pattern; although Kernohan
personally preferred point blocks, and regarded some of the Department's
deck-access designs as ' hideous' , several large schemes were built in
this form. On the other side, he had to deal with Mansley's newly-
created (in 1966) Planning Department, now hurrying to shut the multi¬
storey stable door behind Gibson and Cross by proposing blanket density
limits and tinkering with schemes in the pipeline such as Townhead ' B' :
'At the meeting, the planning girl started telling us "You should have
York stone cladding!" I asked her, "What qualification do you have?"
She said, "I'm a geographer." I said, "You've a damned impertinence
telling the chief architect of Wimpey what to do!"' Nevertheless,
despite these new frustrations, it was clear that Gibson's immediate
legacy, the Modern housing drive in Scotland, was now broadly secure for
at least the rest of the 1960s, if not beyond.
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CHAPTER 7: THE CURATE' S EGG: PROVINCIAL INITIATIVES IN ENGLAND AND WALES
Unlike the unified, even monolithic character of urban public housing
production in Scotland, the position in England and Wales could be
summed up as an individualistic jumble. Overall, however, the housing
drive of the 1960s took place in two distinct compartments: provincial
and Greater London. Output in the provinces was driven forward by the
overlapping, but never fully coincident bursts of energy of various
large county boroughs, while the housing effort of Greater London was
always dogged by its own peculiar constraints. The complex London
problem will be discussed separately in the next chapter. In this
chapter, the polycentric pattern of Modern housebuilding in the key
urban areas of the rest of England and Wales will be outlined.
During the 1960s, the largest English cities all settled down to fairly
sustained production of multi-storey blocks and other Modern flats. In
some cases, such as Manchester, this was the result of a major policy
shift; in others, such as Liverpool, it resulted from policy continuity.
Many smaller cities and large towns in the main conurbations now also
plunged into the wholesale building of high flats, often in rivalry.
Building of Modern flats outside the conurbations was more erratic,
especially in Wales and East Anglia, and will here be treated summarily.
Although this account emphasises the kaleidoscopic variety of building
policies and inter-authority rivalries, it is also important to
appreciate the common characteristics and motives binding together many
active urban housing authorities. These cities and boroughs shared, and
regularly communicated to each other at both member and officer level, a
pragmatic appreciation of the production yield realisable from Modern
high blocks. Neither this common ground, nor on the other hand the
variation between towns, has been adequately represented in recent
historical accounts of Modern housing in England and Wales, as has
already been pointed out at the beginning of this thesis. Apparently
quite blind to the very clear local-political reasons for multi-storey
building, recent historians have concluded that high flats were the
manifestation of some baffling 'rationality deficit', and that the
V
members and officers of large authorities were a passive and homogeneous
mass, meekly following the directions of industrial and professional
groupings. To repeat Dunleavy's summary: 'Actors formulating policy did
so within a context effectively pre-structured by the ideological
positions adopted by the design professions, central government, the
construction industry, and the national local government system' . 1
In reality, the 1960s Modern housing boom in England and Wales was
driven at local level, by a variety of pressures and individuals, but
this range of initiatives was given unity by a common aim: to use multi¬
storey blocks and other Modern flatted types to maximise municipal
output. High flats had been originally introduced to large-scale use in
the context of the land trap, but now that that had eased in some
respects, they could now be freely reproduced, as established types,
anywhere within cities' boundaries. The building of high flats and
Modern housing was pushed through by each active authority on its own
account, at its own pace and in its own manner: a patchwork of
individual policies and programmes which could not possibly have been
accounted for by 'top-down' interpretations of external pressure. Some
of the largest authorities loosely collaborated, such as Sheffield and
Leeds, but others ploughed their own furrow: above all in this respect,
Birmingham, with its colossal burst of output in the later 1960s.
^18
BIRMINGHAM AND THE WEST MIDLANDS
The closest English equivalent to Gibson's multi-storey revolution was
the housing drive initiated in 1963 by Alderman Harry Watton, the
'little Caesar' of Birmingham Corporation. 2 The Labour leader's
initiative, although motivated by the Chamberlain municipal efficiency
ethos rather than the crusading tradition of Red Clydeside, was
nevertheless built on the same two sturdy supports as Gibson's:
opposition to population and industrial dispersal, and subordination of
design considerations to those of rapid production. But the national
influence exerted by Glasgow was almost absent in the case of
Birmingham. Instead, the City's activity remained compartmented, even
from that of the Black Country authorities. (Map 2)
Watton's rise to power in the late 1950s came at a time when the
Corporation was rapidly becoming impatient in the face of mounting
pressure for overspill. This process culminated in April 1960, when
Brooke refused a boundary extension at Wythall and urged the City to
adopt a New Town strategy, following a public inquiry skilfully
manipulated by Osborn through the representations of his local
satellite, the Midlands New Towns Society. In 1959, Watton had
proclaimed in Labour's municipal election manifesto that 'Birmingham
people are entitled to remain in Birmingham if they wish, and Birmingham
industry has the right to remain in the city it has done so much to make
great'. After the humiliation of Wythall, Watton decided on a two-stage
strategy to realise this aim. In the short term, he aimed to reverse
the decline in output within the city, by trying to achieve faster
exploitation of gap sites and a large windfall site: the redundant
Castle Bromwich Airfield. In the medium term, he began to bring the
strongest political pressure to bear on MHLG for the release of another
Green Belt site to make up for Wythall - just as, in Edinburgh, Pat
Rogan would obtain Mabon's sanction for the development of Wester Hailes
to compensate for the refusal of a more desirable, but more
controversial site at Alnwickhill. 3
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But Watton's short-term plan immediately ran up against a substantial
obstacle: the determination of Sheppard Fidler to develop both gap-sites
and Castle Bromwich at his own pace and in his own meticulous manner.
At Castle Bromwich, there was an additional complication: the City
Architect took strong exception to the imposition of a non-Radburn
street layout by Manzoni and his successor, Neville Borg - a dispute
which dragged on for almost a year, into 1963: 'The Public Works
Committee was a very powerful committee, the House Building Committee
not so powerful, but we thought: "This is where we dig our heels in!"
The City Engineer said, "We'll do the layout and you can fit the houses
in." We said, "You damned well won't, you know - we'll design the area
and you'll put in the drains!" - and we won!' A
Sheppard Fidler's victory at Castle Bromwich was, however, to prove
Pyrrhic. There was now, rightly or wrongly, 'a growing lack of
confidence among the leaders of the Labour Group in his department's
ability to produce houses in sufficient numbers'. This unease could not
simply be brushed off, as Watton himself was without doubt 'the most
powerful leader the Birmingham Labour Group ever had - he ruled with a
rod of iron!' Watton had begun to set his face not only against
Sheppard Fidler's individually-designed mixed developments, (111. 13)
but also against the awarding of contracts to national firms attuned to
the primacy of LCC-like design. He finally decided to act when the City
Architect, ' looking for a system you could mould, could design' and
attracted by the 'deluxe engineering' of Camus (exactly the arguments
used against Camus by North at West Ham!), proposed in early 1963 with
Cleeve Barr's backing that 47% of the massive Castle Bromwich
development should be simply allocated to the French firm. In contrast
to Liverpool's Camus initiative, there was no early attempt to find a
West Midlands firm which might act as licensee contractor. Watton
clearly interpreted this as a challenge to the local industry,
especially in the light of a 1962 completions total of just 1, 161 (less
than a quarter of the 1950s maximum): 'I honestly think that some
Aldermen and Councillors thought I was going to import hundreds of
Frenchmen into Birmingham, which would not do at all!' s
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In 1963 the Labour leader decided that if Sheppard Fidler would not
comply with his wishes, he would himself assume effective control of
site development and contractual policy. On this basis, he could then
construct an alternative, production-dominated short-term housing
strategy, based around the rapid development of gap sites and Castle
Bromwich, as far as possible using local building firms.
In the contractual field, Watton's riposte to the Camus proposal was
typically blunt, even brutal. He abruptly redirected almost the entire
Birmingham multi-storey programme, despite Sheppard Fidler's opposition,
to C. Bryant & Son, the only West Midlands contractor recognised as
sufficiently fitted for this task; non-multi-storey contracts were
divided between Bryant, Wimpey and local firms. In contrast to other
West Midlands builders such as Stubbings or Morris and Jacombs, who were
perfectly competent in the construction of cottages or isolated point
blocks, Bryant was able and eager to attain a predominant role.
Sheppard Fidler himself pointed out that some of the other local firms
simply 'couldn't cope with the multi-storeys' . In 1964, grasping the
opportunity with both hands, Bryant boldly put in low tenders to secure
the first big point-block contracts at Castle Bromwich Airfield. This
gamble paid off, and secured Bryant a continuous stream of negotiated
contracts thereafter: 'Things mushroomed at Small Heath - we started
building wooden offices, putting pretty senior people in wooden sheds -
it was like Nissen huts in the war!' s
During this hectic period of expansion, Bryant not only saw off the
Camus threat but also supplanted most of Sheppard Fidler's existing
stable of national high-flat contractors: revered names such as Laing
were jettisoned almost overnight. This was achieved by a twin-pronged
policy. Firstly, 28 in-situ concrete point-blocks, containing 1, 640
flats, were built at Castle Bromwich to get substantial progress at that
vital site; further such blocks were built on several smaller contracts.
(111. 46, 96) A second, simultaneous leap forward was made possible by
a wholehearted embrace of prefabrication. For some contracts for low
blocks, Bryant used its own 'system', while for high flats the firm
secured the status of principal West Midlands main contractor for
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96 Castle Bromwich Airfield (Castle Vale) Group 1 and Area A,
Birmingham: 16-storey in-situ blocks under construction by Bryant
in 1965; Bryant Low Rise housing in foreground.
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Concrete's Bison Wall-Frame. When building Bison blocks, on which its
involvement was virtually confined to siteworks and finishing trades,
Bryant saved more than half the number of staff needed for 'traditional'
construction. As a result, in the context of a severe labour shortage,
the net could be spread much wider, taking in most available gap sites,
parts of Castle Bromwich and the majority of subsequent large
developments. 7 (111. 97-99)
To Sheppard Fidler, the proposal to construct standard Bison point
blocks on gap-sites across the city seemed the most reprehensible
feature of Watton's new policy - and the Labour leader added insult to
injury by the peremptory manner in which he ordered the first batch of
blocks, during a visit on 6 November 1963 to inspect Bryant's prototype
Bison point-block at Hurcott Road, Kidderminster. This visit was
organised by a Labour elder member and Bryant director, Alderman W.
Bowen. Sheppard Fidler recalled:
'Chris Bryant took Harry Watton out for lunch - it must've been a
marvellous lunch! - and Watton came back and said, "Bryants have the
most marvellous type which they can put up in a few weeks - can you
please find half a dozen sites where we can put them up straight away."
I thought this was a funny way of proceeding with design, choosing sites
and so on. Then Bryant said, "We' 11 take the Committee to see a block
at Kidderminster. " But in order to get to the block we passed through a
marquee which was rolling in whisky, brandy and so on, so by the time
they got to the block they thought it was marvellous - they wanted to
change over the whole programme! '
Then ' as we were leaving, at the exit, Harry Watton suddenly said,
"Right! We'll take five blocks" - just as if he was buying bags of
sweets! "We'll have five of them", he said, "and stick them on X" -
some site he'd remembered we were just starting on! Well, I can tell
you, I almost walked out on the spot. I mean, all [architects] get this
done to them from time to time, but this! That was Watton trying to
please Bowen you see!'
Sheppard Fidler went on to recall that 'after leaving Kidderminster, the
coach called at various hostelries on the way to the Civic Centre. What
a day! I can't forget it even now!'
Those seeking to portray postwar public housing production as a
'conspiracy', or at any rate as the result of external pressure on local
authorities, have laid emphasis, in the case of Birmingham's programme,
97 Bell's Lane development, Birmingham: seven 13-storey Bison Wall-
Frame point blocks and Bryant Low Rise housing under construction
in 1965.
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on the bribery scandal involving some Bryant directors and housing
contracts. Indeed Dunleavy, unable to grasp the straightforward appeal
of outer-suburban point-blocks to councillors such as Watton,. and
casting around for external causes that might explain the baffling
'rationality deficit' of high-flat construction, even ventures to
identify the sole cause of Birmingham's mid-1960s multi-storey boom as
'Bryants' vigorous marketing'; although elsewhere he contradicts this
absurd claim with the rather more sensible assessment that
'industrialised high rise on peripheral estates and the city centre
would have been built even without Bryants' influence'. 9
In fact, the driving force which unleashed Birmingham's building
campaign was Watton's determination to start large-scale building of
point blocks on gap sites and at Castle Bromwich. And although Bryant
secured the lion's share of the resulting contracts, the firm's
continuity of work in the City led not to substantial overspending in
the manner of Glasgow's DLO, but to a £600, 000 saving by the Corporation
on final costs out of Bryant's total housing contract figure of
£83,000,000 over the period 1961-73. The firm later paid a high price
for having committed its output and capital investment to Birmingham in
this unbalanced way (to the extent, even, of having imposed a 50-mile
radius tendering limit): 'When the troubles came we had to go and knock




In 1964, chiefly because Watton had begun to 'dictate what I could build
and where', Sheppard Fidler resigned, and went into private practice: 'I
said, "I've had enough!" This decision, by one of the key provincial
City Architects, was widely acknowledged in the world of public
architecture as a major defeat in the running battle between design and
production. 11 To replace Fidler, Watton secured the appointment of the
Leeds City Architect, J. R. Sheridan Shedden. He had achieved in Leeds
a formidable track-record of type-plan standardisation and large-scale
production, and could be counted on to raise output, even if this meant
ruffling the feathers of some designers. One young London-trained
architect, during a period working under Shedden in Leeds, recalled with
indignation the City Architect's energetic pursuit of production: 'He
was an appalling mediaeval baron of an architect, a man of zero
architectural quality, a primeval creature who could have gone to work
for Wimpey or some other contractor - he could have been a Soviet
general, with a huge hat and a coat buttoned up to his chin!' 12
Under Shedden, the Birmingham City Architect's Department was
immediately recast on an integrated, production-directed basis, similar
to the organisation of professional staff in a large contractual firm.
The aim was to make 50% more staff available for housing-related work,
and accord greatest priority to contract-letting, to get rapid progress
at Castle Bromwich and the ever more prolific outer—suburban sites, such
as Druids Heath and Bromford Bridge. There was initially no attempt to
work out fresh plan-types. Nor, however, was there any real move
towards package-deal contracts. Instead, Sheppard Fidler's range of
point-blocks and cottages was rationalised and made the basis of
negotiated repeat contracts with Bryant and others. In December 1964,
Watton's lobbying of the new Labour Housing Minister was finally
successful: Crossman agreed to release a large chunk of Warwickshire
Green Belt at Chelmsley Wood. 13
By 1965, Watton and Sheridan Shedden had virtually completed the
reorganisation and reorientation of Birmingham's programme towards
production - as had Gibson and Cross in Glasgow, four years earlier.
From this point, output skyrocketed from 2,542 completions in 1964 to
us
4,036 in 1965, 4,728 in 1966 and an astonishing annual total of 9,023 in
1967: more than all Birmingham overspill houses erected up to 1971, and
three times the per-capita figure for the whole of Greater London! As a
result, the Corporation's waiting list was slashed by 30% over the same
period.
This sudden, spectacular growth in Birmingham's housing production was
not, however, the direct responsibility of Sheridan Shedden, who became
crippled by illness during 1965 and died in April 1966, or even of
Watton, who gave up the leadership, also because of illness, in the same
year. Watton had shaped the framework for a decisive revival in multi¬
storey building, and output as a whole; however, after his retirement
and Labour's loss of power in Birmingham in the 1966 municipal
elections, responsibility for carrying through his building policy
passed from councillors to a new chief officer. In that year, Shedden
was succeeded by one of Britain's most able postwar public architects,
in terms of sheer organisational ability and drive: Alan Maudsley,
Birmingham's City Architect from 1966 to 1974 - 'a man who saw what
needed to be done and did it - a real goer!' 1A
Maudsley's central executive role in Birmingham's housing drive of the
late 1960s was comparable to that of Cross in Glasgow during the short
period of political power-vacuum between the death of Gibson and the
accession to power of Mabon. But, in stark contrast to the land
shortage which always dogged Cross, Maudsley was fortunate that his
arrival coincided with a sudden glut of good sites. This obviated, from
the beginning, any need to create elbow-room for decanting, and
permitted him to work out a methodical plan for the implementation of
the general strategy sketched out by Watton.
Maudsley's plan was to start with two or three years' undisguised
pursuit of production, using what was immediately available, by
energetic building of Sheppard Fidler type plans for point blocks, low
flats and cottages, at Castle Bromwich and other windfall or gap sites.
This, he hoped, would satisfy much of the most urgent demand for numbers
from Watton, and from his Conservative successors. In Birmingham, as in
the case of Dundee, a glut of good sites in the suburbs would now,
paradoxically, fuel a short-term multi-storey boom. Having secured for
his Department large increases in staff numbers through these results,
he could then introduce new plan-types and patterns of estate-layout and
landscaping; by this stage, it would be possible to largely confine high
blocks to redevelopment areas, and, as a bonus, would also allow the
exclusion of the City Engineer and consultant private architects from
involvement in housing design. Maudsley realised that the Department
could only win the right and the ability to pursue architecturally
innovative work through achievement of output. His explicit aim was ' to
get the team by producing the goods'. 1s Other than in atypical cases
where there was little municipal pressure for output (such as the LCC or
Coventry), the same rule applied to all large urban authorities: the
pursuit of design was possible, sometimes up to the highest levels of
quality (as in the cases of Sheffield and Southwark), but only if
production needs were also fully satisfied.
Despite the initial indispensability of high flats to his strategy,
Maudsley, like most English architects, still assumed that cottages were
the norm, and flats a second-best expedient. He therefore eagerly
endorsed the late-1960s move to housing improvement, while the
proportion of the programme accounted for by multi-storey flats fell
steeply from its 1964 maximum of 59% to a level of 21% in 1967, 11% in
1970 and nothing thereafter - in marked contrast to the continuing
buoyancy of multi-storey output in Glasgow. Maudsley's deputy (from
June 1966), Bill Reed, recruited because of his New Town experience at
Harlow and Basildon, concentrated on increasing the numbers, and
reducing the cost, of cottages and low flats. These made up over 85% of
the 14, 000-dwelling Chelmsley Wood project,and the whole of the
subsequent Woodgate Valley and North Worcestershire developments.
In 1969 Maudsley listed his cardinal principles of organisation: 'The
first is to keep the number of dwelling types down to as narrow a range
as possible, and the second is that one should be prepared to reward a
contractor's efficiency with negotiated continuity'. In the first area,
he had no desire to compete with avant-garde public architects
elsewhere, and only contributed a few quirky personal touches, such as
an almost obsessive enthusiasm for mosaic facing: 'He liked white
buildings: he wanted them self-cleansing!' Unlike his counterparts in
many other large cities, he refused to have anything to do with deck-
access blocks, and even eliminated medium-height maisonettes altogether.
Instead, the City remained faithful to point blocks. In suburban
developments, Maudsley's gleaming white-tiled towers were dotted,
increasingly sparingly, in a sea of two-storey cottages and flats. 17
The second area of organisation pinpointed above by Maudsley was that of
contractual policy. Here his special gift (like that of Cross) was 'an
uncanny way of cutting through red tape, He was autocratic, but he
didn't half get things going! You'd go into the City, there'd be plans
on his wall, and he'd pencil people in for them - Bryants - Stubbings -
Morriss and Jacombs. Those who achieved, and were on programme, got
more work. You'd finish a job and he'd just walk up, rub "X" out and
put "Y" in: "They can't produce - you can!" Awed by Maudsley's
production achievements, the now Conservative-controlled House Building
Committee, under the aged Alderman Ernest Apps, allowed him an autonomy
unusual in a major city: most contracts were routed through a
streamlined 'Chairman's authority' approvals procedure. At the same
time, Maudsley's power over the contractors harnessed to his housing
programme also steadily grew: 'he'd tell the councillors what to do...
while we'd end up doing jobs at his behest and his price!' Yet, despite
the scale of Maudsley's negotiated contracts, the City's housing
programme was never afflicted by overspending and lack of cost-
consciousness. Partly, this resulted from wider factors, such as
Birmingham's relative affluence and its municipal efficiency culture,
which would chop off a redundant branch rather than allow fat nests of
patronage and dependency to proliferate on it. Unlike Cross, Maudsley
never had to grit his teeth at the sight of 31-storey blocks being
built, with luxuriant inefficiency, by a separate, indeed hostile
department of the Corporation. Watton's daring abolition of the rate
subsidy in 1963 had made essential the closest monitoring of building
costs. Maudsley's Department played its full part in this process: an
exceptionally fierce monitoring regime was devised and maintained by his
00 Chelmsley Wood in course of development in 1968: ' the size of a
Mark I New Town - but built in five years!' Almost all dwellings
in this view, covering Areas 6 and 7, were built by Bryant: the
negotiated contracts for high and low blocks were let separately.
The M6 motorway is visible under construction at left.
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Chief Quantity Surveyor, David Bergman. Steadily, the cost (in real
terms) of the City's standard types was pared and pared, not by cutting
'standards' but by forcing exceptionally keen quotes from contractors.
In the words of Ken Harvey of Bryant Construction: 'Prices were very
thin always. It was Maudsley who cut through the red tape, and Bergman
who controlled the finances. Birmingham had very strict control - it
was the best. ' 1 e
More than any other factor, however, it was Maudsley's own dynamism
which was responsible for breaking the back of Birmingham's housing
problem in the late 'sixties - most spectacularly, through the lightning
construction of Chelmsley Wood, 'the size of a Mark 1 New Town - but
built in five years!' (111. 100) This achievement, rather than the
very colourful corruption scandal in which he and several Bryant
directors later became embroiled, constitutes his true historical legacy
in the field of housing production: 'It was exciting to be part of that
particular period. There may have been things going on in the
background - graft and so on - but they weren't the things at the top of
people's minds. What was in people's thoughts was - '"For God's sake
get on and build those houses, and get these people out of the slums!"'
13 (111. 101)
During this period, the City's housebuilding and that of the rest of the
West Midlands remained separate. Expressed in graph form, the contrast
was bizarre: the jagged peak of Maudsley's programme, superimposed on a
steady, plodding line. Of the total increase in public housing under
construction in the region between the beginning of 1964 and September
1966, no less than 98% was accounted for by the City! In the remainder
of the West Midlands, the main change during the 1960s was the gathering
together of the urban authorities into county boroughs in the 1966
reorganisation. Perhaps the major beneficiary of this reform was
Wolverhampton CBC, which suddenly found itself transformed into a city
of over 250,000 inhabitants. It embarked on a belated building spree as
the others cut back, achieving a level of almost 1,300 under
construction at the end of 1969: Wolverhampton's programme culminated in
the grandiose Heath Town redevelopment. By contrast, authorities such
H-33
101 The Sentinels, Holloway Circus: view of Cleveland Tower, 1989.Birmingham's highest flats:.two 32-storey point blocks, built byBryant from 1967.
as West Bromwich and Walsall, previously among the most active in
England, now started steadily to scale down their output. 20
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THE NORTH-WEST OF ENGLAND
In the North-West, Liverpool and, increasingly, Manchester, pursued
consistent output expansion, while several second-rank authorities began
to force their way forward under MHLG encouragement. (Maps 3, 4)
Liverpool's decision, already touched on above, to embark on its Camus
programme, had originated in a consensus decision by the Corporation in
1961 that the City's annual housing target should be raised to 5,000.
The Housing Committee had been gravely disturbed by the sudden decline
in the City's output after the completion of Kirkby: dropping from 2,408
completions in 1958 to a mere 1,517 in 1961. There was much anxiety to
restore the City's established production record. By 1962, several
agreements were in course of negotiation, including an annual programme
of 1,000 dwellings with Wimpey. However, Entwistle's Conservative
administration was determined to crown this counterattack with a single
grand gesture, before their likely defeat by Braddock in the 1963
municipal election: 'They wanted to put their mark on Liverpool!' 21.
In June 1962, therefore, a Liverpool party of inspection to Paris
arrived at an on-the-spot verbal agreement with Camus on a large bulk-
order. Sheffield's Housing Chairman, Harold Lambert, was in Paris at
the same time with a more sceptical delegation. He recalls his
reaction: 'That was bloody silly I thought, rather than coming back and
taking it to the Council!' But as Braddock was on the delegation,
Entwistle and his Housing Chairman, L. H. Sanders, were in no real
danger: as always there was, in effect, a consensus behind the scenes.
Bradbury easily overcame the city's building-industry xenophobia by
persuading Unit, his most favoured regional firm, to act as licensee
contractors, and by stressing that the deal was a bonus which would
abstract neither land nor building resources from the existing
programme. Camus's type plans were rapidly revised by Corporation and
company architects to meet the Housing Committee's specifications, and a
prototype four-storey block was built at Classic Road. However,
following Braddock's victory in 1963, it became clear that the Camus
deal had been far from well prepared in one fairly basic respect. The
new Labour Housing Chairman, W. Smyth, was left seriously exposed when
it was discovered that there were for the moment no sites on which the
25 blocks ordered could be built, owing to MHLG planning obstruction of
the rezoning or Green-Belt release of land at Shell Park, Quarry Green
and Cantril Farm Extension. 2:2
Liverpool's Conservative administration had set out not only to revive
housing output, but also to bring housing under a degree of planning
control, by establishing a separate City Planning Department in 1962.
The arrival of the first City Planning Officer, Walter Bor, was not,
however, welcomed by Braddock, who was deeply concerned of the possible
dislocation of output that might be caused by new-fangled planning ideas
of density or height regulation. In fact, the Labour leader was so
concerned that he decided, in his own inimitable way, that he would have
no contact whatsoever with Bor, either in person or in writing.
Braddock's ostracism of the City Planning Department continued
throughout the entire period between his party's return to power in May
1963 and his own sudden apoplectic death, six months later, during a
supper party to celebrate the opening of the annual John Moores
Exhibition at the Walker Art Gallery. 23
Following Braddock's unexpected demise, the Group and Council leadership
passed to his younger rival, Councillor W. H. (Bill) Sefton, who
completely altered the general direction of municipal policy, by eagerly
taking up the cause of planning. At first, however, Sefton chose to
leave the Housing Committee largely undisturbed. He was preoccupied
with a fairly ambitious strategy intended to reverse decades of
municipal introversion, and to enable the City to compete effectively
with Manchester in the regional economic-development league-table: 'I
saw my job, as Leader of the Council, as being to reestablish Liverpool
in the national framework'. Municipal housing, with its old-fashioned
connotations of local religious politics and patronage, was almost an
embarrassment in such a context of planned modernity. For the time
being, therefore, Sefton was content to make grand sweeps around this
massive, moss-encrusted boulder, making no attempt to disturb the
disagreeable accumulations concealed beneath it: ' I used to leave
102 'Logan Towers', Boundary Street, Liverpool, seen in 1989, One ofthe Corporation's bulk-order Camus blocks, built by Unit from 1964
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housing to Housing. ' So politically the housing scene was still
dominated by the Housing Committee's Chairman, W. Smyth, a staunch
Braddockite, who showed granite obduracy in resisting any proposals by
Bor to set up guidelines for gap-site point-block development, or to
dilute the system of 'deemed planning permission' under which
Corporation housing projects were rubber-stamped past planning
procedures. -i'*
A compromise solution to the Camus site-shortage problem had already
been tentatively agreed under Braddock: to build some blocks on suburban
sites, including those originally planned at Shell Park and Cantril Farm
Extension, but to relocate three 22-storey blocks to slum-clearance
sites in Everton, where they might well perform a useful political
function, in relation to existing ward boundaries. As Deputy Leader,
Sefton had been particularly unhappy about the proposal to build one
block, 'Logan Towers', at Boundary Street. Its location in a setting of
the starkest industrial dereliction, adjacent to a gasworks, canal and
overhead electricity power lines, was dictated almost completely by a
requirement to preserve a small Roman Catholic residential enclave on
that spot; a group of lower flats and cottages had already been built
just to the north. The inhabitants, and their councillors, had lobbied
Braddock that the area should be redeveloped on the same site by the
building of a high block, and the Labour leader eagerly agreed: 'If
that's what they want, that's what they're going to get!' When Sefton
acceded to the Group leadership, he felt unable to overturn this
decision, despite his own preference for decanting to another site, and
his more general desire to channel Liverpool Labour politics away from
from religion towards an emphasis on economic modernisation; 'Logan
Towers' was therefore built in 1964-5. (111. 102, 103)
The balance of power only began to tilt gradually in the Liverpool
planners' favour over the next 3 or 4 years, after the housing camp had
been fatally weakened by further post-Braddock reforms. Most important
were the fragmentation of Bradbury's production empire in December 1963,
with housing design allocated to the less vehement J. W. Boddy, and
Sefton's removal of Smyth from the housing chair in 1965. From 1966,
103 View of 'Logan Towers' from north, showing existing maisonettes and
cottages, probably built in the late 1950s.
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Bor's successor, Jim Amos, was even able to establish a degree of
control over housing policy, and to divert building away from the
isolated point and slab blocks detested by the planners, into large
deck-access schemes such as Netherley. (111. 104) Starting from an
already reasonably high base, Liverpool's output was not able quite to
match the spectacular percentage increases of cities such as Birmingham
or Salford. Nevertheless, the City consistently built around 3,000
dwellings a year throughout the mid and late 1960s.
In Manchester, the City's overspill obsession and neglect of
housebuilding during the late 1950s had, as was explained in a previous
chapter, caused a rapid decline in the Housing Committee's already
faltering programme. Eventually, in 1960, completions slumped below
1, 000 - a level only one-third of the 1950s maximum. From this point,
however, Manchester rapidly reformed itself, and, indeed, began to
follow a curiously similar succession of policies to those of Liverpool:
first, piecemeal point-block development; then, a designer-inspired turn
to deck-access blocks. But there was one intractable difference: the
continuing absence in Manchester of a strong, production-minded housing
faction. This showed itself not least in the way in which the City was
converted to high output: the Council's decisive acceptance in 1961 of a
4,000 annual building target was brought about by pressure not from the
Housing Committee or Austen Bent but from the Medical Officer of Health
and the Town Clerk, with the strong backing of MHLG. These two
officials wished to increase the rate of slum-clearance to 4,000 but
realised that it would be politically awkward simply to overspill the
inhabitants and leave the resulting sites empty! 27
Having at last been persuaded to try to raise output, the Housing
Committee, whose previous lack of interest in piecemeal development had
left it with a glut of small and medium-sized sites inside and outside
the city boundaries, sensibly decided to extract maximum yield from
these immediately through a crash drive of multi-storey building. But
here it soon became very obvious that the local contractors and DL0,
immured in the Simonite Garden Suburb tradition, were floundering
hopelessly in the multi-storey field. Large negotiated contracts were
104 Liverpool, Netherley development: deck-access blocks up to 8
storeys in height, built from 1967 by Wimpey and Unit. 1989 view
during demolition.
awarded to Laing and Wimpey (in one case, Hollyhedge Roundabout, by the
simple expedient of deposing a local firm which had already put in the
lowest tender); but, by mid 1962, construction was still lagging well
behind site availability, 2,3 (111. 105)
It was now a matter of great urgency somehow to raise further the level
of multi-storey construction. At this point (as briefly mentioned in an
earlier chapter) there converged the conservatism of Austen Bent, half¬
hearted in the Camus discussions with Bradbury and Sheppard Fidler, and
that of Laing, anxious not to be left behind by the ' systems' bandwagon
but cautious about committing itself to large loadbearing panel
prefabrication. When the Camus negotiations collapsed in August 1962, a
substitute deal with Laing had been prepared. Four out of nine 13-
storey reinforced-concrete frame point-blocks which had been earmarked
for gap sites on the Heywood overspill estate would now instead be
constructed as prototypes of the in-situ Sectra 'system'. Throughout
the next four years, Laing was the mainstay of the City's multi-storey
programme while contractual diversity was built up. The firm erected 35
point blocks, some package-deal and some Department-designed. The
majority were of normal in-situ reinforced concrete frame or box frame
type, but a substantial number were of Sectra construction. 2-'
The only real obstacle in the way of Manchester's multi-storey building
drive had been the Housing Committee's own dilatoriness. This having
been overcome, the city's favourable land situation made possible
immediate progress. Once large-scale construction of multi-storey
blocks at last began (punctuated by occasional attempts in the Housing
Committee to rescind the policy), there were so many large sites that
the Committee could never see the 90 h.r.p.a. blanket density as an
onerous constraint. Certainly no-one in Manchester ever thought it
worthwhile to prospect, in the Gibson manner, for small gap-sites.
Their 'availability would be seen as a very minor matter. .. this density
maximum governed the whole thing - there were so many of these big
clearance and overspill sites available!' But the ability of existing
sites to absorb decanting requirements was such that even the increased
rate of building could not keep pace with the Medical Officer of
w
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105 Manchester turns to high flats: St George's




106 Rusholme Road Redevelopment Area 1st Stage, Manchester, built from
1964: photographed in 1989. Robert Stones recalls: 'That nine-
storey slab, you banged it down in Wythenshawe, you banged it down
elsewhere, I got sick of seeing it! There it was in the drawer and
you just kept reusing it!'
Health's activities - a discrepancy of which Joseph reminded the Council
in 1963, and which, just over a year later, caused councillors
embarrassment during a visit by Mellish to the Hulme clearance area: ' I
said, "Why are you showing me this desolation?" They replied, "This is
our showpiece." I said, "I'm absolutely ashamed - why don't you put
some bloody houses on it!"'
The initiative towards a final decisive break from the Simon tradition
came not from Manchester's politicians but from the designers. Austen
Bent's architectural staff, under his Chief Assistant Architect, Robert
Stones, were already discontented at the Department's approach to design
and landscaping: 'That nine-storey slab, you banged it down in
Wythenshawe, you banged it down elsewhere, I got sick of seeing it!
There it was in the drawer and you just kept reusing it! It was a
pretty miserable thing to have to do... Then some foreman from Parks
would turn up twelve months later in a lorry and say, "Right, Bill,
chuck out a couple of trees here!"' (111. 106) After the appointment
of J. S. Millar as City Planning Officer in 1966, a united designers'
front briefly emerged. However, it was to dissolve again almost at
once. Following Stones's success, with Millar's help, in establishing a
semi-autonomous Development Group within Bent's department, the two
groups then started to work on separate lines. Millar concentrated on
planning Hulme within the constraints of a virtually unaltered density
ceiling; an additional complication was introduced by the involvement of
Womersley, now in private practice, as consultant for part of Hulme.
(111. 107, 110) Stones's group, on the other hand, designed an
inventive, somewhat megastructural-looking range of deck-access and
cottage types, to be built in Comprehensive Development Areas other than
Hulme; Gibson Street was the only completed scheme constructed (in 1968)
to the design of the Group. (111. 108, 109) Until these large deck-
access schemes could begin to contibute to higher production, pushing
completions back up to almost 4,000 in 1971, Stones's successor as Chief
Assistant Architect, H. Combs, held the fort by continued routine output
of point blocks - for instance at Victoria Avenue East, where eight 17-
storey blocks were erected by direct labour in 1967. 31
107 Hulme Stage 3 North, Manchester: 1989 view, showing Hornchurch
Court, one of three 13-storey Laing Sectra blocks built in 1964-5
to get immediate dwelling gain, and later deck-access blocks built





108 Longsight CRDA Stage 1 (Gibson Street development), 1989 view of
outer facade of 10-storey barrier block (facing line of unbuilt
expressway). 573 dwellings designed by Manchester Housing
Development Group in 1966 in a highly inventive megastructural
style, and built from 1968 by Drury and Concrete Northern (Bison).
HDG members involved in the design of Gibson Street included Robert
Stones (Group Leader), Wolf Pearman, Terry Kennedy, and David
Millard.
109 Gibson Street, view of inner facade of barrier block and lower
'spur' blocks to south, 1989.
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110 Hulme Stage 5, Manchester: linked crescents of 7-storey deck-access
housing built from 1967 by Fram Russell; in the left distance are
visible the 15-storey point blocks of Stretford MBC's Clifford Ward
Redevelopment, built in three stages (1962-9) in a 'salient'
jutting into Hulme.
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While Manchester was having to be dragged backwards into its large 1960s
programme, MHLG's regional office was finding much greater receptivity
among surrounding towns. The Ministry's first showpieces were Salford
and Oldham, England's most slum-ridden second-rank county boroughs, and
both implacably opposed to overspill. In the case of Oldham, the St.
Mary's redevelopment and the local point-block schemes of the mid-1960s
had averted any immediate land shortage. But the overspill threat was
not lifted completely until 1966, when the Ministry finally gave in to
Oldham's incessant demands for the rezoning of a large peripheral site
at Sholver. Salford felt itself overshadowed by two threatening forces:
mass overspill, and the proximity of Manchester: 'They have always
looked over their shoulders at their neighbour - they were certainly
concerned that Manchester would swallow them up!' The resulting
attitude of municipal competitiveness was exploited by Cleeve Barr and
the regional Assistant Secretary, P. L. Hughes: they facilitated
Salford's redevelopment of the 89-acre Ellor Street-Broad Street CDA
with large numbers of multi-storey blocks, on the basis that there would
be no resultant overspill. This served the twin interests of municipal
prestige and preservation of Exchequer Equalisation Grant and rateable
value. Percy Johnson-Marshall's visionary urban-renewal plan for the
redevelopment of this area as a multi-decked 'regional centre' had by
then run into intractable financial and organisational difficulties, and
McWilliam readily stepped back in to fill the breach with package-deal
point-blocks built by local contractors. MHLG saw an expanded Salford
programme as a stick with which to beat the sluggards of Manchester's
Housing Committee. On the basis of the enormous Ellor Street
redevelopment, Salford's output now accelerated at a tremendous rate,
admittedly from a very low base. Completions rose from a mere 30 in
1962 to 465 in 1963 and 1,468 (150% higher than Manchester's pei—capita
level) in 1966! Throughout the second half of the 1960s and the early
1970s, in fact, Salford kept up the highest output per head of
population of any large English authority, even keeping slightly ahead
of Maudsley in Birmingham. :32:
By the mid-'sixties, the influence of the Ministry's Northern (later
North Western) Office was becoming more widely felt among medium-sized
authorities - less through the formal machinery of consortia and
'systems' than through the personal pressure of officials. But, now,
the nature of that influence began subtly to change, in response to
local perceptions and demands. During the period of establishment of
the regional office, P.L. Hughes had been chief proselytiser, faithfully
reflecting Joseph's and Cleeve Barr's preference for lower-height blocks
and mixed developments. However, as MHLG's regional structure
mushroomed during the middle of the 1960s and branches up and down the
country 'went native', these nationally-inspired ideas faded from view,
and were supplanted by voices which echoed and amplified the now-
established municipal values of production. Within the North-Western
Office, some of the initiative passed to its Principal Architect, J.
Clay LRIBA, who assisted in the creation of a new and lively municipal
enterprise among the medium-sized boroughs of the area, in the field of
housing production. Manchester's housing architects, who were at that
very moment busy abandoning point blocks in favour of lower deck-access
patterns, looked on him with some trepidation, as being a Cross-like
bogeyman: ' an absolute high-rise nutter - the entire solution of
Britain's housing problem was point-blocks with garages around!' But
Clay left Manchester well alone. Instead, 'his staff would sit down
with the smaller authorities next door to us and more or less tell them
how to do their schemes. They would be dealing with some borough
engineer who ran the housing programme through a junior architect, and
they'd lean on them - whereas Manchester was one of the big boys!' 33
In one typical adjacent borough, the wealthy but landlocked Stretford
MBC, successive Conservative and Labour administrations had kept up a
consensus policy of self-contained redevelopment, intended to 'keep the
life in the borough'. Along with this went an increasing enthusiasm for
the building of point blocks. The culmination of their programme was
'Perry's Folly', an obelisk-like 25-storey tower at Chapel Lane,
commanding the southern approach to Stretford: 'an imposing block of
flats to give character to this entrance to the Borough*. This lavishly
appointed project was built from 1966, partly at the instigation of a
former Borough Engineer, A. H. Perry. (111. Ill) More controversially,
a clutch of 15-storey blocks was erected in the Clifford Ward
Official opening of Chapel Lane development (Stretford House),
Stretford, on 20 April 1968: group photograph on roof of block.
Third and fourth from left are: Councillor David W. Homer, Housing
Committee Chairman, and Councillor Mrs. Anne Kirkbright, JP, Mayor
of Stretford. This 25-storey point block, nicknamed 'Perry's
Folly' after a former Borough Engineer, was built from 1965 by
Matthews and Mumby.
Redevelopment, a Stretford salient jutting into Hulme. Manchester's
designers, having just expunged point blocks from the plan for Hulme,
were outraged when even larger blocks started sprouting only yards from
the city boundary: 'We were doing Hulme at 110 p.p.a., leaving some
space, but Stretford had this programme, they had three blocks and were
going to put more in at about 200. What infuriated me was that
there was a nice church, a very nice spire - they were going to wall it
in! Stretford's Borough Engineer wasn't a bad guy, but it was Clay who
came down on it, and let them go ahead. My feeling was: "They're using
up the open space, which we created to breathe!"' (111. 110) But
Clay's influence could only reinforce, not override: this was shown for
instance in Burnley's rebuff of his 'strong recommendation' that two
point blocks should be added to their Trafalgar Street deck-access
scheme. 3/t
THE NORTH-EAST AND YORKSHIRE
The unevenness with which the Modern housing drive took hold in South
Lancashire was echoed in other conurbations - notably the North-East and
the West Riding of Yorkshire. (Maps 5, 6) In the former case, the
story revolved around those two polarised extremes, Newcastle upon Tyne
CBC and Sunderland CBC. Sunderland, an entrenched Labour-held
authority, had maintained a high output (often higher than Newcastle's
at only two thirds of the latter's population) without significant
resort to multi-storey building, as a result of an excellent land supply
and the council's willingness to levy a high housing rate. The
appointment of a new, ' systems'-minded Borough Architect in 1964, Harvey
Bishop, coincided with the temporary stepping-up of Sunderland's annual
completions target from 1,200 to 2,000, and the starting of several
multi-storey projects, including the Taylor Woodrow-Anglian contract at
Gilley Law, and a central redevelopment scheme. During the late 1960s,
however, Sunderland's production steadily declined, to a level of less
than 100 completions in 1971. 3S
Newcastle upon Tyne's Modern housing programme was altogether different
in character - not least because it was conjured out of the city's worst
postwar output slump (in 1958), by the most outstanding figure of
postwar local government in the North of England: Councillor T. Dan
Smith, whose energy as Housing Committee Chairman from 1958 to 1962 was
to provide him with his 'ladder to power' . Smith's political origins
lay with the ILP, but, unlike Gibson, this complex and forceful man had
moved decisively to embrace the new Labour rhetoric of national
modernisation: by the late 1950s and early '60s, he had come to see the
housing drive not as an end in itself but as the trigger for a wider
programme of regional reconstruction. However, in contrast to some
'progressive' Labour councillors elsewhere, Smith was emphatically no
Little Echo to the planners, resignedly acquiescing in policies which
would diminish the status of his own city in the furtherance of some
wider plan. His own vision for the North-East combined economic
regionalism with a trenchant repudiation of Osbornite low-density
112 Newcastle upon Tyne's Council Leader, Councillor T, Dan Smith, seen
in 1961 with Dame Evelyn Sharp, inspecting a model of the City's
standard point block: these blocks were then under construction at
Cruddas Park and several other sites,
thinking: he ceaselessly argued for the concentrated development of
Newcastle as regional capital of the North East. 315
Elected to the housing chair in May 1958, Smith needed immediately to
raise output from the rock-bottom level of 611 dwellings under
construction. But that would not in itself be sufficient to get
underway his transformation of the city - or, as part of that plan, to
secure him the leadership of the Council. He had to make immediate and
visible impact on a high-profile housing problem. One in particular
stood out as 'a perfect target for vigorous attack': Newcastle's slums,
manageable (at 8, 184 households) by Liverpool or Glasgow standards. In
view of Newcastle's desperate land situation, any redevelopment
programme would inevitably be 'ring-fenced'; and so Smith, who had in
1953 opposed the Longbenton outer-suburban multi-storey proposal, now
began enthusiastically to build a standard point-block (newly designed,
under his Conservative predecessors) on cleared and landscaped gap sites
near the centre, at Shieldfield, at Heaton Park Road, and at Cruddas
Park (his showpiece): ' With discreet floodlighting we were able to carry
the greenness of the lawns and the dappled shadows of the trees into the
North-East night'. (111. 112, 113) By mid-1959, the use of multi¬
storey blocks on prominent central sites had not only dramatically
reversed the decline in the current programme (raising numbers under
construction by 150% in a single year), but had provided a curtain
raiser for Smith's wider plan of reconstruction, which was focused not
on housing but on the 'renewal' of the city's commercial heart. 37
Subsequently, Smith's programme was delayed by site shortages and
contractual controversies, while he himself moved on to wider planning
fields and alternative housing strategies (such as his 'Operation
Revitalise' improvement initiative). But the City persevered with the
building of point blocks of one- and two-bedroom dwellings, largely on
gap-sites. These blocks remained oversubscribed in every case and
extremely popular with councillors. In 1966, for example, Councillor
Mrs Abrahams hailed the building of an 18-storey Wimpey point-block at
Adelaide Terrace: ' We have had to wait, but the results I assure you are
well worth waiting for. We are going to have three blocks of 18-storey
<ts7
113 Scotswood Read Redevelopment Area (Crnddas Park) seen In 1989
flats eventually, not just one 11-storey block. We are going to have a
shopping parade, landscaping, and when this is finished our little
suburb of Elswick Ward will be one of the smartest places in the City'.
30
Most other active authorities in the North East, such as Gateshead or
Felling, conformed more to the unglamorous output-orientated model of
Sunderland rather than that of Newcastle. However, two major outbreaks
of prestige-building disturbed this pattern. The first was Whickham
UDC's imposing 30-storey block at Ravensworth Road, an outer-suburban
scheme at a notional 100 p.p.a. , which the authority justified on
grounds of soil conditions. The second was the 'castle town' of
Killingworth, where Longbenton UDC constructed an enormous Skarne deck-
access scheme (along with two-storey houses) as an agent for
Northumberland County Council, which was trying to build up rateable
value in rivalry with the City. Killingworth's sombre outcrop of deck
blocks, situated in a strange, bleak setting, was designed by the
architect R. Gazzard, in his capacity as semi-autonomous Director of
Development for the project.
In the Yorkshire conurbation, Leeds and Sheffield were increasingly
close until 1968 under the design-minded chairmanships of Cohen and
Lambert: they jointly comprised the focus around which some smaller
authorities such as Rotherham (led by the energetic Alderman Bill
Beevers) began to push forward. AO Unlike the North-West, where
Liverpool's dogged consistency contrasted with Manchester's extravagant
variations in output, Leeds and Sheffield kept up a close parity in
product ion.
Sheffield's two 'housing leaders', Albert Smith and Harold Lambert, had
secured Womersley great autonomy. Secure in the knowledge that the City
Architect, like Maudsley in Birmingham later in the decade, would ensure
that output remained at a politically acceptable level, Lambert for his
part passionately upheld the LCC-like pluralism of Womersley's
department, whose designs ranged from mixed developments and deck-access
U-st
114 Park Hill Part Two (Hyde Park) development, Sheffield: deck blocks
up to 19 storeys in height, built from 1962 by direct labour. 1989
view.
developments to vast swathes of YDG cottages on the edge of the city.
The Chairman and City Architect closely liaised with one another, and
Lambert protected the programme from any contractual pressure, or from
tinkering by the City Engineer, whom he dismissed as 'a two-storey man -
he couldn1 t address his mind to the kind of development we were moving
to!' Using language fairly close to that of the 1950s Townscapists,
Lambert recollects his pride in the City's achievements in design and
product ion:
'Like Rome on its seven hills, Sheffield's redevelopments were built on
three hills. Park Hill was the first to be developed; then there was a
completely different design for Netherthorpe - a spine of point blocks,
using old grindstones and ponds as features. Then Woodside - I reckon,
one of the finest developments built in the City. It was a fantastic
thing - it reflected even on a layman such as me - walking along the
Infirmary Road area, the changing view of Woodside on its hill as you
move round. To have put Park Hill on each of these three sites would
not have been on at all. You'd have got completely fed up looking at
them! ' *■1
Following the shock of the narrow defeat of a proposal, strongly backed
by Lambert, to assimilate the Corporation's town planning functions
within his department, Womersley left Sheffield for private practice in
1964. Before then, however, his dual policy of deck-access and mixed
developments attained its highest level of grandeur, in the form of the
Park Hill Part Two (Hyde Park) development, an extraordinary, cliff-like
19-storey decked acropolis containing well over a thousand dwellings,
and the Norfolk Park scheme, a group of fifteen 17-storey towers with
low blocks interspersed on undermined ground. Lambert comments: ' At
night, looking over from the other side of the valley, Norfolk Park is a
marvellous sight - when the lights are all lit on the point blocks, it
looks like a great Christmas tree!' This massive push won Sheffield a
bonanza year of completions (3,651) in 1965, and so cut the waiting list
that annual output from that point barely needed to exceed 2000. 14:2
(111. 114-116)
Leeds's vigorous but architecturally far less glamorous building of
point blocks by Wimpey and Tersons enabled a very similar output to
Sheffield's to be maintained, with an annual average of 1,800
completions in 1961-5, rising to nearly 2,000 in the late 1960s. (111.
115 Hyde Park: 1989 view of topmost deck in 19-storey block.
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116 Sheffield's standard 'twin tower' block of the 1960s: 1989 view of
one example, built at the Hanover development by Gleeson in 1965-6.
117) However, as will be explained in a later chapter, Cohen's own
attention and enthusiasm was by that stage moving fast in a completely
different direction: away from the building of high flats, towards a
policy of area housing improvement.
The Chairman (Councillor K. C. Cohen, C.B.E., LL.B.)
and Members of the Housing Committee of the Leeds City Council
request the pleasure of the company of
at a ceremony to be performed by
The Rt. Hon. Denis W. Healey P.C., M.B.E., M.P. (Minister of Defence)
on Saturday, 19th February, 1966, at 11.45 a.m. to mark the opening of
the first 15-storey block of flats to be completed on
the Whinmoor Development.
Councillor K. C. Cohen, C.B.E., LL.B.,
Chairman of the Housing Committee, will preside.
17 Invitation to opening ceremony at Whinmoor development,' 1966:










■FREESTANDING1 CITIES AND SMALLER AUTHORITIES
Outside the intense pressures and rivalries of the conurbation areas,
the building of multi-storey flats proceeded at a much less frenetic
rate. For instance, the per-capita output of high flats in Wales and
East Anglia in 1963-7 was less than one-fifteenth of that in highly
urbanised Scotland.
Large 'freestanding' authorities often embarked on energetic housing and
slum-clearance drives not as part of an open-ended commitment to a
certain building level or 'target', but in a 'once-for-all' manner.
Perhaps the most highly compressed of all multi-storey programmes was
that of the Labour stronghold of Swansea CBC. This authority had, by
1960, built some 7,800 postwar dwellings, all cottages and low flats.
Then, however, under the housing chairmanship of Councillor T. S.
Harris, Swansea suddenly flung itself into a brief but energetic
redevelopment programme, letting in 1961 five separate multi-storey
contracts for a total of 13 point-blocks. This sudden glut was
followed, as early as 1963-4, by vandalism and letting difficulties in
the newly completed blocks; so no more high flats were built in Swansea.
Similar policies were pursued by Bristol CBC. Here, by 1960, a large
21, 000-dwelling postwar push had got the general-needs problem under
control, and so an incoming Citizen Party administration diverted all
effort into a five-year burst of multi-storey building and
redevelopment: the proportion of the City's programme accounted for by
high flats soared from 34% of total approvals in 1959 to 99% in 1962.
Likewise, in Brighton CBC, the entrenched Conservative administration of
Councillor S.W. Theobald, 'the King of Brighton', came under sudden
pressure in 1961-2 to increase output, as a result of local political
and social stresses caused by the 1957 Act's decontrol of privately
rented housing. Theobald responded by temporarily throwing into reverse
the Council's low-output and house sales policies, and embarking on a
brief but vigorous multi-storey and redevelopment programme.
In coastal towns in the South-East of England, the phasing-out of
general-needs building in the early 1960s coincided with a new and
somewhat unexpected demand for old people's housing. In most instances,
this was satisfied through the building of cottages; but, in the notable
case of Southend CBC, it sparked off a spate of point-block building in
a previously cottage-dominated programme. Vigorous housebuilding was
more difficult for the non-county boroughs and districts, although some
go-ahead urban districts such as Thurrock, using delegated planning
powers, were able to undertake ambitious programmes.
In non-conurbation authorities free of severe perceived housing
problems, the new Modern types of flats were mostly introduced for
reasons of design. The New Towns, by definition at first free of local
housing demands, had long been encouraged by Dame Evelyn Sharp to view
themselves in this light. Some New Towns, such as Harlow and Stevenage,
carried on building point-blocks in the 1960s for mainly aesthetic
reasons (as did Cumbernauld, East Kilbride and Glenrothes in Scotland),
but the focus of their architectural innovation had now moved to 'low
rise high density' patterns. **
Among large provincial municipalities committed to the LCC orthodoxy of
designer-controlled mixed development, the unchallenged standard-bearer
was still Coventry CBC. Coventry, not unlike the LCC, had long regarded
itself as a privileged authority duty-bound to innovate for the benefit
of harder-pressed cousins. Its City Architect and Planning Officer,
Arthur Ling, on succeeding D.E.E. Gibson in 1955, had found few slums
and a waiting list cut since 1945 from 13,000 to 4,500, 45% of which
were one-bedroom cases. Ling was thus able to pronounce (in his dual
capacity of housing architect and town planner) that ' slum clearance
could be coped with, but spec building was a worse problem' - a
definition of the housing problem in chiefly aesthetic terms, which
would have seemed incomprehensible in Glasgow or even Manchester.
Ling rapidly embarked on a three-pronged Modern housing programme in
Coventry. Its first element was the redevelopment of two seedy but not
unfit 'twilight areas' at Hillfields and Spon End; these schemes,
including LCC-like 10-storey slab blocks, Ling saw as prototypes for the
Urban Renewal of areas not classifiable as 'slums', but seen as outmoded
ta
in architectural and planning terms. Secondly, he began building one-
bedroom point-blocks, mostly of 17 storeys, around the city centre and
at suburban focal-points; these had a visual and practical purpose, to
realise his own multi-storey aesthetic (closely related to Gibberd's
'church spire' planning at Harlow) and to provide conveniently-situated
flats for small households and higher-income groups. Thirdly, after the
formation of the Midlands Housing Consortium in 1961-3, many of
Coventry's extensive suburban sites were developed with prefabricated
timber-framed MHC terraces. Despite the city's lack of emphasis on
production for its own sake, Coventry's favourable land supply
paradoxically made possible a very respectable output during the mid
1960s: annual completions edged well above 1, 000.
The Coventry example was copied in various smaller cities in Southern
England. For instance, D.E.E. Gibson's deputy, David Percival,
appointed as Norwich's City Architect in 1955, valiantly struggled to
import Modern patterns to this low-density Labour stronghold, in the
limited form of four-storey point blocks and maisonettes. But it was
only when the anti-flat diehard George Carver was dislodged from the
housing chair in the early '60s by design-minded councillors such as Len
Newton and Freda Hartley, that Percival could begin to add a few
judiciously sited high blocks, some in the context of central slum-
clearance and others to break what he saw as the ' monotony' of suburban
estates.
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, medium-sized Conservative-held
boroughs such as Gosport, Bedford or Hove were prone to embark on urban-
renewal multi-storey schemes in their town centres, seeing these as
municipally-sponsored equivalents to the luxury private developments
with which they were often familiar. Gosport MBC's high flats, the
cherished creation of its Housing Committee Chairman, shipyard worker
Alderman A. R. Nobes, were an especially lavish example of prestige-
building. The startlingly tiled slab blocks of high-rent flats in
Nobes's South Street development (built by Wimpey from 1958)
substantially offset Gosport's housing land shortage and reduced the
borough's waiting list, while cocking a snook at Portsmouth across the
harbour.
One of the most complex of all the provincial 1 progressives' of the
1960s was Leicester CBC, a city whose 1960s Modern housing programme was
shaped by two powerful designers, the City Planning Officer and the City
Architect. Comparatively few high blocks were constructed in Leicester,
but those that were built were almost all slender point blocks around 20
storeys in height, disposed to maximum aesthetic effect: the city has
the highest average block height of any major city in England and Wales.
The move towards selective, design-determined multi-storey building, in
a city with no land problem, no 'slums' even by Coventry's modest
standards and a Conservative-Labour consensus on most housing and
planning issues, was not caused by a policy change within the Housing
Committee, which remained wedded to the cottage pattern. Instead, it
came about through the decisive seizure of initiative by the Town
Planning Committee, whose forceful Conservative leader, Alderman Kenneth
Bowder, had become determined to modernise his city in the Coventry
manner. Under such a plan, a powerful apparatus of town planning would
be necessary; in 1962, therefore, a new department was created and W.
Konrad Smigielski, an ebullient Polish academic attracted to Leicester
by its prosperity, was appointed the first City Planning Officer: 'I
said: that's my city! - because there were possibilities!' so (111.
118)
The Town Planning Committee, as part of its plan to establish hegemony
over all aspects of development, had demanded that housing production be
stepped up. So Smigielski evolved a strategy like Smith's in Newcastle,
intended to use housing to get quick and highly visible results, while
his staff got to work on the climax of his reconstruction proposals - a
complex and ambitious traffic plan. As a first initiative in the field
of housing, he secured the abandonment of the previous City Architect's
old-fashioned layout for the suburban Rowlatts Hill scheme, and put in
its place a mixed development: four point blocks would provide a
Gibberdian 'accent' and one-bedroomed accommodation. This, he demanded,
should also be the pattern for the more complicated inner-area
118 W. Konrad Smiglelski, seen at home in 1973, a short time after his
retirement as Leicester City Planning Officer (including caption
from local newspaper article).
Konrad Smigielski at homo, with a painting he
bought "to prove you can make money out
of a hobby." He bought it—black and
unrecognizable—restored it and, on the
strength of black and white photographs,
Christies estimated that he would get at least
£600 for it. AH of which bears out erstwhile
student and colleague Henry Blacknichi's
assessment of him : "Mr. Smigielski has an
artist's eye for colour and an uncanny knack
of being able to sort out the good from the
bad".
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redevelopraents: 'Any idea had to come first from my Department. I
wasn't interested in buttonholes and details. We decided the master
plan, the density, the broad layout. As for detailed design, I was
interested in that too, but it was the City Architect's job. Urban
design is the town planner's job.' S1 (111. 119)
Clearly, as a result of Smigielski's expansive world-view, there was a
potential overlap, even conflict, in the area of housing layout and
design between his department and that of the new City Architect (from
1963), Stephen George. However, unlike the case of Birmingham, there
were no significant differences between the two. George's interests and
initiatives were channelled in another, altogether different direction:
involvement of the architect in the building process, and promotion of
technical experimentation and architect-controlled 'system' building.
Already, as Deputy, he had persuaded the Department to join CLASP; now,
as City Architect, he participated energetically in the founding of the
Midlands Housing Consortium. George was perfectly content with the
'landmark' point-block formula, and made relatively few changes to the
outline schemes prepared by Smigielski's staff for major developments.
Instead, the two officers jointly turned their fire on the City
Engineer, viewed by Smigielski as 'a troglodyte - banging black tarmac
on pavements' .
George's intention was to 'get a new horizon' for his department by
establishing it as an LCC-like centre of scientific research. In
October 1964, he made a successful bid for control of a new DLO set up
by an incoming Labour administration: his aim was to use the force as a
vehicle for constructional innovation. The DLO first built three
schemes of standard MHC cottages, with few problems. The next, and more
challenging step was to work out a battery-cast 'system' for low and
high blocks, in the EDLO fashion, and to build a large prototype scheme
at the Highfields North redevelopment area. Unfortunately, unlike
Edmonton, Leicester experienced incessant fluctuation of political
control. Despite the agreement between the parties on the Council
concerning even such normally contentious matters as cost rents, direct
labour building was one issue that was guaranteed to upset the most
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119 Smigielski's Gibberdian aesthetic: 24-storey point blocks built
from 1965 at the St. Matthews Phase II development by Laing.
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harmonious political consensus. By 1967-8, the Highfields North scheme
was at the stage of construction where major teething problems
(exacerbated by the effects of Ronan Point) were being encountered. By
then political control of the Corporation had once more changed. Unlike
Birmingham's Conservatives, who avidly supported Maudsley" s production
drive, Bowder was less committed to the 'numbers game'. In late 1967,
indeed, the Council had acquiesced in a MHLG allocation cut from 900 to
500 (doubtless to allow redistribution to Birmingham or Nottingham). So
Bowder reassigned the Highfields North project to Wimpey in 1969 and
shut down the DLO the following year, and George left for private
practice. 5:3 (111. 120)
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120 Highfields North (St. Peter's Area) Redevelopment, Leicester; 18-
storey towers and low blocks built from 1970 by Wimpey following
the closure of the DLO.
m
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER 7
1 Rationality deficit: Dunleavy, p. 178. Actors: ibid., p. 351.
2 'Little Caesar': int. Reed.
3 TCPA against Wythall, Watton election manifesto: A. Sutcliffe and R.
Smith, Birmingham 1939-1970, 1974, p. 144; Watton's previous interest in
housing output, HBC 16-1-1958. Bradbeer: K. Newton, Second City
Politics, 1976, p. 202.
4 'The Public Works Committee': int. Sheppard Fidler. Castle Bromwich
row: HBC 3-5-1962; resolved 21-3-1963 (new layout).
5 'Growing lack of confidence': Sutcliffe and Smith, p. 441. Watton
'rod of iron': int. Reed; Sutcliffe and Smith, p. 105; Newton, p. 202.
'System you could mould', 'deluxe engineering', 'I honestly think..':
int. Sheppard Fidler.
6 'Couldn't cope': int. Sheppard Fidler. Castle Bromwich low Bryant
quotations: for instance Area B 736 flats 19-11-1964, Bryant accepted,
only other tenderer (Wates) 16% higher in price. Huts: int. Harvey.
Shepherd: int. Lambert.
7 Bryant competence, methods: int. Sheppard Fidler, Reed, Harvey.
Camus: HBC 13-12-1962, Dunleavy, pp. 271-7; Bison Hounslow visit 29-8-
1962, Tyburn Rd prototype, HBC 6-6-1963, ABN 8-4-1964 p670,
Kidderminster visit, HBC 7-11-1963, Chairman's Action (executive
action), HBC 4-6-64.
8 'Chris Bryant took Harry Watton': int. Sheppard Fidler. 'As we were
leaving': P. Dunleavy, The Politics of High-Rise Housing in Britain
(1978, Oxford University PhD thesis), p. 356. 'After leaving
Kidderminster': letter Sheppard Fidler to M. Horsey 1988; also HBC 7—11—
1963 p. 84.
9 Dunleavy, op. cit. , pp. 337, 350 (diminishing returns), 73-7, 88-9
(illogicality).
10 Int. Harvey. Saving on contracts: Finance Department, Schedule of
Contracts, July 1974, and Evening Mail 7-4-1978 p. 5. Gifts list
Evening Mail 8-4-1978 p. 5. Entertaining of Maudsley, Evening Mail 11-4-
1978 p. 5. Watton probably not corrupt: interview Amos.
11 AJ 26-2-1964 p. 450, Sheppard Fidler reply: AJ 11-3-1964 p. 566; see
also Sutcliffe and Smith, pp. 440-1. Int. Sheppard Fidler for 'dictate'
and 'had enough'. Ceri Griffiths, his Principal Housing Architect, left
for Dawley earlier in 1964.
12 Shedden: int. former Leeds architect.
13 Shedden reorganisation of City Architect's Department: the Housing,
Education and General branches were merged into two equal branches,
Housing and Education/General: NBA, Housing Productivity in Birmingham ,
1969, p. 11; Dunleavy, pp. 286-7. Contractual policy after 1964, NBA,
op. cit. , p. 17; ' unpopular' 3, 4 storey blocks, HBC 20-1-1966.
Chelrnsley Wood success: Crossman, pp. 87, 91.
14 'Goer1: int. George; Maudsley was Deputy City Architect from 1964,
increasingly stepped in for Shedden during the latter's illness: HBC 16-
8-1965. Shedden retirement: HBC 17-3-1966, Dunleavy, p. 286.
15 First Castle Bromwich contract (Area B, 736 dwellings in in-situ-
built 16-storey point blocks), HBC, 19-11-1964; 1965 extension contracts
to Bryant to get the site moving, int. Harvey. 'Get the team': NBA, op.
cit. , p. 59. Landscaping: ibid. , p. 33. Displace City Engineer: Evening
Mail 12-4-1978, p. 5.
16 Maudsley enthusiasm for improvement: int. Reed. Cost reduction of
cottages: NBA, op. cit. , p. 25.
17 Maudsley's cardinal principles: NBA, op. cit., p. 62. 'Self-
cleansing' : int. Harvey.
18 'Uncanny way' 'He'd tell councillors' 'Prices were very thin': int.
Harvey.
19 'Size of a Mark 1 New Town': int. Reed, 'It was exciting': int.
Reed. Corruption saga: Evening Mail 7-4-1978, p. 5, 8-4-1978, 11-4-1978,
p. 5 (gifts list). Historical account obsessed with corruption scandal
to exclusion of virtually all else: Dunleavy, pp. 292-302. But verdict
of F.J.C. Amos, Chief Executive brought in in 1973 to clear up
corruption: 'In some places corruption is linked to substandard building
and design - but not in Birmingham' .
20 Pre-1966 parochialism: Crossman, pp. 286-7. Racial tension on
Smethwick housing: ibid., p. 46. Go-ahead multi-storey policy of
Darlaston pre-1966: Wednesbury and Darlaston Times 29-8-1964 (Bentley).
Rowley Regis conservatism on high flats, see for instance HBC 10-1-1964
(row with Estates Management Committee on high flats scheme for Riddins
Mound). Bitter opposition from Darlaston and Willenhall to Walsall
takeover, Walsall placatory policy: int. Winn, Wood. 'Copying' of
Walsall point-block designs by new Stafford MBC Borough Architect: int.
Winn. Wolverhampton 'conditioned with city status', prompting Heath
Town project:int. Winn. 'Socialist decrepitude' of pre-1966
Wolverhampton leadership: Crossman, p. 286. Wolverhampton background: G.
W. Jones, Borough Politics, 1969.
21 Int. Bor. Liverpool Echo 8-11-1963, p. 14 (Entwistle). 'They
wanted to put..': int. P. E, Nixon. '
22 'Bloody silly': int. Lambert. Decision to approach Unit: Liverpool
CBC HC 26-7-1962; 2,486 dwelling tender approved HC 24-1-1963; tender
dated 13-1-1963. Classic Road: int. P.E. Nixon. Sites not available: HC
17-10-1963 p. 536, int. Bor; Chow, pp. 71-5. Bradbury enthusiasm for
'systems': Municipal Review September 1963 p. 570.
23 Bor and Braddock: int. Bor, Amos. Braddock against planners:
Liverpool Echo 4-11-1963, p. 6; his death, Liverpool Echo 13-11-1963 pp.
1, 9, 12.
24 Sefton left 'housing to Housing': int, Sefton, Liverpool Echo 14—11—
1963, p. 11, G. Turner, The North Country, 1967, p. 155. Tension with
Braddock, Sefton character sketch: Observer Magazine 19-11-1972, p. 35.
Bor attempts to curb point blocks: City Planning Officer, Interim Report
of City Planning Officer for a High Buildings Policy, 19 July 1963
(opposed by Bradbury at HC 19-9-1963 on cost grounds); HC 29-11-1963,
Bor report on Density in Liverpool to Development Plan Committee.
25 Relocated Camus blocks and gerrymandering, as at ' Logan Towers' :
int. Sefton.
26 Change in power balance: int. Amos. Boddy as Director of Housing:
Liverpool Echo 15-11-1963 p. 17; F. J. C. Amos profile, Municipal
Engineering, October 15 1971 p. 1927. General account of Liverpool
postwar housing: L, Esher, A Broken Wave, 1981, pp. 217-45.
27 HLG 118-154 paper 17-5-61 for 30-5-61 Minister's visit.
28 Hol-lyhedge scheme: Manchester CBC HC 9-1-1961.
29 Construction lagging, Camus: HC 9-7-1962. Camus abandonment,
acceptance of Laing Sectra for Heywood: HC 13-8-1962. J.J.G. Michie on
'spontaneous' Manchester adoption of Sectra: Team Spirit August 1963;
Manchester reluctance to depart from traditional construction: HLG 118-
154 15-7-1963 MHLG-Manchester meeting on housing drive. In-situ Laing
point blocks: Team Spirit July 1965. 2,267 Laing dwellings built: Team
Spirit September 1965. Manchester building policy: int. Stones.
30 Attempts to reverse the multi-storey policy: Manchester CBC Council
4-11-1964, HC 10-1-1966 pp. 842-3. Availability of gap sites 'a very
minor matter' : int. Stones. HC opposition to raising of 90 h. r. p. a.
ceiling: HC 11-2-1963. Joseph reminded the Council: HLG 118-154 11—7—
1963, briefing for Minister's visit. By Nov 63, suspension of waiting
list and lifting of prohibition on letting of high flats to families
with young children: HC 14-11-1963. Mellish visit: int. Mellish.
31 'That nine-storey slab': int. Stones. Womersley and Hulme: AJ 5-10-
1966 p. 834; City Planning Department, A New Community - the
Redevelopment of Hulme, c. 1966; G. Turner, The North Country 1967 p69-
70 (on Millar). First Sectra point blocks to get immediate housing gain
from Hulme: Team Spirit June 1965; HC 1-4-1968 decision that npw CDAs
should be developed at 'approximately 100 h.r.p.a.', comprising cottages
at 80 and blocks of up to 6 storeys at 160. Net densities of first such
developments: Gibson Street 148 p. p. a. , Turkey Lane 195 b. s. p. a, ,
Wellington Street 170 b. s. p. a.
32 Salford and Oldham most slum-ridden: int. Armitage; HLG 118-185.
Sholver: Oldham CBC HC 7-10-1959, 12-10-1966. 'They have always looked
over their shoulders': int. Raitt. MHLG saw an expanded Salford
programme: for instance 11-7-1963 HLG 118-154 brief for Minister's visit
w
to Manchester. Salford: 5-6-1963 p. 509; AJ 2-10-1963 p. 687; R.
Chandler, H January 1966, p. 225-9. Abandonment of high building in
Salford: Salford City Reporter 18-9-1970, 4-2-1977.
33 Manchester architects' view of Clay: int. former Manchester housing
architect,
34 'Keep the life..': int. Homer. 'Imposing block of flats': 17-4-1968
note for Councillor Homer when opening block on 10-4-1968; int. Homer,
'We were doing Hulme': int. former Manchester housing architect;
Stretford programme entirely slum-clearance: HC 7-12-1965; London visit,
abortive attempt to push Stretford into 'systems': HC 8-2-1966;
Cornbrook 11-10-1966. Clay and Burnley: HC 6-6-1966. Example of nearby
authorities influencing one another: Eccles MBC s purpose-built point
blocks for old people (HC 5-5-1959, 5-9-1962, 5-2-1963) spread to Hyde
MBC (General Purposes Committee 21-9-1967, 16-10-1967). See also
Chadderton UDC: small authority choosing high flats to break both slum-
clearance and waiting-list problems: HC 17-10-1966, 12-6-1967, 22-1-
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CHAPTER 8: BREAK-UP OF AN EMPIRE: REORGANISATION AND REVITALISATION IN
LONDON
The recovery in housebuilding and the gradual easing of the 'land trap'
in many provincial cities throughout the early and mid 1960s, only threw
into greater relief the steadily worsening shortages of housing and land
in Greater London. This crisis ultimately stemmed from a prosperity-
related influx of population, with all its much-publicised by-products:
homelessness, 1 Rachmanism' , higher land cost, tenement unfitness.
However, the impact of this deep-seated demographic pressure was made
far more severe by organisational shortcomings in the public housing
drive, caused by the fragmentation of local government in Greater London
and by the half-hearted attitude of the LCC towards housing production.
1
The Government's remedy was the reorganisation proposed in the 1963
London Government Act, whose implementation was completed in April 1965.
(Maps 7, 8) This reform retained, but rebalanced the two-tier system,
parcelling out the Greater London area into new London Boroughs of
almost county borough status (including virtual autonomy in
housebuilding matters), and scrapping the LCC in favour of a larger, but
far less powerful body covering the whole of Greater London: the Greater
London Council (GLC). As to the success of this initiative in housing
production - the output figures speak for themselves. For 1964, total
public housing completions per 1,000 population stood at 2.8 for the
County of London (the LCC accounting for half) and 1.8 for the entire
1963 Act Greater London area, compared with 6.3 for the most active
Metropolitan Borough, Shoreditch, and 4. 1 for Liverpool as a production-
minded provincial city. In 1967, while Liverpool's output had remained
virtually static, Greater London's had grown by 55%. Although this
increase was rather dwarfed by Maudsley's fourfold jump in output in
Birmingham, and by the even greater energy of second-rank cities such as
Salford and Dundee, it was. still a very creditable achievement, given
the particular housing difficulties of the capital, with its scarce,
costly and difficult building sites and its grave building-industry
shortages.
LCC: DEAD HAND AT THE HELM
'A very difficult body." Sir Milner Holland
' The whole of the Housing Division seemed like a giant nursery school,
whose main object was the happiness of architects!' M. Richardson 2
In the County of London, the late 1950s and early 1960s saw the
progressive disappearance of any credible claim the LCC had to overall
authority over London housing. This was partly caused by the Council's
dilatory handling of its own programme, which had been protected from
any political 'push for numbers' since 1950 by the power of the
architects, But the situation was made much worse by the LCC planners'
and members' inflexibility towards the aspirations of the boroughs - an
attitude inherited from the Herbert Morrison years before the war, when
authoritarianism towards the boroughs was at least combined with
vigorous housing output by the LCC itself! Once divorced from
production pressures, after housing was taken from Walker in 1950, the
Council's centralist power (now headed by Sir Isaac Hayward) was now
used in support of the architects and planners, to bolster their
emphasis on design considerations and density controls. Thus,
paradoxically, 'coordination' or 'central control' became not a spur but
a drag on production throughout the County, whether by the LCC itself or
by the boroughs. This created a vicious circle of diminishing respect
for the LCC's authority in housing policy: those Metropolitan Boroughs
now wishing to launch themselves into vigorous production - often as a
result of Walker's encouragement in the ' 40s - became more and more
resentful, and put forward initiatives which exposed yet further the LCC
disinclination to build forcefully or allow others to do so. Yet there
was no single force which could push aside the LCC, and resuscitate the
capital's housing drive. As a result, from around 1960 until local-
government reorganisation in 1964-5, the story of Greater London
housebuilding became characterised by extreme complexities and
frustrations, in contrast to the simplicity of (say) Glasgow or
Liverpool, or, indeed, of Scotland or Northern Ireland as a whole. 3
How did the LCC's own programme, once so strong a production force under
Walker, begin to hold back production throughout the capital? The most
immediate cause was the fact that, within the Architect's Department, an
anti-production bias became entrenched from the very moment, in 1950,
that it recovered responsibility for new housing design. The
Department's guiding principle was abhorrence of standardisation,
exemplified in the way that the term 'standard design' was used as a
cloak for one-off schemes bearing some very general resemblance to one
another. Scientific-sounding 'standardised' code-letters were used to
give the impression that each project belonged to a series and avoid
accusations of self-indulgence from MHLG or councillors: for instance,
all point blocks were designated by the letters 'PF' normally followed
by a sub-series letter, but even point blocks in completely individual
schemes by private consultant architects would be referred to as *PF'
or, more coyly, ' PF mod. ' Kenneth Campbell recalls that 'nothing would
make them use the same design twice, or, worse, someone else's design!
For them, life was a series of designing an answer for each particular
problem. As long as it had any resemblance to any of the "standard
designs" we could get it accepted!'. Associated with this presumption
in favour of an individual tailor—made 'solution' for each site was a
lack of both production discipline and cost-consciousness, encouraged by
the Council's freedom from Ministry loan sanction controls: it was taken
for granted that the Council had an example to set, whether in
constructional innovation or in patronage of the arts. In contrast to
its sweeping, worldwide reputation in design and 'R&D', the Housing
Division's attitude to the production and political context of housing
was curiously introspective. Martin Richardson recalls his reaction, as
a young architect joining Colin Lucas's renowned group in the late
1950s:
'I could hardly believe it! In our section of twelve architects, we all
had little projects - the last bits of Roehampton, and some sites in the
East End. I and two others were given a little project of sixty flats
in one block at Pelling Street. The care and talent we expended on
designing those sixty dwellings was prodigious! We even designed the
kitchen fittings, the knobs on the kitchen cupboards! The attitude in
Colin Lucas's group was that you didn't even consider whether it would
please councillors. Architectural quality was the only criterion to
Colin. If we came across a problem, he'd say, "Why don't you think
about it over the weekend?" Time, cost, politics, even social
appropriateness were hardly considered at all. Colin was a very
contemplative man, a follower of Gurdjieff's teachings - he believed
that you should be true to absolute qualities!' *■
The separation of the Housing Committee from immediate local demand, as
a result of the LCC's regional status, deprived the architects'
production schedule, however efficient, of any external impetus which
might have checked the luxuriant spread of design thinking, At the same
time, the Council's commitment to population dispersal further
encouraged the anti-flat predilections of the architects and Housing
Committee, and the zealous enforcement of density maxima by the planners
and the Town Planning Committee. The inconsistencies of the position of
the LCC Housing Committee, which wavered between support for expanded-
town decentralism and lukewarm pursuit of the ' numbers game' , were only
kept in check by the remarkable abilities of Mrs. Evelyn Denington, its
long-serving Vice-Chairman (and chairman of the important housing-
planning Joint Development Sub-committee). (111. 121) Denington
combined a passionate belief in overspill and designer freedom, with
consummate executive skill and decisiveness - exemplified in the adroit
way in which she pushed schemes through committee once approved at her
'call-in'. One junior LCC architect around 1960 recalls the Committee's
consideration and approval of 'his' scheme, a mixed development at Grove
Park Road, Lewisham: ' She started a lengthy ding-dong argument about
overnight lorry drivers, then suddenly said "Right! Time's getting on!
All those in favour...!"' s
From around 1960, internal pressure to rectify the LCC's decline in
output had two results. The first was the contractual and staffing
changes discussed above in Chapter 3; the second took the form of a move
to increase densities on the Council's own schemes. During the 1950s,
the Valuer's staff had attempted in a desultory way to encourage the
architects to develop sites piecemeal, as and when they came up. The
latter had successfully fended off this pressure, and had managed to
build up quite sizeable areas such as Royal Victoria Yard or Warwick
Crescent. (111. 7) The architects sometimes felt themselves obliged to
develop the first part of large staged developments piecemeal, using
121 Mrs. Evelyn Denlngton seen at the House of Lords
Croix Rouge Pursuivant, Hubert Chesshyre, before
Baroness of Stevenage on 19 July 1978.
with her Herald,
her ennoblement to
point blocks. Multi-storey gap-site development pure and simple,
however, remained taboo. Oliver Cox recalls, 'We'd advise the Committee
that this was madness. If it had to be developed piecemeal, you did an
overall plan!' In the early 1960s, there came ever greater pressure
from the Finance Committee for higher densities and, by implication,
greater use of multi-storey blocks - calls which were justified by
reference to site cost, nearby open space and so forth, However,
Denington remained generally opposed to net densities above 100 p.p.a..
Therefore, she saw to it that the Housing Committee substantially
watered down any proposals for development above zoned density before it
agreed, in its turn, to put pressure on the Town Planning Committee for
zoning relaxations. 6
THE COUNTY AND THE BOROUGHS: CONCURRENT HOUSING POWERS
The LCC"s attitude towards the boroughs' programmes inhibited output, if
anything, to an even greater degree than did the absence of production
drive within the Council's own programme. For a start, the LCC and the
boroughs had overlapping responsibilities in the field of land
acquisition and housing construction. The existence of concurrent
powers will always, in time, result in quarrelling over their use.
However, this kind of conflict over London housing remained latent
during the 1940s: power and initiative was still as asymmetrical as it
had been before the war, and Walker closely controlled both the LCC's
own programme and the boroughs' 'local housing operations' (through his
responsibility to appraise their schemes for loan-sanction purposes).
Even after the transfer of new housing design to the Architect in 1950,
however, there was at first little conflict with the boroughs: for 5 or
6 years, the County Council continued to live up to its responsibilities
under the old patron-client relationship, notably its longstanding
practice of allocating of 25% of new lettings to families on the
boroughs' waiting lists. But when MHLG deleted many suburban sites
zoned for council housing from the Development Plan, and began to push
for a concerted move to slum-clearance, the traditional links began to
spring apart, one by one. The LCC's ever greater decanting liabilities,
as its own slum clearance gathered pace, caused the Council to revoke
the 25% allocation to the boroughs at the end of 1955. From that point
onwards, the LCC and the boroughs found themselves more and more in
competition for the same, increasingly scarce slum-clearance land. This
situation was eased for a while by the County Council's renunciation of
sites under two acres and its provision of some decanting assistance to
the boroughs. But the next fluctuation of fortune sharply worsened the
plight of the latter once again: Brooke imposed with very little warning
a requirement that the large numbers of requisitioned dwellings,
inherited by the boroughs from the wartime years, should be released by
March 1960. 7
Although the boroughs' share of public housing production in London was
climbing steadily from its 1956-60 level of roughly 25%, the LCC still
H-%7
tried to cling to its imperial past. The Council took for granted two
continuing prerogatives; in development, that it could peremptorily
acquire any site it wanted, ignoring borough boundaries if necessary;
and, in letting, that it should set out to disperse the inner London
population through a grand regional process of 'rippling-out' and
overspill. The LCC's interpretation of concurrent housing powers also
assumed that a coordinating role could be assumed at any opportunity: in
slum-clearance, in overspill, even in the early 1960s negotiations with
British Railways over surplus land - despite the fact that this railway
land issue had initially been raised by Paddington MBC as a rival
borough initiative! e
Perhaps the most grandiose expression of LCC trans-borough thinking, as
well as the last substantial foothold of its planners in housing design
after 1950, was provided by the Stepney-Poplar Reconstruction Area.
This had been set up in 1944 with the aim of coordinating the rebuilding
of the worst-bombed districts of the East End. The Planning Division
certainly achieved a superficial show of control in this area, not least
through its sponsorship of the much-publicised Lansbury development and
the able propagandising and organising work of Percy Johnson-Marshall's
Reconstruction Areas Group (established in 1949). However, unlike
Manzoni's department in Birmingham, the LCC had not taken the
opportunity, afforded by wartime legislation, of buying outright all the
land in the area. So, in practice, the Council could only develop the
district through piecemeal schemes, such as Walter Bor's development at
St. Anne's, Stepney. But the LCC's fragmented effort was not
counterbalanced by borough vigour: the County Council's pervasive
presence in the area had stifled most of the potential initiative of the
two borough councils. Stepney and Poplar MBCs faced a constant battle
to secure transfer of compulsorily purchased sites from the County
Council, and their shares of total council housing production in their
areas, relative to that of the LCC (27% in Poplar and 31% in Stepney),
were by far the lowest of any Metropolitan Boroughs. 3
A few other Labour—controlled boroughs, such as Southwark and, at the
end of its existence, Wandsworth, also took the same line. This Mellish
described in caricature form as 'the "we'll do nothing, we'll let the
LCC do it" attitude'. But increasing numbers of other boroughs began,
with varying degrees of success, to try to carve out their own
programmes. In some instances, these initiatives were closely bound up
with acute local perceptions of slum-clearance need. Such cases
included Bethnal Green's vigorous tenement redevelopments, Battersea's
dogged fight to acquire responsibility for the Battersea Park Road
redevelopment, and the bruising ten-year battle waged by 'Mr
Hammersmith' , Councillor Ted Woods, to wrest the southern part of the
Latimer Road Area from the LCC for multi-storey redevelopment, with the
aim of clearing the slums and rescuing the Borough's housing drive in
the nick of time from land starvation; 'In his early days, Mr Woods came
face to face with acute poverty in his own ward, Latimer. He entered
homes which were hovels and saw children walk barefoot to school. These
sights helped mould his life and made him determined to improve the lot
of the ordinary man and woman. It could not be done by waving a magic
wand. It took years of hard work, for in the 1950s he had an enormous
fight on his hands to get the site accepted as a clearance area'. 10
Some boroughs achieved higher output by avoiding too obsessive a
concentration on slum-clearance. For instance, authorities such as
Lambeth and Camberwell began to build up a cycle of redevelopment
throughout the 1950s by fairly large developments such as Studley Road
or Sceaux Estate. But all these trailed far behind London's most
dynamic housebuilding borough, Shoreditch MBC. This authority was
fortunate in the size and wealth of its industrial and commercial area,
relative to the extent of its residential areas; there were therefore
plentiful rate revenues available to spend on relatively few residents.
Many people had moved out during the war, so there would also be a
fairly low decanting liability from any slum clearance. Under its
Housing Chairman, J. Samuels, and its Borough Surveyor, J.L.Sharratt,
Shoreditch launched itself with great vigour into the building of
repetitive multi-storey slab blocks (from 1948) and point blocks (from
1955). (111. 3, 122) Astonishingly, during the late 1950s the per-
capita building rate of this tiny, hemmed-in borough exceeded that of
the most active provincial or Scottish cities, such as Dundee or
122 Kingsland and St. Mary's Estates, Shoreditch: 1990 view, showing
the first built example of the Borough's 11-storey 'standard' point
block <21-64 Laburnum Court, commenced 1955), and other flats
constructed in the mid and late 1950s.
Sunderland. Through its efficient slum-clearance and building
organisation, the Borough achieved a final completions total in March
1965 which was, per head of population, twice that of the runner-up
borough, Finsbury, and 807. higher than that of the County as a whole,
including the contribution of the LCC! All in all, Shoreditch's per-
capita total was by far the highest in the County - with the sole
exception, of course, of the City Corporation, whose miniscule
residential population and vast resources in many ways echoed
Shoreditch's situation to a far more exaggerated degree. 11
The City Corporation was able not only to exclude the LCC from its small
territory, but also to engage in considerable building outside its
boundaries - notably the Avondale Square development (I960), including
three 20-storey point blocks. The City's gradual progression from a
'residual' or once-for-all conception of housebuilding, to the heroic
scale of the Barbican, was the result of cumulative pressure from
various sources: from its own Public Health Committee Chairman, Eric
Wilkins; from his close allies, the architects Chamberlin Powell and
Bon; from Sergei Kadleigh; from MHLG and LCC; and from the City
Architect, appointed in 1955. (111. 123) Competition with the LCC over
sites also impeded the activities of some Conservative-controlled
boroughs, such as Hampstead, although it presented less obstacle in the
case of very determined authorities such as Westminster and Holborn. 12
123 The Corporation of London's Barbican development, built from 1963
and including three point blocks of 43-45 storeys height.
THE COUNTY AND THE BOROUGHS: PLANNING CONTROLS
'It's the thin end of the wedge - you're either trying to keep a decent
city, not just "boroughs", or each one comes with special pleading, and
where do you get in the end? Too high densities!' Lady E. Denington 13
While the LCC's employment of its concurrent housing responsibilities
provided an increasing source of friction with the boroughs, its use of
its planning powers as a means of intervention and control, particularly
in relation to densities, started, in the same period, to act as a brake
on overall housing production in London.
During the late 1940s, Walker had ruthlessly imposed his interpretation
of the Abercrombie density rings, as minimum levels, on boroughs that
were anxious to build cottages at lower densities. It was a supreme
irony that, the very next decade, Ling's planners should have set out to
pursue a diametrically opposite policy, with equal sternness. From that
time onwards, those same density-rings were employed as maximum levels
in determination of planning applications: the 'diminishing returns'
argument was used to deter boroughs set on using high flats for 'site
cramming' , while the LCC itself continued to build many high blocks in
mixed developments. This alteration of course was one of the results of
the LCC's rejection of Walker's production ethos and the Council's
espousal of overspill. From the early 1950s, the Town Planning
Committee turned down many borough schemes on grounds of excessive
density, maintaining a dogged resistance to any attempts to ease its
grip. 1/1
The first challenge took the form of a head-on charge against the
density zonings. The LCC's opponent here was Paddington, a severely
'ring-fenced' borough whose Conservative Housing Chairman, R.J. Burrell,
and whose Director of Housing, Major R. A. Jensen, had a long-term
ambition to build multi-storey commercial-residential developments
(presaged in Kadleigh's 'High Paddington' project) and an immediate
intention to break the planning stranglehold of the County Council.
There was already hostility between the two authorities: the LCC had
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begun systematically harassing Paddington since it had passed to the
Conservatives in 1949 - for example, by building a school at the Bishops
Bridge Road development without consulting the borough. But Jensen's
test-case challenge was a proposal in 1954 to build three 15-storey
blocks ('Perkins Heights') at Paddington Green, at a notional density of
124 p. p. a. if the adjacent open space were included, 320 p. p. a. if not.
This was opposed by the LCC not on party-political grounds, but as an
attack on planning controls, which, Arthur Ling contended, might provoke
the ' complete collapse' of overspill. Following indignant LCC
resistance, the proposal was defeated at a public inquiry in October
1954. Burrell and, later, Jensen resigned as a result; but the County
Council only stepped up its relentless obstruction of the borough's
housing drive, and succeeded by further refusals in whittling
Paddington's programme down to a mere 8 dwellings under construction by
1957. The icy relations between the LCC and Paddington continued right
up until local-government reorganisation: as a final snub, the LCC Town
Planning Committee turned down a Paddington scheme for the British
Railways Mileage Yard site in November 1964 on grounds of excessive
density, against its own officers' recommendations. 1 s (111. 124)
With frontal assault by individual authorities revealed as unproductive
for the time being, the boroughs then decided to attempt to apply joint
pressure on zoned densities, through their collective mouthpiece, the
Metropolitan Boroughs Standing Joint Committee (MBSJC). The MBSJC's
first, unsuccessful campaign of protest had followed the LCC's abolition
of the 25% letting allocation to the boroughs in 1956, In 1959-60,
however, the Committee had greater luck in the matter of densities: by
exploiting the MHLG's new leaning towards higher density, the MBSJC was
able to persuade the Ministry to issue Circular 37/60, which advocated
the raising of densities. As a result, the LCC was compelled,
grudgingly, to concede selective increases in zoned densities. However,
Comprehensive Development Areas were excluded from this new measure, as
a result of an ingenious contention by LCC planners. Their argument ran
as follows: within 'comprehensive' developments, the ratio of
residential to non-residential land had already been fixed by the
planners themselves, and so higher net densities, with their assumed
124 Westminster City Council's Brunei Estate, built from 1969 by
Gilbert Ash on the Mileage Yard site previously disputed between
the LCC and Paddington MBC,
diminishing returns, could only serve to reduce the land available for
housing! Such reasoning, piling one theoretical sophistry upon another
in an attempt to fend off the political pressure for higher output,
would not have been countenanced for an instant by the likes of Gibson
or Cross. It was only the entrenched position of designers in the LCC
which made it possible for them to put forward unchallenged this kind of
self-confirming argumentation.
In the early 1960s, the Town Planning Committee began to allow the
boroughs a limited amount of flexibility in calculating the densities of
staged developments - including an element, even, of retrospective
determination. This was, of course, no more than the TPC was by then
compelled to allow the Council's own Housing Committee. By 1965, the
TPC was also coming under increasing Ministry pressure .to move the
goalposts of density computation, by reducing the assumed occupancy rate
of new dwellings by 18%. '7
It was, however, only at the very end of its existence that the LCC* s
density hegemony suffered its most startling jolt - a shock administered
by another Conservative-controlled borough set on confrontation. The
borough was Chelsea MBC, and the 'test case' over which this new battle
was fought was an ingenious scheme by the architect Eric Lyons for the
West Chelsea Extended Area (World1 s End) redevelopment. Chelsea, with
its lack of slums and grossly inflated land costs, was an authority that
had been driven to despair by the County Council's cessation in 1956 of
its annual quota of lettings to the boroughs. Although Chelsea had been
able to make some impact on the 'distressed gentlefolk' problem created
by rent decontrol in its area, it could offer no hope to its 1,200
waiting list applicants. Rapidly its Housing Committee, under the
determined leadership of Miss Elisabeth Stockwell, arrived at the
opinion that the LCC's density restrictions constituted the main
obstacle to a resolution of its problems. In 1961, therefore, the
Committee decided to mount a head-on challenge, by proposing the
redevelopment of an extension to the Cremorne estate at 338 p.p.a.: this
would achieve 200 p. p.a. over the combined area, which was zoned at 136.
Predictably, the proposal was disapproved by the LCC Town Planning
lo
125 West Chelsea Extended Area Redevelopment (World's End): 1989 view
showing, at left, the chimneys of Lots Road Power Station, whose
emissions were cited by LCC planners in a last-ditch attempt to
stop the scheme.
Committee, overruling the initially favourable inclination of Stamp and
the officers. Now Stockwell instructed the Borough Engineer, E.
Goldring, to find a national architect who could fight and win the
ensuing public enquiry. For this purpose, Eric Lyons was selected,
being already seasoned in battle with the LCC over the density of
developments by the private company SPAN. ie
For two years, a succession of proposals and negotiations were pursued
and endured, until, by 1964, Stockwell and Goldring began to scent
victory. This was clear from the fact that the LCC was now putting
forward increasingly desperate last minute 'red herrings', including a
suggestion that development should be delayed pending comprehensive
redevelopment of the entire district at an unspecified future date, or a
claim that the proposed point blocks would be subject to serious smoke
pollution from Lots Road Power Station. Many lesser boroughs might now
perhaps have meekly yielded to the LCC's assumed primacy in matters of
scientific research. Stockwell, however, straight away set out to
neutralise the Lots Road smoke emission argument, by engaging a
consultant chemical engineer, Dr. G. Nonhebel, to produce for her an on-
the-spot counter-report demolishing the LCC's calculations. Ironically,
however, Chelsea's final victory over the LCC's density policy was
posthumous: it was only in August 1965 that the public inquiry inspector
finally approved in principle the World's End project, and recommended
that the Development Plan zonings should from now on be be regarded as
'average' density levels rather than 'a maximum limit for any particular
development'. After 15 years during which the LCC's decentralist
planners had maintained a design-determined interpretation of densities,
reversing the production-first policy of Walker before them, the
pendulum had swung half-way back. From now on, zoned density would be a
basically neutral factor in the battle between design and production in
London. 13 (111. 125, 126)
^92
126 World's End; close-up view of outer facade, 1989.
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DOUBLE STANDARDS?
Although it was the LCC's use of the density rings that stirred up the
most disputes with the boroughs, the County Council's exercise of its
planning powers as an instrument of aesthetic control also caused
considerable delays to production, and general friction. It was only to
be expected that the LCC planners would, where possible, try to impose
their own preference for mixed development and point blocks on
architecturally retardataire boroughs which tried to retain elements of
the old-fashioned Walker block-dwelling formula. However, they also
attempted on occasion to exert control in a different, even opposed
direction: as a way to check the architectural assertiveness of those
few boroughs, such as Finsbury, St. Pancras and Westminster, which saw
design of 'social building' as a vehicle for municipal status. 20
Among these ' progressive' Metropolitan Boroughs, the pace had been set
before the war by the forceful new Labour administration (from 1934) of
Finsbury MBC. Finsbury's then leader, Alderman Harold Riley, procured
the services of the Modern architects Tecton to design the pioneering
Pine Street Health Centre and high flats at Busaco Street and Rosebery
Avenue. Even after Riley was ejected from the Council in 1945 as a
result of a corruption scandal, Finsbury still carried on commissioning
architecturally innovative designs from Tecton, and after that from
Emberton, Franck and Tardrew. But during the 1950s the drift of
Finsbury's consultant architects towards increasingly massive multi¬
storey designs began to inspire open hostility from LCC planners. This
first seriously delayed the programme in 1955, when proposals for high
blocks at Galway Street became trapped in a two-year proxy dispute
(1955-7) between the LCC and MHLG: on the one hand, the County Council
wanted slender point-blocks, and, on the other, Bellamy's staff at the
Ministry insisted on more economical blocks with six flats on each upper
floor. (111. 127) Then, in 1962, the LCC planners turned down
a gargantuan 25-storey block at Clarke's Close, containing 300 flats and
almost square in elevation, on grounds of its ' sheer bulk'. This sort
of controversy, concerning issues of design as much as output, was the
cause of repeated interruptions in Finsbury's vigorous housing drive -
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127 Finsbury MBC's Galway Street development, built by Wates from 1958,
including two 17-storey blocks delayed by a dispute with LCC
planners and MHLG: 1989 view.
at just the time that next-door Shoreditch was pressing ahead so
successfully with construction of its visually old-fashioned but
uncontroversial blocks on any available site.
The LCC planners also frequently tried to tinker with the appearance of
proposed borough schemes in a more detailed manner. Lubetkin recalled
that, in comparison to the 1930s, the power of the planners had 'grown
considerably, and they intended to make use of that. Previously,
architects' plans were simply checked by the LCC. Now they had
aesthetic preferences: "We want a different window, a slightly flatter
roof, a slightly steeper roof!"' While these interventions were meekly
accepted by some boroughs, they were vigorously rebuffed by others. For
instance, Ling's staff rashly tried to object to the Lupus Street
elevation of Powell and Moya's Pimlico scheme, suggesting the
substitution of 'softer, more Swedish' detailing, but they hastily
withdrew in the face of bristling resistance from Town Clerk Sir Parker
Morris. 2:2
What created ill-will among the Metropolitan Boroughs above all else,
however, was the feeling that the LCC design establishment was quite
consciously applying double standards. In their view, the County
Council was setting out to throttle the boroughs with its planning arm
while securing itself maximum freedom in the architectural and
acquisitions field - and in either case relying on the almost certain
support of the Ministry in the event of any appeal. The LCC's
assumption that notification of 'lower-tier' authorities concerning its
own developments was no more than an irritating formality, caused
smouldering resentment among active boroughs, Labour and Conservative
alike. This was displayed quite clearly, for instance, in the response
of Bermondsey's Town Clerk to the LCC's decision to divest itself of an
unwanted road on its Eugenia Road development by peremptorily assigning
it to the Borough under a little-known legal footnote: 'The County
Council had, with every apparent indifference and discourtesy, entirely
ignored the Borough Council's viewpoint and wishes in the matter; at no
time during the period of correspondence had the County Council shown
even the slightest desire to discuss, with the Borough Council, the
128 LCC Tldey Street/Spanby Road developments, Poplar: two 19-storey
blocks, built from 1962 by J, and M, Hill: view in 1989.
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merits or demerits of the Borough Council's objection, but had simply
adopted what, on the surface, would appear to have been an arrogant,
overriding attitude in the full knowledge that - relying upon precedent
- the Minister would automatically reject the Borough Council's
objection'. 23
In short, it was felt by borough members and officers that the LCC
designers, with the full backing of their Ministry counterparts, were
determined to keep the boroughs in their place - especially those most
committed to energetic multi-storey building. In early 1957, for
instance, the LCC stopped Finsbury and Camberwell from erecting 19 and
21 storey blocks, apparently so as to prevent the boroughs from stealing
the limelight from its own first 19-storey block, at Tidey Street,
Poplar - a block which, ironically, the County was proposing to erect
against strong objections from Poplar MBC! (111. 128) The only
effective and permanent emancipation for the boroughs would come with
the acquisition of planning powers over housing - a change which was
only to be achieved after the reorganisation of London local government
in 1964-5. However, Woolwich MBC, long accustomed to view itself as
London's foremost housebuilding borough, had achieved a partial
breakthrough to an almost county borough status in the 1950s: it had
succeeded in persuading the LCC to delegate to it the planning powers of
a fully-fledged Comprehensive Development Area. This scheme, the St.
Mary's CDA, was the only such area within the County not to be preempted
by the LCC itself. Woolwich's good fortune, properly exploited, laid
the foundations for the expansive central redevelopment plans of its
successor authority, Greenwich LBC. ^ (111. 129)
129 The slum-clearance programme of Woolwich MBC and Greenwich LBC:view of the Glyndon Redevelopment Area (including 11-storey blocksbuilt by the DLO and Wates for Woolwich from 1961, and 24-storeyBison blocks built from 1966 by J. M. Jones for Greenwich).
BUILDING IN GREATER LONDON: FRAGMENTATION AND OPPORTUNITY
Before the local government reforms of 1965, no concerted mobilisation
of the building industry in London for housing construction was
feasible, As already explained, the LCC, with its dominance by
architects and its contractual conservatism, took on board
prefabrication and the other implications of higher output in the 1960s
with little enthusiasm. Most Metropolitan Boroughs, on the other hand,
never sorted out their land problems, and raised output, to a level
where building-industry shortages could have a real, perceptible effect.
This was discovered by Wandsworth MBC in 1959 when it approached Reema
and other prefabrication firms, only to be told that its sites were all
too small to be of interest. Greater London's multi-storey building,
before 1956, was dominated by local and regional firms to an extent not
matched elsewhere in the UK (42%). The situation inside and immediately
outside the County was fragmented and fairly inconsistent. On the one
hand, there were experienced boroughs such as Shoreditch MBC, precocious
in negotiated contracting, or Edmonton MBC, with its outstanding direct
labour tradition. On the other hand there were authorities such as
Stepney MBC, whose lack of experience of large contracts, as a result of
longstanding LCC dominance, led it in 1964 to make a disastrous blunder
in its first ever point block scheme, a 24-storey block at Bede Road:
the tender of Rye-Arc Ltd., a local ship-repairing and marine
engineering firm, was accepted, with predictable consequences (Rye-Arc's
withdrawal from the contract) when the firm's bank refused to lend them
the necessary money. (111. 130) A similar degree of rashness was shown
by Heston and Isleworth MBC, an authority which, on the eve of its
abolition at reorganisation on 1 April 1965, saw fit to assign a
contract for four 19-storey point-blocks at Ivy Bridge Farm, to an
obscure Warwick-based contractor whose associated London company was
later found to have an issued share capital of only £1. One should,
however, bear in mind that the hurried conclusion of large prestige
contracts for high flats was a general phenomenon throughout Greater
London in the last days of March 1965!
130 Bede Road development, Stepney, seen In 1989. Stepney MBC's oneand only point-block scheme: the contract was awarded in 1964 tolocal ship-repairing firm Rye-Arc, but the latter subsequentlywithdrew and was replaced by Tersons.
OUTSIDE THE COUNTY: INTROVERSION AND INERTIA
The sluggishness of public housing production across Greater London
housing prior to 1965 resulted not just from the situation within the
County, but also from the administrative fragmentation of metropolitan
Essex, Middlesex, Surrey and Kent. The industrial boroughs of south¬
west Essex and east Middlesex might, on the map, have appeared nothing
more than arbitrary subdivisions of a single sprawling suburban mass,
but their culture and municipal political life was isolated and
parochial in the extreme. West Ham CBC was the most powerful of these
authorities, and the most active in housing matters; even it, however,
was typically 'insular... West Hammers were very cliquey - they felt
themselves a race apart!' The County Borough Council's longstanding
Labour administration and housing programme had been tightly controlled,
since 1946, by a ' troika' of members, none of whom ever served as
Housing Chairman. Two of the three were Freemasons; the third recalls
that the Council's closed political culture, for many years, revolved
around battles between 'the two factions - the Masons and the Roman
Catholics!' He also recalls that in 1963, when the London Government
Act first established that the council would eventually merge with
neighbouring East Ham CBC, another Labour controlled county borough, ' I
couldn't've recognised a single member or officer of East Ham!' 2:6
In this outer zone of Greater London, the LCC of course enjoyed no
planning or other powers over or alongside the local housing
authorities, although, as developer and owner of the many large out-
county estates built over the previous decades, it was constantly felt
to be present in the background. Following the winding-down of out-
county building during the 1950s, this indirect influence was exerted
less through housebuilding, than through the so-called 'sons and
daughters' problem: the cumulative letting burden imposed by these
existing estates on the municipalities in whose territory they were
located - particularly Essex boroughs such as Barking MBC and Dagenham
MBC. However, the LCC's seizure of 70% of the Croydon Airport housing
site in 1963, with the support of the Ministry, was interpreted by many
as an ominous portent of fresh LCC expansionism outside the County, a
campaign which was likely to be focused on an increasing number of large
windfall sites. Although it became obvious in that same year, from even
a cursory glance at the 1963 London Government Act, that any land-
poaching campaign by the LCC would be brought to a rapid and very final
end in April 1965, the metropolitan Surrey authorities took no chances
in the meanwhile, and kept up a shrill and incessant chorus of
opposition to the Croydon Airport land allocation: a Sutton councillor
declaimed in 1963, for example, that 'many a Town Council had awakened
to find that large areas of the borough were in the possession of the
LCC'.
Throughout the out-county metropolitan area in the early 1960s, output
never deviated from a rock-bottom level. In 1964, before
reorganisation, completions in the area of the future Outer London
Boroughs totalled only 1.2 per 1,000 inhabitants: this per-capita level
was only one-quarter of that of the whole of Northern Ireland in that
year, and a mere 15% of that of Lanark County Council. This stagnant
picture was only broken by the energetic but isolated building
programmes of the three county boroughs, Croydon, West Ham and East Ham
(in Croydon's case a 'once-for-all' burst of building, typical of an
active Conservative authority, in the early 1960s), and a few go-getting
non-county boroughs in Essex and Middlesex, such as Barking, Leyton or
Tottenham. As the county councils around London did not enjoy
concurrent housebuilding powers - although Middlesex County Council made
occasional half-hearted efforts to acquire them in the brief periods
that it was held by Labour - their planning scrutiny of borough housing
proposals lacked the imperial edge of the equivalent LCC activity.
Perhaps for that reason, .they happily went along with MHLG's suggestion
of increased zoned densities in Circular 37/60. Middlesex, for
instance, raised the maximum densities permitted in redevelopment areas
by 25% and elsewhere by 10 h.r.p.a.: this allowed boroughs such as Wood
Green and Tottenham to start building many high flats.
Middlesex was undoubtedly the most complex and varied part of the outer
metropolitan area. Its component authorities ranged from suburbs with
little perceived housing problem such as Ruislip-Northwood UDC, to
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Willesden MBC, faced with an acute problem and no immediate outlet. In
between these extremes stood vigorous Labour authorities such as
Edmonton MBC and Acton MBC (which had secured enough nearby land outside
their boundaries to enable their decanting and redevelopment programmes
to begin building up a surplus), and active Conservative boroughs such
as Harrow, which, under its Housing Chairman, Horace Cutler, combined
considerable building activity with a policy of council-house sales.
The achievement of Willesden was in many ways the most significant of
all Middlesex authorities. This borough had commenced its postwar
redevelopment programme in 1952, in the shadow of a sweeping overspill
proposal laid out in the County's Development Plan: this advocated a 17%
overall reduction in Willesden's 180,000 population, and, more
particularly, a 50% cut in the population of the Borough's only
redevelopment area at South Kilburn. But Middlesex did not enforce
blanket zoned densities as strictly as did the LCC, ana, in some areas,
cartograms were used: their overall district densities, as in the case
of Glasgow, enabled new developments to be inconspicuously lumped in
with existing housing. Therefore, in the thirteen years from its first
South Kilburn contract for 64 flats, the Borough was able quietly to
diverge from the Development Plan, through gap-site development in South
Kilburn and the suburbs, and through adding extra storeys to already
approved blocks: a strategy that was of course completely barred to its
southern neighbours within the County of London, such as Paddington! 30
By 1963, the momentum of South Kilburn had built up to the extent that a
phase comprising 283 dwellings, including three 12-storey slab blocks,
could be commenced. Even that, however, could not achieve a rate of
decanting sufficient to satisfy Willesden's forceful leader, Alderman
Reginald Freeson. Freeson wanted to spread the scope of redevelopment
into two new areas, Lower Place and Stonebridge. He was also aware that
the 1965 reorganisation was set to drop a substantial 'land-bank' into
Willesden's lap, in the form of the whole of the adjoining Conservative-
controlled borough of Wembley: Willesden (much the larger authority) was
to be amalgamated with Wembley, to form the new London Borough of Brent.
But Freeson was impatient to step up decanting, and so he decided to act
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unilaterally in the meanwhile. His attention was drawn to a large area
of decayed 19th-century villas at Chalkhill, Wembley Park, then in the
first stages of piecemeal speculative redevelopment. To the
consternation of Wembley's sedate councillors, he decided to
compulsorily purchase the entire area directly and without consulting
them; this would obtain a housing gain of nearly 1, 500 dwellings and
allow commencement of decanting from Lower Place and b'tonebridge: 'They
were wettish Tories, quite nice people, and I was a bit thick-skinned.
Instead of talking to them, the Town Clerk and I drafted a letter which
went to every individual owner up there, and the thing blew! It was a
bit insensitive, but it got the b thing moving - about the biggest
single piece of land assembly in London!' But the output gains of
Willesden's bold gesture were only to be realised after 1965. And to
the end, output throughout Middlesex as a whole remained very sluggish:
even in 1964, its overall per-capita completion rate was only 43% of
that of the County of London, with its far more circumscribed land
supply. 31 (111. 56, 131)
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131 Chalkhill Redevelopment Area, Brent.: over 1,250 Bison deck-access
dwellings built by Farrow from 1966, This view, taken in 1989,
shows Claw F (an extension contract, built from 1968) and one of
the two multi-storey car parks.
S72_
GAMEKEEPER TURNED POACHER: THE GREATER LONDON COUNCIL
'By and large... the answer was: "We don't want to know you - go away!"'
Lady E. Denington 33
Sir Keith Joseph's decision to continue London's divided housing system
after 1965, by allocating reserve housing powers to the new Greater
London Council, stemmed not from some grand redistributive strategy but
from the Government's political vulnerability on the housing question in
the early 1960s. Bizarre though it may now seem, there was indeed a
worry, assiduously exploited by the 'LCC lobby', that a complete
transfer of responsibility to the new ' quasi-county boroughs' might
actually cause a drop in output. However, Labour's victory in the first
GLC elections in 1964 - indirect result of the Government's
incomprehensible capitulation to the pressure of some outer suburban
Conservative-held authorities that they should be excluded from the
reorganisation area - brought Mrs. Denington, long held down as Deputy
Chairman in the LCC, to the housing chair at last. It was to be her
unique achievement to conjure a plausible programme out of
responsibilities originally acquired by default. 33 (111. 121)
To start with, the new two-tier balance between the London Boroughs and
the GLC was quite different from the old borough-LCC relationship. On
the planning side, the tables had now turned. The new boroughs were
more or less full planning authorities in the area of housing. They
therefore could delay or turn down GLC proposals, and soon eagerly began
to do so; by 1967, this had seriously affected the programming of GLC
building, and had stalled some important schemes, such as Downs Road,
Hackney. In their land acquisition policy, some boroughs showed an
aggressiveness unknown before 1965. This was discovered by Denington
when Spencer (Fred) Fagan, Lambeth's Development Committee Chairman, on
hearing of GLC plans for compulsory purchase of a site off Leigham Court
Road, convened an immediate committee meeting to secure a counter-
compulsory purchase order to block any move by the GLC: ' I said: "We
want it for Lambethans, not anyone you care to take off the London
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housing list." She said, "You wouldn't dare!" I said "You just wait
and see!"' 3A
As a result, the GLC's share of output in Greater London began at a low
level, and steadily tailed off further (dropping from 31% of local-
authority completions in the area in 1965 to 24% in 1967 and 20% by
1972), Even if some officers saw the GLC as the LCC writ large,
Denington realised that the Council could not impose its will on housing
policy, but would have to win cooperation. 3S
In formulating a strategy, Denington's instinct, as former chairman of
the LCC New and Expanded Towns Committee, was to attempt to resurrect
the LCC's ' rippling-out' crusade of population and density
redistribution. But she was also very much a pragmatist, and well
appreciated that the GLC's limited and ill-defined powers would make
impossible any real intervention in the suburbs: any move by the GLC to
start a large-scale programme of land acquisition in the outer boroughs
would be resisted, site by site. This meant that all significant
'rippling out' would in future take place within the boundaries of, and
under the control of, the new radial boroughs - between Willesden and
Wembley (within Brent), Shoreditch and Stoke Newington (within Hackney),
Acton and Southall (within Ealing), and so forth. Despite all the grand
rhetoric concerning regional coordination of housing, in reality the GLC
could aspire to no more than a toehold in Outer London building, by
trying to win a few large windfall sites (ex-railway, ex-airport or ex-
Service) as a 'strategic reserve' to assist decanting. As a further
token gesture, Denington also asked outer boroughs to make small letting
allocations to the GLC. But alongside and despite these highly
publicised 'strategic' initiatives, the routine bulk of GLC
housebuilding would still remain concentrated in inner boroughs well-
disposed towards the Council: above all, Tower Hamlets (building on the
previous friendship with Stepney MBC), but also one or two others such
as Islington. (111. 132) Such cooperation might take the form of joint
plans for tenement redevelopment, and other 'partnership proposals'. 3S
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132 The Indian summer of GLC point blocks; three 25-storey blocks built
from 1968 <by Sunley) at the Bow Locomotive Works Site development,
Tower Hamlets, adjacent to low terraces decked over a railway line
(1989 view), A more grandiose group of similar point blocks was
under construction at the same time at the Downs Road site,
Hackney.
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With windfall sites, Denington's greatest successes were in the field of
ex-Service land, where Mellish cut through bureaucratic prevarication on
her behalf. He insisted on the immediate transfer of the large
Kidbrooke Depot site, for instance, when he discovered at a meeting with
the Service departments in December 1966 that the main use of the
warehouse buildings occupying the site was the storage of Royal Navy
chamberpots. (111. 133) Railway surplus land, however, was a much more
contentious issue - not least because the whole question had originally
been raised by the boroughs. This was demonstrated in the case of the
Marylebone Goods Yard (Lisson Green) site, where the bitter legacy of
the LCC' s persecution of Paddington returned to haunt its successor.
This site had been the object of pressure by St. Marylebone MBC since
1950. When, in 1964, Denington claimed it for the GLC as a strategic
'reservoir' for West London, Westminster's Housing Chairman, Councillor
J. Gillett, a hardened ex-Paddington member, firmly rebuffed her
arguments, and pointedly remarked on ' the absurdity of treating
Westminster, with its huge overspill problem, as a receiving authority
for the overspill from other boroughs where the problem is not so
great'. Denington was eventually forced into what amounted to an almost
complete climbdown: she had to cede the site to Westminster, to abandon
any ideas that the GLC could attach conditions as to density, occupancy
factor and Parker Morris standards, and to settle for a percentage of
first lettings. In Outer London, once the GLC had come to terms with
the limited scope available for any unilateral land acquisitions of its
own, a successful formula of collaborative development was evolved; this
was applied, for instance, in the case of developments in the Lee Valley
or to the Hendon Aerodrome (Grahame Park) scheme, Barnet. 37
By contrast to the limited but nonetheless real usefulness of GLC land-
acquisition in Outer London, the parallel policy of seeking allocations
from the outer boroughs was mainly rhetorical in character. Despite
this, there was bitter resistance from several boroughs, above all
Bromley. In this area, even Denington's tactful approach made little
headway. She recalls: 'By and large the answer was: "We don't want to
know you - go away!" I thought, "You'll be thinking, like the expanded
towns at first did, that you'll be getting the worst of Londoners,
SIC
133 The GLC's Kldbrooke Depot redevelopment, Greenwich, built 1967-72
in two stages by Wates. A vast and awesomely rectilinear layout oflinked deck-access and 12-storey point blocks, designed by ColinLucas's group. 1989 view.
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throwing their dirty fish and chip papers around your leafy borough, but
you won't - they are the ones who*11 never move - you'11 get the
best!'". Denington managed in the end to secure offers of around 10-15%
of most outer boroughs' output; but, in practice, these took the form of
poor-quality and remote relets which were even less popular than
overspill had been in the 1950s. The only substantial break in suburban
ranks was the case of Hounslow, a marginal Labour—held borough whose
leadership saw its enormous land glut as a great political opportunity:
to secure the maximum importation of potential Labour voters, it offered
the GLC, in place of nominations, two large sites at Brentford Dock and
Heston Farm. 3e
In the organisation of the GLC's housing programme, there was at first
little change from the old LCC ways. The continuation of the Money Bill
block financing system (which cut out the need for individual loan-
sanction applications), and the persisting power of the architects,
encouraged the approval of ambitious projects such as Woolwich-Erith
(Thamesmead). But in 1966-7, unprecedented new Government restrictions,
such as unofficial loan-sanction vetting and mandatory cost yardsticks,
were applied to the Council's programme. The greater size of the GLC
programme, compared with that of the LCC, made it necessary to increase
the proportion of work allocated to private architects, so that GLC
design staff resources could be freed for major schemes such as
Kidbrooke and Woolwich-Erith. The fragmented LCC contractual tradition
remained undisturbed, with the exception of the large windfall sites,
where large contracts for prefabrication were negotiated - all, however,
under the strict supervision of the Council's architects, as in the
Taylor Woodrow-Anglian case. During the three years of Denington's
chairmanship, the old mixed development pattern continued to hold sway,
with densities over 150 p. p. a.only sanctioned 'in exceptional
circumstances'. Yet the loss of the old LCC esprit de corps affected
the officers as much as the members. Now architecturally thrusting new
boroughs or Borough Architects such as Hayes of Southwark or Jacob of
Haringey were starting to seize the limelight with their many novel
initiatives. There was a 'diaspora' of the most gifted ex-LCC
architects, and the new boroughs took their share. In the view of a
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senior Southwark architect, 'we were waxing and they were waning!' And
Macey's Housing Department could never forget that, in the shadows,
there all the time lurked the ultima ratio of the 1963 Act system: the
promise that the GLC's letting empire would one day be divided up and
distributed among the boroughs - which would mark the end of the
Council's role in the capital's housing provision. 33
After the Conservative victory in the April 1967 GLC elections, the
housing chair passed for the first time to a man outside the charmed LCC
circle, the driving and iconoclastic Horace Cutler. Now, the axe was
openly unsheathed and the Housing Department's careful holding operation
suddenly turned into a rout. Architectural design was less affected by
Cutler's reforms, as he was happy to leave Denington still in day-to-day
charge of the subcommittee covering this politically subsidiary and less
sensitive subject. Despite his experience as an estate developer,
Cutler had his work cut out battling to force through even his main
initiatives - transfer of housing stock to the boroughs and ending of
large-scale land-acquisition - and protect them against the Housing
Department's wily tactics of procrastination and obstruction. So he had
neither the time nor the inclination to challenge the power of the
Council's architectural establishment in design matters: 'People like me
are always at a tremendous disadvantage in being able to dissect the
plans of an estate, or a high block - you've got dozens of skilled,
expert people around. You had a call-over meeting every week, and you
could only scan them. No man has all knowledge!' A°.
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CITIES WITHIN THE CITY: THE NEW LONDON BOROUGHS
'I thought, "My God - these people are good!" Housing was their
spearhead - they knew they only had small sites, but they had enormous
ambitions!" E. Hollamby 41
The creation of the new boroughs unleashed an uneven burst of building,
ranging from the modest activity of some suburban municipalities to the
city-sized programmes of authorities such as Southwark. For the most
ambitious boroughs, concerted building of public housing became a
principal way in which they could create a new civic identity - in the
same way that it had been used by cities such as Glasgow or Salford to
defend their municipal autonomy.
Just like provincial county boroughs, the new authorities could now plan
and act virtually autonomously. Only for their first couple of years of
existence was their housing activity overseen, to a limited extent, by
MHLG. Over their first year of building, the Ministry set cautiously
low 'allocations'. Here, MHLG sought advice and informal evaluations of
borough needs and capabilities from the GLC's officers, and the low
estimates that resulted may perhaps be seen as a last, vain attempt to
reapply the old LCC strait jacket. However, these initial limits were
purely for Treasury consumption, as there was no intention among Housing
Administrators to apply any restraints on authorities that wished to
exceed their allocations, such was the political urgency of raising
production levels in the capital. During this initial period Mellish
concentrated on pulling conspicuous outer—suburban laggards such as
Kingston or Redbridge into line, and encouraging his old inner-borough
Labour associates to raise their sights - including extreme cases such
as Islington, 'that rotten borough of the London Labour movement' , whose
leadership needed a bruising visit from the Parliamentary Secretary
before they could be prodded into vigorous multi-storey building and
tenement clearance. In Mellish's words, 'in some boroughs I was
welcomed, in others dreaded!' 42
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After the new boroughs' relative capabilities had become clear, MHLG
divested itself as quickly as possible of the initial allocation
figures, which were based on the low achievements of the pre-1965
authorities, and on the GLC's pessimistic evaluation of the likely
capabilities of the new boroughs. There was, after all, a grave risk,
in the increasingly overcast economic climate, that these artificial
limits might now be seized on by the Treasury as a way to keep down the
output of active boroughs, Mellish let it be known, as soon as he
could, that the allocation figures had all along been regarded by MHLG
as minima rather than maxima, and could indeed now be referred to as
'targets': 'I set up what was tantamount to a league table, and said the
people at the bottom would be relegated!'
Administratively, negotiations and contacts with the boroughs and the
GLC concerning the London housing drive were handled by MHLG Housing
Division B. From 1966, this came within the responsibilities of perhaps
the key housing Deputy Secretary, Ronald Brain, and was dealt with
directly by an Assistant Secretary, Douglas Milefanti. Elsewhere in
England, an assembly-line procedure was the rule: short-staffing
compelled the streamlining of compulsory purchase order processing and
other vetting duties, and redistribution of allocations from
underperforraing to active authorities within aggregate totals. In
London, by contrast, Milefanti and his staff kept a close personal eye
on the programmes of all active boroughs; underperforming boroughs were
from now on left in comparative peace.
MHLG made no attempt to influence active boroughs' policies, but merely
concerned itself with overall output. In this area, Greater London's
low level of building before reorganisation had left the capital
trailing far behind provincial cities in the 'numbers game'.
Accordingly, active authorities' notional allocations were supplemented
by the Ministry without formal balancing cuts in the declared programmes
of others. London in the post-reorganisation years, in its lack of
aggregate allocations, was the closest English equivalent to the
flexible procedures of Scotland and Northern Ireland, neither of which
ever resorted to allocation systems. Milefanti recalls his negotiating
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technique: 'With underperforming borough X, I'd say, "Look, you must get
on!" - knowing full well they wouldn't. Then I'd go to high-performing
borough Y and would say, "Yes, you can have the extra 300 next year!"...
I'd repeatedly tell them, "The sky's the limit!" Mellish gave
unstinting political backing to the initiatives of his 'wildly
enthusiastic' Administrators: 'I'm a very poor economist. I never took
allocations off authorities. I'd say, "Get ahead, full steam ahead -
get bloody building!"'
Once the new boroughs were fully established, the GLC's indirect
influence over allocations and borough programmes at once ceased. In
planning terms, the difference from the weak position of the former
boroughs could hardly have been greater. Now, although the GLC's
observations on skyline and location considerations had to be sought in
certain circumstances (such as development including high buildings or
near a major road), the Council's only executive planning involvement
was the preparation of a vaguely-defined document known as the the
Greater London Development Plan, which was intended to supersede all
existing development plans within the area. But the interim drafts of
the GLDP, which proposed the replacement of the outer—London cartograms
by annular blanket densities (which would extend the harsher LCC system
to the whole of Greater London), were attacked and rejected in 1966-7 by
most boroughs. Meantime, the so-called Initial Development Plan
applied: this simply consisted of all the existing plans spatchcocked
together without alteration, and so was unified only in name. As a
result, the GLC's Planning and Communications Committee was only able to
intervene over densities if boroughs proposed excesses so flagrant that
they could be argued to constitute substantial departure from the IDP.
Not only that, but even here the GLC had no executive power to overrule
the boroughs: instead, it had to complain to Mellish and ask him to act.
It is little surprise that successful interventions by the GLC over
housing density - for instance, in the case of Waltham Forest LBC's
Cathall Road scheme in 1966 - were noteworthy chiefly by their very
rarity.
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In contrast to the GLC's building policy, which at first closely
resembled that of the LCC in its dogged reliance on mixed development,
the programmes of the active boroughs were characterised by
kaleidoscopic variety, It was as if the capital had been parcelled out
among the Housing Committees of a random few dozen provincial cities and
towns, from Aberdeen to Plymouth, and each had imported its own
particular range of national package-deals and local firms, monumental
prestige-projects and gap-site infills, and its own balance between
production and design.
In the field of contractual organisation, the vigorous programmes of
some boroughs were a particularly dramatic departure from previous
cautious practice, This particularly benefited Concrete Ltd. but also
provided a bonanza for any large contractor who was prepared to make the
necessary investment and establish reliable local connections. Crudens,
for instance, was able to vault straight down from Scotland and the
North of England to build Lewisham LBC's two setpiece schemes, at Evelyn
Estate and Milton Court Road III. Occasionally, however, unscrupulous
contractors attempted to take advantage of this sudden glut of work in
Greater London. In 1966, for example, the housing chairman of an inner
South London borough negotiating with several large contractors for the
building of standard multi-storey blocks on various sites suddenly
discovered that one of these, a very prominent London firm, 'was trying
to con us... they'd put a tender in, we'd accepted it - then I got a
frantic telephone call from the Borough Solicitor, saying they were
trying to up the tender by half a million pounds! I got the Borough
Architect round, and said, "Look, we've wasted a lot of time with this
crowd, but that's too bad. Tell'em to get stuffed, and as long as I'm
Chairman, they're banned from tendering!"'
Each new London Borough represented roughly the equivalent of a second-
rank provincial county borough in its potential attractiveness to
contractors. Active boroughs' multi-storey work was normally divided
out between two or three large contractors and the DLO(s) (if any);
other housing was left for local firms. For example, Enfield LBC's
Housing Committee set out to distribute work three ways: to EDLO (50%);
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134 Wandsworth LBC's Doddington Road scheme, built from 1967 by Laing
(12M Jespersen): 1989 view. Doddington Road was envisaged by
Sporle as the springboard of an audacious drive to tear down the
'twilight areas' of Battersea; but it eventually proved to be both
his crowning monument and his undoing, owing to Labour's loss of
the Borough in 1968 and his own imprisonment on corruption charges
arising out of this contract.
to Wates, principal contractor to the former Enfield MBC (25%); and to
Townsend & Collins, seen as the best of the local firms <25%: the firm's
entire output was promised to Enfield). In the case of some
authorities, the adoption of 'system building' formed part of a self-
conscious expansion of vision following the reorganisation. Wandsworth
LBC's 961-dwelling 12M Jespersen contract with Laing at Doddington Road
was visualised by that authority's corrupt but outstandingly dynamic
Housing Chairman, Sidney Sporle, as a central component of a rolling
plan which he hoped would eventually result in the complete rebuilding
of the slums and ' twilight areas' of the borough: 'This is the largest
IB project yet undertaken in the London area and we are proud that we
are sponsoring it, A modern estate will soon rise upon the site now
occupied by a squalid collection of old and worn out houses' (111.
134)
Not surprisingly, the former county borough areas, having been least
inhibited under the pre-1965 structure, had a head start: they recorded
the highest cumulative completion totals by April 1968. Newham achieved
3,514 completions, with the (by 1968) faltering aid of its 'winged
Pegasus', the Taylor Woodrow-Anglian bulk-order; while 3,206 dwellings
were completed by Croydon, which was just putting the finishing touches
to its Wates 11-storey point-block programme and preparing, in typically
self-contained fashion, to wind down its housing drive below an annual
rate of 100 by 1970 as others expanded. 4e (111. 54)
These former county borough authorities had little time for the
previously LCC-dominated London Labour establishment or, by the same
token, for the initiatives of Mellish (of whom one former housing
chairman remarked, 'if it was good for the LCC area, it was good for
London, the country, Timbuctoo! ' ). They set an example of self-
sufficiency and readiness to embrace package-deal and serial-contract
thinking that other outer boroughs with strong organisational nuclei and
adequate land supply were quick to follow. Within five years, a jumble
of parochial towns and suburbs had transformed itself into an array of
forceful, city-like authorities. For example, by 1970 Willesden's and
Wembley's combined 1964 completions of 267 had been multiplied into an
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135 Model of Hounslow LBC's Brentford Waterworks Stage I development,
built from 1967 by Wates: six 23-storey point blocks. The
borough's prestige scheme, proudly lining the M4 motorway.
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annual Brent output which was nudging 1, 900 - twice that of Newcastle-
upon-Tyne! (111. 56, 131) In the west, a grouping of Labour-controlled
outer boroughs had come into being. These mostly comprised inner
traditionally Labour areas - such as Acton in Ealing, Willesden in Brent
- and new outer 'land banks'. However, this pattern was not universal.
The composition of Hounslow LBC, for example, contained an unexpected
twist. The Council's Labour majority was provided largely by its outer
components, above all by industrial Feltham. Yet the leader of the
housing drive which was to imbue this ungainly geographical assemblage
with municipal purpose, the Council's Development Committee Chairman,
Alf King, had up to then spent his entire political career in
opposition, in the innei—suburban, but Conservative-controlled Brentford
and Chiswick MBC. (111. 135) Likewise, in the north, Enfield and
Waltham Forest each achieved nearly 3, 000 completions by 1968 through
energetic letting of point-block contracts, in the former case to Wates
and EDL0, in the latter to Wates and local firms. In Enfield, a
Conservative majority in the 1968 municipal elections had always seemed
on the cards, However, Eric Smythe's determination that Edmonton and
EDL0 should go down with all guns blazing was handsomely rewarded in the
1968 completions figures, as Enfield's total of 1,345 was 37% higher
than that of any other borough! A-' (111. 38, 39, 60, 136)
Some Conservative outer boroughs such as Harrow, Sutton or Merton were
intermittently active in the building of public housing, but steered
clear of all but isolated multi-storey schemes. Other Labour outer or
middle-ring boroughs wholeheartedly threw themselves into extensive
slum-clearance. These included Greenwich, whose sociologist Housing
Chairman, Joyce Carroll, much impressed by Park Hill, pushed through a
bulk-order for 24-storey Bison point-blocks on gap sites, to allow inner
areas to be cleared and rebuilt with deck-access housing; and Haringey,
which developed a very substantial windfall site at Broadwater Farm with
a big Taylor Woodrow-Anglian contract, to get its housing drive
(exclusively devoted to slum-clearance) off to a flying start. so
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136 Barbot Street Redevelopment, Enfield: four 23-storey battery-castblocks built by EDLO from 1966. In the foreground, Block A(Lancelot House), opened by Robert Mellish in April 1968.Photograph taken in 1989.
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THE INNER LONDON BOROUGHS
'I thought: "Right! From now on, it's going to be for Lambethans!
Many of the new inner London boroughs immediately began to indulge in a
kind of ostentatious muscle-flexing, both to emphasise their
emancipation from the LCC and to compete with one another. In contrast
to Outer London, many members and their GLC counterparts, and officers
such as Town Clerks, were well acquainted with one another already.
Several inner authorities saw accelerated slum-clearance programmes as
their route to greatness. However, internal decanting even within
boroughs began to be impeded by the same local attachments among slum
residents, the same reluctance to move, that had earlier exerted a more
pronounced effect in discouraging overspill to the expanded towns. This
problem became more marked as output and demand for clearance grew: it
led Westminster, for instance, in 1968, to take the drastic step of
officially dividing its building programme into north and south halves.
Despite the fact that all London Boroughs were required to appoint a
Borough Architect of chief officer status, in practice the active inner
boroughs fell into two broad categories: those which had moved some
distance towards LCC emphasis on design as well as output, and those
which continued to adhere, more or less, to production-line thinking.
The architecturally 'progressive' category included the richest
boroughs, the City, Westminster, and Camden: these were all closely
involved at first with outside architects, as had been their pre-1965
equivalents, such as Finsbury. But the London Borough which modelled
the structure of its architectural staff most closely on LCC lines, from
the very beginning, was Lambeth. Lambeth"s leadership regarded housing
design, as opposed to just output, as their municipal flagship: 'What
we wanted to do was to rebuild the bits of Lambeth that needed
rebuilding - but we wanted to do it in such a way that people going past
in a bus would look at it and know they were in Lambeth because of the
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design quality!' Lambeth MBC had been the only Metropolitan Borough
facing not full merger/abolition but, in effect, an enlargement of
territory in 1965: Lambeth London Borough was to comprise the whole of
Lambeth MBC's territory, augmented by a chunk of Wandsworth. The
Council was able to anticipate by two years the organisation needed for
its post-1965 building programme. Its Leader, A. Cotton, and chairmen
Ewan G, Carr and Spencer Fagan astutely secured Ted Hollamby from the
LCC in 1963 as their first Borough Architect. 53 (111. 137)
Hollamby's background, combining the stylistic pluralism of the LCC
group-system with a skill in rough-and-tumble negotiation over sites and
contracts, made him ideally suited for this borough of high
architectural aspirations but scarce land. In the case of the 'Lambeth
Towers' project in Lambeth Road, for example, he recalls that 'we'd been
offered it in the LCC, where I gave the brief back to the Valuer saying
"Don't make me laugh with this small site!" - and it was the very first
site that landed on my desk when I started at Lambeth!' (111. 138)
Hollamby knew that he would have to earn the design autonomy that he and
the Council leadership sought, by raising output well above the 400
annual target that had prevailed during the early 1960s. But there was
no notion on the part either of politicians or officers to go for the
Maudsley solution: production bonanza first, then and only then followed
by 'high quality design'. Carr and Fagan straight away accepted
Hollamby's argument that the new target should be set at 800, and that
no attempt should be made to compete with the 2,000 target of Lambeth's
neighbour Southwark. In fact, even this relatively modest figure was
not to be achieved until the early 1970s; in 1968, Lambeth's pe>—capita
total of dwellings under construction was the second lowest of any
Labour-controlled inner borough. Thus, in many ways, Lambeth
perpetuated the designer preeminence of the LCC - but now within the
context of a strong local political base.
But a fairly vigorous cycle of decanting and clearance would still have
to be built up first, from exiguous beginnings. The building of point-
blocks on gap-sites was an obvious initial step: and Hollamby settled on
parallel bulk orders with two firms, Wates and Sunley (later Wimpey,
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137 Opening of 'Tomorrow's Lambeth Today' Exhibition at the Royal
Festival Hall on 9 November 1965 by the Minister of Housing and
Local Government, Richard Crossman. Seen here inspecting a model
of the Clarence Avenue development: (from left to right) Marcus
Lipton, MP; Councillor Ewan Carr; Richard Crossman, MP; Mrs. Betty
Carr; Councillor Spencer Fagan; E. E. Hollamby (Borough Architect).
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after the Sunley negotiations proved abortive), for blocks to highly
individual designs by architects in his own Department. (111. 55)
These, he envisaged, would provide landmarks in a moderately traditional
Gibberdian manner as well as fill gaps with numbers. At the same time,
however, Hollamby was fully conversant with, and sympathetic to, the
change in architectural climate against high blocks underway in avant-
garde London circles throughout the 1960s. Therefore he had ranges of
low dwellings designed (from the mid-1960s) to provide a long-term basis
for the slum-clearance programme, and imported a former LCC colleague,
Rosemary Stjernstedt (veteran of the pioneering mixed developments at
Portsmouth Road, Roehampton, and Trinity Road) to evolve a low-height
scheme for the Borough's prime site at Central Hill. (111. 142) Before
Stjerristedt could begin work on Central Hill, Hollamby had to use his
considerable powers of persuasion to deter Fagan from imposing his own
cherished vision for that particular site: a line of point blocks
proudly marching along the ridge. Within Fagan's vision of 'Lambeth for
Lambethans', another key element, it goes almost without saying, was the
blocking of GLC incursions: 'It annoyed me - it wasn't for Lambethans -
we had a big enough housing list without them coming in nicking stuff
and bringing people in from their general waiting list!' So Hollamby
kept the GLC on their toes, exploiting to the full his duty, as planning
officer, to scrutinise their proposals, and pouring out a barrage of
attempted amendments. ss
While Lambeth creatively adapted the LCC tradition, other energetic
inner boroughs wholeheartedly embraced production values. These
included Islington, whose determined 'Housing Development Area'
programme pushed it to the top of the London output league by the early
'70s; Hackney, whose Borough Architect, J. L. Sharratt (Shoreditch's
former Borough Surveyor), imported his old assembly-line methods to his
new post through a large Camus bulk-order (111. 53); and Wandsworth,
where Sporle conceived exceptionally bold plans to tear down the
' twilight areas' , and remorselessly browbeat the GLC into yielding
control of their massive and megastructural Wandsworth Stadium scheme.
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138 Lainbeth Road development (Lambeth Towers), built from 1966: 1989
view. 'The very first site that landed on my desk when I started
at Lambeth!' (Hollamby).
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However, the programmes of several inner boroughs were less successful
in production terms - and without the excuse, as in the Lambeth case, of
a countervailing 'design first' philosophy. This relative failure, in
some cases, derived from a lack of impetus or organisation within the
municipality. The worst affected was Tower Hamlets. Here a few able
officers, above all an outstanding Town Clerk, J. Wollkind, struggled
valiantly but vainly to weld together a disparate jumble of members and
staff inherited from three of London's most parochial Metropolitan
Boroughs: 'The quality of a number of the councillors there was very low
- some could hardly read or write! ' Of the three constituent
authorities, Bethnal Green had been a reasonably energetic small inner
borough, although neither as wealthy nor as active as Shoreditch,
Finsbury or St. Pancras: within Tower Hamlets, its go-ahead traditions
were more than counterbalanced by the comparative inertia of Poplar and
Stepney. Tower Hamlets's housing drive was hardly assisted by the
especially strong preference for cottage housing among many East End
councillors, as displayed in the trenchantly anti-flat pronouncements of
the Council's Leader and housing 'strongman', Councillor Joe Orwell: 'He
used to say, "Wouldn't it be wonderful if everybody in Tower Hamlets
could have a little house with a garden and there weren't any flats!"'
With such disorganisation, and hesitancy about flat-building, it soon
became clear that Tower Hamlets was unable to attain its 1,000 dwelling
annual completions target; and the Borough was forced, like Stepney and
Poplar before it, to fall back on outside assistance, in the form of GLC
housebuilding and an NBA organisational survey: 'We said, "for God's
sake, come on in!" - we never said, "this is our patch, keep off!"'
Horace Cutler recalls that Mellish, by the late 1960s, had become so
disgusted with this quagmire of inefficiency that he once, perhaps
jokingly, offered to prorogue the Labour-controlled Borough's housing
powers and appoint the Conservative GLC Leader as a special proconsul
for Tower Hamlets!
The second major problem impeding building in some Inner London boroughs
was a persisting land shortage. This was still concentrated in boroughs
which had few slum areas, and thus little scope for building up a cycle




139 Bonaray-Delaford Development Area, Carnberwell and Bermondsey: 1989
view. This scheme, an extreme example of the architecturally
complex, medium or low height developments favoured by Hayes and
Tienton, was built from the early 1960s on a large fragmented site
straddling the two boroughs' boundaries: a foretaste of Hayes's
'imperial* approach at the 1964-5 reorganisation,
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where the lack of further clearance sites following Latimer Road (South)
had forced the completions rate below 100 in 1967, and had obliged the
Housing Committee to start considering the much more difficult
proposition of 'twilight-area' redevelopment. By contrast,
Conservative-held Kensington and Chelsea, perhaps unconsciously, devised
an approach that looked ahead to the end of the decade: an improvement-
based solution for much of its North Kensington slum problem, which
involved rigorous enforcement of Housing Acts compulsory repairs
provisions. s®
Without doubt, however, the most dramatic episode in the story of the
London 'sixties boom was the tremendous late housing drive of Southwark
LBC - an authority which followed its own individual course, in design
as much as in production. In both cases, Southwark pursued a breadth of
scale unique in Greater London. In architectural style, this took the
form of an uncompromising monumentality, denounced by others as
'gigantomania', which emphasised massive, horizontally-accentuated
groups. In output, the Borough's push for numbers was tackled through
the letting of enormous contracts with outside contractors and with its
own DLO.
Although Bermondsey was, in terms of overall political and
organisational power, the predominant element in the new borough, the
near-completed state of its reconstruction programme left the initiative
with the housing apparatus of the former Camberwell MBC, whose
'grandiloquent' aspirations had been built up during the late 1950s and
early 1960s by the Borough Architect, Frank Hayes, and the Housing
Chairman, Wally Allen. Camberwell's cycle of decanting and building had
gradually gathered pace following development of its first major
windfall site, the Sceaux Estate. During this period Hayes's deputy and
'architectural mastermind', the enigmatic Austrian-born Felix Trenton,
along with other design staff, abandoned the LCC mixed development
formula of informally-grouped, freestanding high and low blocks in
favour of medium-height agglomerations of slab blocks and courtyards.
By the early and mid 1960s, developments of this type, such as Acorn
Place or Bonamy-Delaford, were starting to build up to individual
140 Four 14-storey point blocks approved by Southwark Metropolitan
Borough Council in 1965 for construction at Portland Street, The
erection of identical blocks was proposed at the Aylesbury
redevelopment, but Hayes (by then designated architect to the
London Borough of Southwark) secured their cancellation, to allow
his own deck-access scheme to go ahead.
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contract sizes of several hundred dwellings. (111. 139) However, as in
the case of Freeson's programme at Willesden, the position was still one
of potential rather than actual achievement: average annual completions
over this period still barely exceeded 300. eo
Following the passing of the 1963 London Government Act, however, Hayes
and Allen, and Camberwell's Leader, Ron Brown, began to cast a new and
imperial eye to the north. On the formation of the new borough in 1964,
Hayes moved fast and ruthlessly to absorb the staid architects' sections
of Bermondsey and Southwark MBCs. Most important, he assumed effective
control over the latter's Aylesbury redevelopment area, where he secured
the removal of consultant architects and snuffed out an unadventurous
(by 1960s architectural standards) Southwark MBC point-block scheme,
even although the contract had already been let. (111. 140) Now this
extensive, but fragmented area would be given over to Felix Trenton, to
be shaped in accordance with his uncompromising 'Germanic' aesthetic.
The Aylesbury site had the plan of a sinuous letter ' L', and was dotted
with numerous existing buildings, including block dwellings, whose
retention was stipulated; furthermore, it could only be acquired in
widely-separated stages. Into this unpromising setting, sheer slab
blocks, no more than 14 storeys in height but immense in length, were
inserted, and the remaining irregular spaces were filled by low
terraces. On a strung-together hotchpotch of bomb-sites and small
clearance areas, a colossal monument to the aspirations of the new
Borough now steadily began to rise, section by section. ei (111. 141)
A coordinated acquisitions policy for Southwark LBC was established by
Hayes' chief property surveyor, John O'Brien, and the Town Clerk, Frank
Dixon-Ward: this was a vital prerequisite for building up the
exceptionally ambitious redevelopment cycle demanded by the political
leadership. Safe in the knowledge that Mellish, the local MP, would
keep a benevolent eye on allocations and CPOs, Hayes could now begin
letting very large contracts. Almost immediately, starts went straight
through the ceiling: from 62 in 1966 to 3,573 in 1967! In that year,
the 1, 400-dwelling North Peckham development was awarded to the DLO and
141 Aylesbury Development Area, Southwark, built by Laing from 1967:
view in 1989.
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the Aylesbury contract of 2,127 units to Laing - a welcome fillip for
the latter's ailing 12M Jespersen campaign.
Compared to his 'old friend and rival' Ted Hollamby, Hayes had had a
decade's head-start in clearance and in building up a ' land-bank'.
However, there was a also a difference in attitude on the part of both
members and officers, a conscious sense of mission, a search for
grandeur both in output and in architecture. The contrast with Lambeth
showed itself most strikingly in the two developments designed in 1966
for commanding sites on the South London ridge: Stjernstedt's large, but
low-scaled Central Hill project, with its avoidance of skyline breaks,
and the proud, bristling outcrop of Southwark's Dawsons Hill scheme,
designed to soak up much of the local Dulwich waiting list in a single
grand gesture. (111. 142, 143) But Hayes was not averse to lavish
'low-rise high density' developments intended to 'beat the yardstick':
some of these, from the late '60s, were designed by the architects
Neylan and Ungless. 63
By the end of the 1960s, although Laing was still pursuing Aylesbury and
the follow-up Heygate contact with remorseless efficiency, DLO
difficulties at North Peckham were beginning to slow Southwark's
programme. After the 1968 elections, Labour retained power in the
Borough (alone in South London), but there were changes within the
Labour Group, and control gravitated back to the tightly disciplined
Bermondsey members: the new Leader was Councillor John H. 0'Grady and
the new Housing Chairman Councillor Charles Sawyer. Yet even the
letting problems and the disillusionment which followed the great surge
of completions - with an annual rate of almost 2,000 sustained as late
as 1972 - only seemed to further emphasise the heroic scale and daring
of Southwark's achievement: 'We were housing, rehousing more people,
letting dwellings to people that hadn't had them before: not just
nibbling at the problem, but taking massive great bites at it!'
 
143 Dawsons Hill development, Southwark, built from 1968 by Sir Lindsay
Parkinson: seen in 1989,
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14-10-1964 on Downs Road. HC pressure on TPC: TPC presented papers 21-5-
1962 (Banner Street); also HC 22-3-1961 on land acquisition, Council 8-
10-63 on Coopers Gardens density increase; Joint Development Sub.
presented papers 7-6-1961 (higher density Marine Street scheme justified
as part of 'Bermondsey CDA').
7 Slum-clearance of sites over 2 acres: Council 24-4-1951 (from 1951,
LCC to accept all overspill from sites of 10 houses or less, and 507. of
sites larger than that). 25% allocation: Council 16-6-1948, and 30-6-
1953 on first realisation of impending site shortage. Gradual rundown
and backlog in the previous 2 years: Hackney MBC 31-1-1955; abolition,
LCC Council 20-12-1955. Derequisition problems: Lewisham MBC HBC 3—11—
1958.
8 LCC assumption it could ignore boundaries: int. Campbell. Increasing
unpopularity of rippling out and overspill: GLC HC 6-5-1965. Spheres of
influence: LCC HC 25-9-1946 on Islington. Railway surplus land
initiative: Lambeth MBC HTPC 20-11-1957; section 87 of 1962 Transport
Act.
£>3
9 Stepney and Poplar battle to get sites (success of Stepney HC
Chairman's 5-year battle to secure Smithy Street site): Stepney MBC HC
6-10-1963; credulous account of LCC 'control' of Stepney-Poplar, R.
Furneaux Jordan, AR November 1956, p. 318.
10 'We'll do nothing': int. Mellish; Southwark HTPC 1-4-1953, Mardyke
Street tenement delegation rebuffed and told to go to LCC. Bethnal
Green Public Health and Housing Committee 21-4-1954 pressure on LCC to
allocate more slum-clearance to Borough; Public Health and Housing
Committee 5-10-1955 on joint LCC-BGMBC initiative against the slums; HC
21-11-62 (MBC's allocation of slum-clearance already exhausted, so clear
extra 321 tenements. Battersea: HLG 118-67 24-6-1954. 'In his early
days': Official opening of Poynter House (brochure), March 1968; see
also Hammersmith MBC HTPC 17-9-1951, representations to LCC on Latimer
Road South; 28-11-56 protest against LCC preempting of Latimer Road
North area; HTPC 28-9-1960 approval of 3 26-storey blocks in principle;
at 3-5-1961 only 10 dwellings under construction by Hammersmith MBC;
also see WL0 22-12-1966, p. 1.
11 Lambeth: HC 22-9-1954; Mayor's Address 24-5-1955 for pressure on
MHLG for extra large allocation, Mayor's Address 22-5-1957 on land
earmarked for 6,000 dwellings. Camberwell: Building Development
Committee 22-3-1954, Hayes initial 3-storey infills; Sceaux
'springboard', Trenton move to lower-height schemes thereafter: int.
Solman, Dixon Ward. Shoreditch: HC 30-2-1948 deputation to LCC to ask
for release of sites; HC 30-6-1955 approved standard 11-storey point
block; LCC praise of Shoreditch 'remarkable achievement' of redeveloping
entire area north of Old St, LCC HC presented papers 10-7-1963;
Shoreditch Council 22-3-1965, final report on housing drive. Shoreditch
general background, , rebuff of LCC criticism of Wenlock Barn 'excessive'
proportion of high flats: Marmot, p. 125.
12 Hampstead: Walker refusal of Borough's bid for more land, HC
presented papers 6-1-1953. Corporation of London: int. Powell; Avondale
Square 'once-foi—all' solution to City's housing problem: Court of
Common Council 26-7-1956.
13 'Thin end': int. Denington.
14 TPC refusals of borough schemes by early 1950s on density grounds:
for instance St. Pancras Town Planning and Housing Development Committee
8-7-1951, 19-12-1951, LCC curb of piecemeal densification of Regents
Park development.
15 Bishops Bridge Road school dispute: Paddington MBC HTPC 3-1,1-1949,
7-2-1952. Jensen: Director of Housing, later Borough Architect," 1947-
1956. Perkins Heights: LCC TPC presented papers 22-2-1954, LCC HC
presented papers 1-12-1954 on architects' and planners' report hostile
to High Paddington as 'not what people want'; refusal of scheme
Paddington MBC HTPC 30-6-1955. Public inquiry: B 15-10-1954 p. 627; also
Jensen plea for higher density: AJ 8-6-1950; Jensen letter AJ 5-1-1961;
Jensen against blocks of more than 15 storeys, JRIBA March 1955 p. 205.
Further refusals of Paddington schemes: John Aird Court, HTPC 4-7-1957,
Adpar Street first scheme 1-6-1961; Mileage Yard LCC TPC presented
sw-
papers 23-11-1964, Paddington MBC HTPC 9-7-1964 (agreement by LCC
officers), TPC 7-1-1965 (refusal by TPC).
16 MBSJC initiative: Kensington MBC HTPC 21-4-1960, 20-10-1960 (on
CBAs), 19-1-1961. LCC resistance to MHLG 'higher density' Circular 37-
60: Architect report HC presented papers 26-5-1961, repeated in HC
presented papers 2-5-1963. Retrospective calculation of 'staged'
developments: Westminster HC 7-5-1963, 7-4-1964 on Abbots Manor; but
Deptford HC 13-8-1962: application of CLP density would cause building
standstill in two years? Detailed restrictions, such as against mixed
industrial-residential in 200 zone: St. Marylebone MBC 10-7-1963 on
Clipstone Street. General account of MBSJC: MJ 3-7-1959, pp. 1828-9.
17 Disputes between LCC HC and TPC over extent of adoption of
recommended occupancy rate reduction from 1. 1 to 0.9; TPC insistence on
retaining 1, 1 in 200 p.p.a zone: LCC HC presented papers 14-4-1964, TPC
12-10-1964 presented papers.
18 Chelsea MBC HC 2-2-1956: no hope for alleviation of waiting list,
Distressed gentlefolk: Milner Holland Committee 7-9-1964, evidence of
Miss E. Stockwell; int. Gullick. West Chelsea: initial TPC disapproval,
overruling Stamp: Gullick papers, letter Rugg-Brooks 1-2-1962, Piper-
Stamp 13-2-1962, Brooks-Rugg 23-7-1962; LCC TPC presented papers 26-2-
1962.
19 Gullick papers: MHLG-Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea 3-8-
1965; Nonhebel 7-5-1964 report, 6-10-1964 Goldring-Nonhebel. Lyons
negotiating skill: for instance deflecting LCC red herring of further
extended area at 20-2-1964 Chelsea-LCC officers' meeting,
20 LCC imposition on retardataire boroughs: refusal of initial
Hazelhurst Road scheme: Wandsworth MBC HC 6-12-1960.
21 Finsbury: int. Lubetkin; M. Davies, Lubetkin and Tecton's Housing
for Finsbury Borough Council, 1989 (Cambridge University diploma), pp.
126-8. Riley scandal: Finsbury MBC Law and Parliamentary Committee 14-6-
1944; Evening Standard 23-6-1945. Donnison and Chapman, pp. 129-39.
Finsbury programme (general): GAP November 1967 p. 1623. Parallel LCC-
MHLG 'high buildings policy' debate from c. 1956: HLG 131-126/7.
22 'Grown considerably': int. Lubetkin. Detailed quibbling accepted by
some boroughs: for instance St. Marylebone MBC HC 9-10-1957 (LCC
quibbling over straight or curved plan for Church Street Extension
shops), Westminster rebuffed LCC (Ling) attempt to make Lupus Street
elevation of Pimlico 'softer': int. Sir P. Powell. But even Westminster
schemes occasionally blocked, such as Dufours Place: Westminster HC 27-
11-1961 (objections to podium design).
23 Eugenia Road dispute: LCC HC presented papers 8-5-1957, letter 18-4-
1957 from Bermondsey Town Clerk; complaint rebuffed, HC presented papers
10-7-1957. See also LCC HC presented papers 19-11-1952 on row with
Hampstead over LCC's last minute notification of Finchley Road multi¬
storey proposal. LCC HC presented papers 13-3-1957: complaint from
Poplar about LCC failure to notify Borough of 16-storey Locton Street
proposal,
24 Flnsbury: Galway Street refusal March 1957: Donnison and Chapman,
op. cit., p. 133. Camberwell: Sceaux refusal, LCC working through agency
of MHLG: Camberwell MBC Building Development Committee 14-1-1957, int.
Dixon Ward. Poplar objection to LCC high flats: first 'friendly
warning', LCC HC presented papers 21-3-1956; objection to Tidey Street
19-storey block refused by MHLG, LCC Council 5-3-1957, B 15-2-1957 p.
315; Poplar objection to Locton street proposal, LCC HC 13-3-1957. LCC
objections to height of proposed Hide Place block, Westminster: int.
Eastwick Field. Woolwich St. Mary's CDA: first suggested by Special
Committee on Draft Development Plan for. ..the Borough of Woolwich, 18-
12-1950; Woolwich Borough Council file on CDA, 1951 paper 'St. Mary's
Redevelopment Area: Representations of the Woolwich Borough Council' and
other papers on meetings with Percy Johnson Marshall; building began
1952.
25 Wandsworth and Reema: Wandsworth MBC 17-3-1959 p. 99. Stepney Bede
Road: Stepney MBC Finance and Policy Committee, 11-5-1964, 18-8-1964.
Ivy Bridge Farm: Hounslow LBC, Report of Solicitor to Council 20-9-1965;
int. King. Other prestige schemes rushed through immediately before
April 4965: East Ham CBC (Little Ilford: int. Lund). Chingford MBC
(Chingford Hall, brainchild of Chingford Ratepayers Association: int.
Walsh), Crayford UDC (Lincoln Road: Wimpey tender accepted although
insufficient land for access, so Bexley LBC had to compulsorily purchase
and demolish one house: Bexley LBC Housing Schemes Sub. 3-6-1965).
26 West Ham recollections: int. former West Ham councillor.
t
27 ' Sons and Daughters' : Dagenham MBC HC 4-9-1964 pressure on K. Joseph
to transfer Becontree to Borough rebuffed; Barking LBC HC 10-7-1964 on
transfer of Becontree as 'matter of the utmost urgency'; MHLG refusal to
transfer, Barking HC 25-1-1967. LCC allocations on out-county estates
in response: between 1918-52, children accepted on to LCC waiting list;
after 1952, certain local authorities (mostly in Essex) could nominate a
percentage of lettings on out-county estates on their territory
(increased by 25% in 1964 in the case of Barking MBC and Dagenham MBC):
LCC HC presented papers 18-3-1964, 28-4-1964. Croydon Airport
controversy: Sutton MBC HC 4-3-1963 on boroughs' 'extreme
dissatisfaction' with allocation of Airport land; 'Many a Town Council':
Councillor M. F. Curtis, H December 1963, p. 104.
28 Middlesex zoned density increases: for instance Wood Green MBC
Planing and Development Committee 28-11-1960 on densities, 2-10-1961 on
Commerce Road; Tottenham MBC HHC 21-3-1961, Lands and Planning Committee
22-3-1961; Twickenham MBC HC 10-6-1964, Teddington redevelopment area.
Outside redevelopment areas: ineffective Middlesex opposition to
Hounslow Heath higher density, overruled by Joseph and Mellish:
Twickenham MBC HC 10-2-1965. Debates on Middlesex housing powers:
Tottenham MBC HC 2-7-1946, and in 1954.
29 Middlesex housing summary: HLG 118-171 note by Niven 24-11-1962.
Vigorous Labour authorities: Edmonton MBC HBC 7-9-1962 8-year housing
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plan to rehouse all 2460 slum displacees plus 25% surplus: int. Smythe.
Acton's self-contained South Acton redevelopment: Acton MBC HC 2-2-1954,
2-12-1964, int. Vinson; Yeading Green allowed reduction of waiting list:
Acton MBC HC 25-9-1964, 2-12-1964. Active Tory boroughs: Harrow MBC HC
18-3-1954 abortive first attempt to start council house sales, 31-3-1960
successful attempt, HC 6-6-1963 authorised 1500-dwelling 5-year building
drive, but no high flats.
30 Willesden general context and beginnings of piecemeal multi-storey
development: Willesden Civic Review October 1957 (on Alpha Place and
Development Plan overspill), TPC 15-6-1950, Housing Sub. on Alpha Place
20-6-1950. Cartograms 'not hard & fast': Willesden Civic Review October
1957. Additional storeys: HC 5-6-1956. Suburban gap sites to get 1954
Act clearance drive going: HC 3-7-1956.
31 'Wettish Tories': int. Freeson; also Willesden Civic Review April
1964, Willesden MBC Lands Committee 10-12-1964, Brent LBC HC 7-7-1965.
32 'By and large': int. Denington.
33 Background to London reorganisation: S. K. Ruck, G. Rhodes, The
Government of Greater London, 1970; G. Rhodes (ed. ) The New Government
of London, 1972; K. Young, J. Kramer, Strategy and Conflict in
Metropolitan Housing, 1978 (generally pro-LCC/GLC, anti-borough
account). Quasi-county boroughs: HLG 101/704 Niven note 1-6-1962. Clause
21 (4) (a) of 1963 Act gave MHLG power to override borough opposition to
GLC developments; see HLG 118-195 12-10-1961 for fear that boroughs
would try to lock up land, 23-10-61 Niven note on GLC to keep LCC
estates, 26-2-1962 note on London Boroughs to lose out-county estates,
6-4-1962 fear of fall in output, yet GLC only to get reserve rather than
concurrent powers. LCC HC 30-1-1963 against devolution of housing
powers, as obstacle to output. LCC pressure group at Westminster: int.
King (G Reynolds sacked as Parliammentary Private Secretary to George
Brown for opposing LCC line on children's services), and Crossman, op.
cit. , p. 74. Incomprehensible capitulation: int. Beddoe.
34 Borough refusals of GLC developments: GLC HC presented papers 16-6-
1966 on Downs Road, 6-7-1967 on seven delayed schemes. '"We want it for
Lambethans"': int. Fagan.
35 For pro-GLC interpretation: Young and Kramer, op. cit., p. 44; K.
Young and P. L. Garside, Metropolitan London - Politics and Urban Change
1837-1981, 1982, pp. 321-2 (an account which assumes that the GLC and
all boroughs were equally geared to output: 'the essentially zero-sum
nature of conflicts over access to housing').
36 ' We were looking to do the big sites, and let the boroughs do the
rest': int. Denington, Milner Holland supported 'strategic' idea: Milner
Holland Report para. 228. Windfall: GLC HC presented papers, report 28-
1-1965, HC (Council) 14-12-1965 p. 851. Allocations 'token' of
willingness: Kingston LBC HC 27-4-1966 on Denington visit. 'Partnership
proposals' with Tower Hamlets: GLC HC presented papers 28-4-1966 on
transfer of sites to Borough; with Islington: Islington LBC HC 12-7-1965
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for Baylis-Denington agreement GLC to prepare joint tenement demolition
plan, and allocate Islington 280 bungalows and flats at Bognor.
37 Kidbrooke Depot: int. Denington, Mellish; GLC Council, HC report 31-
1-1967. Diaries of D. Milefanti: meeting on 14-12-1966 between Mellish,
Denington, and Parliamentary Secretaries of Ministry of Works and Army
Department. Lisson Green debates: Westminster Council January 1965 p.
20, HC 16-11-1964, 13-12-1965, 28-2-1966, GLC HC presented papers 28-10-
1965, GLC PC 11-10-1965. GLC success in resisting fierce borough
pressure to get Carnpden Hill Road site: Kensington and Chelsea LBC HC
14-12-1964. Collaborative Outer London developments: Cheshunt UDC HC 7-
3-1967 (GLC to develop Holdbrook East, Waltham New Town, as agents for
UDC).
38 'Dirty fish and chip papers': int. Denington. Allocation
bargaining: for instance Sutton LBC 24-2-1966. Denington tact to smooth
ruffled borough feathers: Redbridge LBC HC 2-3-1966, 4-4-1966. Unpopular
relets: Kensington LBC HC 29-9-1966, Lambeth LBC Minutes, Mayor's Report
10-5-1967 p. 44 on poor quality, reluctance of tenants to move. GLC
housing managers' view there was little 'community' resistance to
decanting: HLG 117-86 July 1968 GLC evidence to CHAC Housing Management
subcommittee. Inter-borough allocation arrangements: Harrow LBC HC 8-2-
1966 authorised 25% of all lettings to go to Kensington and Chelsea.
Hounslow: int. King, Denington.
39 Denington years, density restrictions: GLC HC presented papers 13-1-
1966, GLC and outside architects: HC 14-12-1965 pp. 848-9. 'Diaspora':
int. Richardson. 'We were waxing': int. Solman. Loss of esprit de corps:
int. Denington.
40 Cutler years, confrontations: int. Cutler, Milefanti.
Interpretation of GLC Conservative housing strategy in negative terms
('...abdication of statutory powers and duties'): Young and Kramer, op.
cit. , p. 324.
41 ' I thought. . ' : int. Hollamby.
42 Mellish pulling Labour laggards into line: int. Mellish; assistance
from GLC: int. Milefanti. Mellish querying 65% shortfall below target:
Redbridge LBC minutes of meeting with Mellish 17-10-1966. 'Rotten
borough': int.- Freeson, Mellish, Denington; Mellish assisted here by
chairmanship of London Labour Party, then the Greater London Regional
Council of Labour Party.
43 'League table': int. Mellish. Targets: Barking LBC HC 27-4^-1966, 29-
6-1966, 7-12-1966, for raising of 1966 target from 450 to 1,020, setting
of 1967 target at minimum of 750.
44 'Underperforming borough X': int. Milefanti. 'I'm a very poor
economist': int. Mellish. Voluntary programme cut from 837 to 640:
Sutton LBC 7-5-1968. Southwark CPOs facilitated: int. Dixon Ward.
45 Initial Development Plan rows: for instance Waltham Forest's Cathall
Road was reduced by 14% from 990 dwellings after GLC pressure on
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Mellish, Waltham Forest LBC HC 6-9-1966, 4-10-1966; tender accepted 6-
12-1966. Objections to February 1966 ' interim policy': Lewisham LBC TPC
I-11-1966. Objections to Greater London Development Plan initial
proposals: Hackney LBC 25-10-1967; GLC HC presented papers 8-6-1967. GLC
planners' routine observations on high blocks confined to skyline,
location considerations under Town and Country Planning (Local Planning
Authorities in Greater London) Regulations 1965: GLC Council 14-2-1967.
46 'Trying to con us': int. former housing chairman (1964-8) of a
London Borough.
47 Enfield: int. Srnythe, Sporle on rebuilding: Wandsworth LBC Minutes
31-5-1966; Sporle corruption: B 10-7-1970, Guardian 13-12-1971 p. 5,
Wandsworth LBC Minutes 14-3-1966.
48 Pegasus: int. Edwards. Croydon LBC HC 8-9-1966: discussion of
withdrawal from LHC South Group owing to advanced 'stage now reached in
the Council's housing programme'.
49 'If it was good..': int. Edwards. Hounslow context: int. King.
Acton/Ealing land bank: int. Vinson. Hillingdon large drive, Bison sub¬
group: Hillingdon LBC HC 23-9-1965, 11-11-1965, 3-3-1966, 21-4-1966.
Enfield? int. Smythe (Enfield also highest output in 1969).
50 Harrow decision not to build high flats: Harrow LBC HC 15-12-1966,
'system' low flats HC 11-7-1968. Redbridge LBC TPC-HC conflict over
density of Broadmead Road: HC 20-10-1965. Greenwich LBC: HC 12-7-1966,
II-11-1966, increasing yield of first phase of redevelopment drive by
adding point blocks; glut of multi-storey dwellings for letting, HC 5-
11-70. Carroll: int. Milefanti. Haringey LBC: Town Planning and
Development Committee 1-3-1966 on slum-clearance-only drive, 16-6-1967
on decision not to build further very high developments.
51 'I thought:' int. Fagan.
52 Town clerks knew each other: int. Wollkind. Westminster division of
programme into 2 halves: Council 27-7-1967 (dwellings in south half
difficult to let), HC 18-11-68 (division of programme). Parochialism in
East End: int. Wollkind.
53 'What we wanted*: int. Fagan. Camden: St. Pancras Annual Review 1964
for 2,000 programme, Planning and Development Committee 6-3-1967 for
raised target.
54 Lambeth MBC Building Committee November 1963, negotiation with
Wates; December 1963, decision to step up target; int. Fagan, ^Hollamby;
JRIBA July 1965 p. 350-7; AJ 19-7-1967 p. 155, Lambeth Towers: AR 137
1965 p. 49. Conspiracy interpretation, point blocks as result of
pressure from architects: Marmot, pp. 217-233.
55 Wates 'fast track' contract: Lambeth LBC Building Committee 20-4-
1966; blocks unprofitable, int. Lord; Wates blocks, ABN 8-11-1967.
Pentagon blocks: AR January 1966 p. 39. Central Hill: int. Fagan,
Hollamby, Stjernstedt. 'It had annoyed me': int. Fagan, Lambeth querying
of GLC schemes on planning grounds: GLC HC 3-2-1966 (Ethelred), March
1965 (Hollamby on point blocks); GLC HC presented papers 16-12-1968
(Meadow Mews). Lambeth background: Esher, pp. 156-62.
56 Wandsworth Stadium agreement with LCC: September 1963. Doddington
Road approval in principle: Wandsworth LBC HC 17-12-1965; HC 12-7-1966
for further clearances. Public support for Sporle: Evening Standard 11-
10-1971.
57 'The quality of some councillors' , 'outstanding' Wollkind: int.
Mellish, Disorganisation: int. Milefanti. Orwell, 'For God's sake': int.
Wollkind, Tower Hamlets LBC programme: HBDC 22-11-1967 (NBA report), 6-
2-1969, Mellish and Tower Hamlets: int. Cutler.
58 Hammersmith LBC: HC 18-1-1966 (Charecroft), 27-9-1966 (Moore Park
Road), Council 24-4-1968 (Reporton Road, Chapman report on causes of low
output). Kensington and Chelsea: int. Gullick.
59 Gigantomania: int. Hollamby and Fagan.
60 Grandiloquent: int. Milefanti. Hayes: South London Observer 26-2-
1959 p. 4. Bonamy-Delaford: ABN 21-2-1968 pp. 284-8. Mastermind: int.
Solman.'
bl 'Germanic', Aylesbury: int. Solman, Neylan and Ungless, Dixon Ward;
Esher, p. 159.
62 North Peckham, Aylesbury contracts awarded: Southwark LBC HC 12-7-
1966 (meeting with Mellish on acceleration of programme), Council 15-2-
1967 (10% overall increase 1965-7), 12-5-67 (North Peckham, Aylesbury
contracts), Aylesbury: Team Spirit July 1967. North Peckham plans: AR
January 1966, p. 41.
63 Dawsons Hill and local waiting list: int. Sawyer. Plans for both
Central Hill and Dawsons Hill: AR January 1967 pp. 22-3. Beat the
yardstick: int. Neylan and Ungless.
64 'We were housing': int. Solman. Southwark 'outstanding' record: int.
Mellish. Aylesbury progress: Team Spirit February, May 1970; first
architectural attacks against Aylesbury, AJ 27-5-1970 pp. 1288-91.
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PART III: END OF THE DRIVE
INTRODUCTION
'By the late '60s, you could feel that the run thereafter ought to be a
lot easier. ' J. E. Beddoe 1
'We always reap the whirlwind of the bright ideas of a generation
ago. . . the present harvest of tower blocks comes at the moment when
progressive architectural opinion has moved decisively on again.' N.
Taylor 2
'Just before leaving Leeds, I drew up at Leek Street in my grey car, in
my grey suit and grey socks, and I looked at the grey buildings and
thought, "Is it just because I like grey?" Before, I'd felt, "What's
wrong with grey buildings set on green grass, like the Dales villages?"
Now I wondered, "Is this iron consistency enough?"' M. Richardson 3
This thesis has so far traced the way in which Modern public housing,
once established by avant-garde designers in the 1940s and ' 50s, was
then transformed into an instrument of production, and was built across
Britain on a colossal scale. At the end of the 1960s, however, the
building of Modern council dwellings went into rapid decline. Part III
will discuss some key elements in this breakdown.
During the late 1960s, a crisis of confidence arose in the field of
production. The impetus behind output was sapped by its very success in
attaining, at last, a rough housing surplus, after half a century of
large-scale public housebuilding; and this housing 'glut' threw into
prominence the increasing controversies about Modern flats at both a
political and housing-management level. It will be argued in this Part
that, just as the growth and flourishing of the housing drive had been
characterised by considerable regional variations and disjunctions, the
same applied in the case of its decline.
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But the rejection of production did not take place in isolation. At the
same time, or slightly earlier, housing designers and critics were
beginning to turn sharply away from Modern design, and from that chief
social and moral ideal of the postwar reformers - the creation of
'community'. We cannot, in this account, discuss in detail this
breakdown of Modern design and sociology, which constituted a further
phase in the avant-garde debates about working-class housing. One could
point out that, as it was this general intellectual context from which
the 'Modern Movement' in housing had originally sprung in the 1930s and
1940s, and which had formed the bedrock of the LCC design
establishment's fight against package-deals and 'site cramming', the
fact that architectural and sociological avant-gardists were still on
the attack against 'mere numbers' in 1970 was hardly remarkable. But
what must be borne in mind is that, now, these blasts were not only much
more sweeping - against all production rather than just, say, 'block
dwellings' - but also formed part of a sea-change in professional and
public opinion. Increasingly, it became impossible to identify any
pure, untainted 'production' grouping, within local government or
anywhere else. The parallel questioning and rejection of the values of
'production' and 'design' had the effect of eclipsing not just Modern
style and theory, nor just the drive for numbers, but the whole ethos of
public housing. Now a fresh professional and political consensus, which
would increasingly come to take for granted 'The Failure of "Housing"',
was coming into being, its assumptions moulded by the rhetoric of a new
generation of forceful architect-journalists and housing pressure-
groups. All of a sudden, the burden of argument and proof changed, and
statements that would have seemed sophistic or unintelligible before,
now seemed so obvious as only to need to be cited as crude slogans. By
1970, the Architectural Review felt able to attack, as if it were self-
evident, the very fact that Birmingham was still pursuing a large
housing programme. Clearly, the Review observed, the sheer scale of
such an adventure could only be 'self-defeating - who is all this
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FOOTNOTES: PART III, INTRODUCTION
1 'By the late '60s': int. Beddoe.
2 'Whirlwind': N. Taylor, AR 11-1967, pp. 341-4.
3 'Just before leaving Leeds': int. Richardson.
4 'Self-defeating': AR, 9-1970, p. 179.
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CHAPTER 9: THE BREAKDOWN OF *PRODUCTION'
'The "numbers game" had backfired on its well-meaning participants'. L.
Esher 1
Earlier in the century, the State had forsaken the self-regulating
ability of the privately-rented market, and had put in its place the
simple instrument of State housebuilding. In the process, the
Government had committed itself in effect to the overcoming of slums and
housing shortages by brute-force overbuilding. Accordingly, in place of
the fragmentation, anonymity and unpredictability of market-directed
building cycles, there emerged powerful departmental organisations and
powerful individuals dedicated to the continuous, open-ended
construction and management of dwellings, in accordance with political,
social, architectural and other aims. But the ' boom-slump* cycle of
building had not disappeared altogether: instead, a different, longer-
term cycle was substituted, within which active housebuilding
authorities would keep up high production until a state of 'housing
glut', as perceived by local and national politicians, would suddenly
and unexpectedly be attained. This point was indeed reached, throughout
Britain, at varying times in the late 1960s and 1970s. Now councillors
became aware that the public clamour for high rates of housebuilding
seemed finally to be ebbing. Whereas previous swings in housing
provision had been of a temporary or regional character, now a general
change of emphasis was underway. By the mid 1970s, production levels
had gone into final decline throughout the whole country.
Over the following pages, the reasons for the collapse of output will
very briefly be traced. In this chapter, we shall see that there were
powerful influences within the production machine itself, which
contributed to its rapid loss of impetus and disintegration. Most
significant were the effect of the glut of new housing in undermining
political support, and the increasing disruption caused by financial and
building-organisational blockages. Seen in the cyclical context of
economic, building and even political activity, none of these
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developments was really unexpected. The next chapter, however, will
explore the equally damaging impact on the housing drive of a startling
and unforeseen problem, external to production because it was associated
with Modern estates that had already been completed: namely, the spread
of management difficulties, vandalism and even a kind of general squalor
previously associated with the old 'slums' .
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ENGLAND AND WALES: MODERN HOUSING REJECTED
During the late 1960s, Modern housing throughout most of England and
Wales experienced an outright rejection at local political level. This
sudden collapse in political commitment to the values of the Modern
housing drive was, nevertheless, an indirect result of the very success
of production, as was made clear by isolated 'pointers' in advance of
the main trend. Perhaps the most remarkable of these had occurred in
Leeds earlier in the decade when Karl Cohen, faced with a glut of new
housing, suddenly turned against large-scale demolitions and building of
Modern flats. Already, he had commenced a bold policy of area
improvement; but in 1965, with the worst slums now demolished, and their
occupants decanted into his new multi-storey schemes, he openly
challenged the City's twenty-year clearance programme. Brushing aside
arguments by the Town Planning Committee and key officers that back-to-
back houses were a 'social evil', he flatly stated that his improvement
programme would be expanded, and that ' the Housing Committee would not
in future accept layouts which were not two-storey dwellings and three-
storey houses'. Although the implementation of this policy reversal
took several years, it provided a striking foretaste of the way in which
the glut of Modern housing would either lead the 'housers' to abandon
their concern for output, or would allow new groups to bypass them and
gain power on the basis of new slogans, such as 'participation', in
addition to all the old, persisting anti-flat assumptions. 2
Generally, it was only two or three years later that the new thinking
began to acquire a nationwide currency at local-political level. The
disappearance of heavy perceived public pressure, the drying-up of the
evening queues in councillors' gardens, allowed dormant anti-flat
sentiments to revive, and increased the attractiveness of housing
improvement. This change was not gradual, but burst suddenly into the
open, in the context of the sweeping victories of Conservative and other
non-Socialist groups in the municipal elections of 1967 and 1968. In
the first systematic adaptation for direct party-political use of issues
concerning the architectural form of housing, Conservatives in many
municipalities branded large-scale clearance and multi-storey building a
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'Socialist' policy, and, following their accession to power, moved fast
to cut output and to increase the number of improvement schemes. 3
Of course, perhaps the key role in the propagation of new ideas of
'conservation' and 'user participation', was played by designers and
critics - as in the case of their avant-garde Modern predecessors in the
'30s and '40s; this activity, just as in the previous case, lies outside
the immediate scope of this account. But the parallel growth in
conservationist sentiment among councillors in England and Wales was
also considerably influenced by local-political considerations. For
instance, while the scale and pace of the demolitions of privately-
rented 'unfit' housing had made many councillors uneasy, outright
opposition was triggered off by the progression of clearance operations
to owner-occupied areas. Over the whole postwar period, the Government
had time after time called for an improvements drive, to match
production of new dwellings, and had tried one administrative and
financial expedient after another, to try to encourage this. But, up
until the late 1960s, all these initiatives had foundered on the granite
rock of local-authority indifference or opposition. The problems of
decanting from 'unfit' dwellings which were also overcrowded, the
inherent difficulties of speed and coordination, and an almost total
lack of interest on the part of councillors and, seemingly, the slum-
dwellers themselves, had deterred all but the most determined and
ingenious Housing Chairmen, such as Karl Cohen and T. Dan Smith. ' If
you're committed to the numbers game, it's easier to do that by building
your houses new on greenfield sites than to go in for the much more
laborious, architect-intensive, quantity surveyor-intensive business of
doing up houses!' Throughout 1968, MHLG, the Welsh Office and numerous
local authorities throughout England and Wales began to reach the
conclusion that large-scale improvement was now desirable, firstly
because it was cheaper (an attitude now more prominent, in the context
of economic crisis), and also because it was felt that fit houses were
being cleared which could more easily be improved. With the White Paper
'Old Houses into New Homes' as a catalyst, redevelopment areas were
replaced by General Improvement Areas up and down the country. A
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But this process, as always in this story, was uneven in character: even
in the late 1960s, many English and Welsh local authorities were still
vigorously pursuing multi-storey building, now the line of least
resistance for rapid production, as had been block dwellings and cottage
estates in the 'forties. To jolt them out of this would require an
external stimulus: and it was here, as we saw in Chapter 4, that MHLG
and Welsh Office architects now for the first time took a decisive role,
using the mandatory yardstick as their weapon. Initially, in 1967, the
latter was only used as a means of density and building-type control to
halt prestige-building of high blocks by small towns, while loopholes
were found for cities such as Birmingham and Manchester. However, after
the severe jolt to local and national opinion administered by the Ronan
Point disaster in May 1968, Government architects and Administrators
opposed to high flats quickly realised that they now had a golden
opportunity to achieve painless expenditure reductions, by choking off
multi-storey building. 5
By 1969, the Government's failure to raise the yardstick in line with
inflation had begun to squeeze out costly patterns, especially
prefabricated high-flat developments. Any major multi-storey programme
from now on had to be carefully justified by association with small
sites and high notional site densities. By 1975, the DoE was openly
calling on authorities not to build any more high blocks or developments
exceeding 100 p.p.a. Although public housing completions in England and
Wales, outside London, fell by 58% between 1967 and 1973, output was to
some extent preserved in those cities which turned to large-scale
medium-height deck-access housing of the type encouraged by the
yardsticks. For instance, Manchester CBC kept its output above 2, 500
for several years from 1968 as a result of large deck-access schemes
such as Harpurhey or Beswick-Bradford, reaching a maximum of 3,991
completions in 1971; by contrast, Birmingham CBC, whose point blocks
were not favoured by the architect-defined yardsticks, saw its programme
plummet from 9,033 completions in 1967 to 1,444 in 1972. e (111. 104,
108, 109)
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Some Greater London authorities provided the main significant exception
to the sudden decline in Modern housing production throughout England
and Wales. An energetic late building campaign was pursued not only by
the few Labour councils to survive the 1968 local elections, such as
Southwark and Newham, but also by several newly Conservative authorities
such as Lambeth and Islington. In some municipalities, such as Barking,
the building of point blocks and open-space layouts continued in the
early 1970s. (111. 145) In most Inner London boroughs, however, Modern
housebuilding in areas zoned at high density increasingly took the form
of deck-access blocks around 4-6 storeys in height. Such blocks'
construction benefited from revisions to the existing regional
variations of the yardstick in 1969. Although annual GLC output
remained fairly static or declining, at around the 5-6,000 level in the
late '60s, the boom in borough building ensured that Greater London
completions kept rising until 1970, when a peak of 27,235 was attained.
Between 1970 and 1973, London output fell by 42% to around 15,500
(perhaps partly as a result of the new policies introduced following the
1967-8 Conservative local-election gains) but then recovered sharply
again to around 19,000 in 1974-5. This recovery was associated with a
further expansion of 'low rise high density* Modern building in design-
minded authorities such as Lambeth, Camden or Southwark, assisted by
ever more ingenious architectural manipulations of the yardstick
framework; there was also a widespread move beyond this last
architectural variant of Modern housing, towards building of
'traditional' terrace-house layouts, which of course lie outside the
scope of this account. Output was further revived, still in most cases
without high blocks, after the Labour gains of the 1971 elections. In
contrast to the ferocious anti-production rhetoric of many municipal
Conservative groups, at Ministerial level the Mellish tradition of
wholehearted support for London housing production was continued without
a break by the new Conservative junior housing Minister, Paul Channon. 7
In the case of the GLC, the first effects of the yardstick and new loan-
sanction procedures were dispiriting to staff traditionally unused to
cost controls, and the Council automatically began to avail itself of
the full 10% unsubsidised allowance above the yardstick level. (111.
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145 Multi-storey survival in the London Boroughs, Brent LBC's South
Kilburn Redevelopment Area, Extended Area Stage II Phase I: two 18-
storey and four 6-storey Bison Wall-Frame blocks built from 1971 by
Concrete Southern at the conclusion of this very complicated multi¬
stage scheme.
146) The administrative complexities of the yardstick compounded the
overcommitment of architectural resources on the GLC's windfall sites,
to produce a state of chaos on such projects as Grahame Park, Barnet. 61
Many of these problems, however, eased following Horace Cutler's
decisive break from the LCC imperial tradition during his period as
Housing Committee Chairman between 1967 and 1970, His withdrawal from
large-scale land acquisition caused some resentment among Campbell's
housing architects, fearful of outside intrusions on their comfortable
world: 'Campbell used to say, "You can't do this!" I'd say, "You just
watch me mate!"' Following Labour's return to control of the GLC,
completions recovered by 39% within two years, from their 1972 minimum
of 3,821. However, the drying up of big sites, which resulted from
Cutler's policy, prevented Labour from reestablishing any 'strategic'
GLC housing programme in the 1970s - although tensions with some
boroughs persisted during the chairmanship of Gladys Dimson, whose
'Strategic Housing Plan' was suffocated at birth in 1975 by borough
opposition.
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146 Deck-access survival at the GLC, The Gloucester Grove development,
Southwark, comprising roughly 1,000 dwellings in blocks up to 10
storeys high, built from 1972 by Gleeson in calculated brickwork
construction: 1989 view.
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SCOTLAND: STAY OF EXECUTION
In contrast to England and Wales, the decline in Scotland's Modern
housing drive was relatively undramatic, and characterised by fewer
violent swings of political or professional evaluation. The peak in
Scotland's housing programme was in 1970, when just under 35,000 public
sector completions were recorded: this figure coincided with a marked
revival in the level of multi-storey building. Thereafter completions
declined steadily to 13,016 in 1974 and 9, 119 in 1977. The success of
Mabon's strategy of redirection of output towards smaller authorities
and the counties was reflected in the fact that, by 1974, the proportion
of public housing completions located in the four cities and the large
burghs had fallen to one third, compared to one-half throughout 1945-66.
Of the counties, Lanark fell back somewhat from its enormous programme
of the late 1960s, while others surged forward, such as Aberdeen County
Council, whose forceful Housing Convener, Sandy Rennie, pushed through a
major programme of prefabricated timber village housing in 1973-5 in
anticipation of an oil-related housing shortage that never materialised.
During the mid-1970s, the New Towns, particularly Livingston, took up an
evei—greater proportion of the declining public housing programme (over
one third of completions by 1977).
In Scotland, too, the housing improvement movement was enthusiastically
embraced from 1968/9 onwards: a number of Housing Treatment Areas
(equivalent to the English 'GIAs' ) were declared, and a housing
association-based improvement programme began to emerge in Glasgow
around 1970. Gibson, like Cohen, had earlier wished to embark on large-
scale ' municipalisation' and rehabilitation of privately-rented 19th-
century tenement flats, as a complement to continuing high-flat
construction. But this plan had been blocked by the continuing
incidence of serious unfitness and overcrowding, and the seeming lack of
support for improvement among councillors and tenants in the early
1960s; 'People didn't say: , "Can you rehabilitate this tenement?" They
said: "Can you get me out of this tenement - the roof's leaking - it's
verminous!" 10
However, in contrast to England and Wales, the beginnings of the
Scottish rehabilitation movement did not neatly coincide with any
political repudiation of Modern and multi-storey building. For, once
the mid-1960s planning confrontations in Edinburgh and Glasgow had been
resolved, there was no further major public controversy concerning high
flats. Within SDD, the planners' energies had been largely diverted
into a fresh round of New Towns; however, a number of researchers
hostile to multi-storey housing, such as Pearl Jephcott, were pursuing
projects on the sidelines of the Planning Division. Housing
Administrators applied the liberal indicative costs procedure as a
straightforward value-for-money gauge. As already explained above,
this, in contrast to the MHLG yardstick, encouraged authorities to raise
notional densities of given sites further to meet indicative costs,
rather than eliminate the high blocks. 11
Thus, in Scotland, local-political support for production of Modern
high blocks remained largely intact throughout the late 1960s and the
early 1970s. After an initial dip in 1968, multi-storey building
gathered pace again from 12.7% of approvals to 21.8% in 1970, and only
finally declined in the mid-1970s. Relatively little deck-access
housing, with its connotations of 'traditional' English terraces, was
built in Scotland. Instead, there was a fairly undramatic continuity:
continuity in the local-political support for the building of point and
slab blocks, particularly in Aberdeen, and continuity between the
'tenement survival' of some staircase-access multi-storey blocks and the
' tenement revival' which inspired the nascent rehabilitation movement.
'Tenement survival' and 'tenement revival' came closest, perhaps, in
Edinburgh's Wester Hailes development, built in 1967-74 to a plan by Sir
Frank Mears and Partners, on the City's last major peripheral site. For
this 4, 800-dwelling development was almost entirely composed of
staircase-access flats, varying in height from 4 to 10 storeys.
Architecturally, there was much in common between, for instance, the
massive, harled 9-storey blocks built here by Crudens and the 17th-
century tenements of Edinburgh's Old Town - or, for that matter, the
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staircase-access slab blocks prominent in the postwar output of many
Continental countries. 12 (111. 87, 147)
Tenement survival in Scotland. Wester Hailes: aerial view from
east in 1989. Several thousand dwellings, almost entirely
comprising staircase-access flats: at centre are the 9-storey
Crudens blocks of Contract 7 and at bottom right the 10-storey
Bison blocks of Contract 4 - both built in 1969-71.
MODERN HOUSEBUILDING: FROM BOOM TO BUST
The fall in the level of high-flat construction in the late 1960s was
paralleled by a steep decline in the fortunes of prefabrication. It had
become obvious from the start that organisational problems and demands
for minor variations, would vitiate many of the airily-predicted
advantages of 'factory building'. But, despite the downturn in the
general building cycle in 1966 and the marked fall in speculative
housebuilding following the 1967 Callaghan credit squeeze, public
housebuilding, and prefabrication, still remained cushioned from output
reductions well into 1968. 13
Only later in 1968 did council-housing starts in England and Wales
finally record a significant fall. This, in combination with a further
downturn in all building activity across Britain, suddenly turned boom
into bust, sending prices through the floor and destroying the last
remnants of the economic rationale of prefabrication, from the
contractors' point of view. Over—extension of resources was now cruelly
exposed - as Crudens found in the case of their Skarne 'system', which
turned overnight from a handy marketing gimmick into a rather expensive
liability. At Killingworth, Longbenton UDC without warning rescinded
Phase 2 of a major contract for Skarne deck-access blocks: 'I said "Do
you know how much money has been spent on designing the second phase?"
They said, "Oh, don't worry!" I said, "What the hell do you think two
dozen engineers have been doing for six months!"' Local firms who had
proudly commissioned their own 'systems' were put in an even worse
quandary, They were now forced to grasp at small contracts anywhere in
the country in order to recoup some of their investment. Matthews and
Mumby, following Crosby's cancellation of their serial contract for
point-blocks in 1967, were forced to move the moulds and assembly gang
down to St. Albans to erect a single 13-storey block as a structural
subcontractor. In some cases, the curtailment of large 'system'
contracts was another by-product of the changes of political control at
the 1967 and 1968 municipal elections, Sheffield's and Nottingham's
withdrawal crippled the YDG Mark I programme, already in deep trouble as
a result of Shepherd's rashly low initial tender. And, of course, the
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Ronan Point disaster in May 1968 only accelerated the withdrawal of
local-authority goodwill from prefabricated high flats,
The contractors, large and small, had enthusiastically leapt aboard the
bandwagon set in motion by the big cities, and many were left seriously
exposed when it suddenly ground to a halt - although the proportion of
multi-storey dwellings erected by prefabricated methods actually
continued to increase for a while. Just as the difficulties experienced
by Camus in the early 1960s seem to suggest that 'contractual pressure'
was hardly a 'determinant' of the start of the multi-storey boom, so the
ignominiousness of the collapse of the prefabrication movement at the
end of the decade suggests, equally, that contractors were not able to
exploit this boom, once underway, to create any significant or enduring
monopolies over housing construction.
In respect of the role of building labour, too, the late '60s and early
'70s were a time of rapidly increasing difficulty. This was caused by a
wider malaise in the building industry. The 1960s had been marked by a
gradual decline in real building wages and a growing reliance on
subcontracting and complex bonus agreements. Labour-only subcontracting
(the 'lump') spread swiftly following the introduction of Selective
Employment Tax in 1966, and became particularly prevalent in local-
authority housebuilding in Greater London during the mid-1960s
commercial building boom. Falls in membership led to the consolidation
of building trade unions in a single organisation, the Union of
Construction and Allied Trades Technicians (UCATT: founded in 1968). 1S
During the late 1960s, the labour climate, especially in London, became
progressively more volatile. The trouble was not caused by
prefabrication, as off-site labour was exempted from Selective
Employment Tax yet received building pay rates; instead, unrest spread
at exactly the time that use of high blocks and prefabrication was in
steepest decline. In the turbulent years around 1970, some schemes
ground to a halt through sheer straightforward mismanagement, while
others were subject not only to official trade-union action, culminating
in the 1972 national building strike, but also to a campaign of
so
unofficial disruption by Communist agitators. The pattern for such
action, involving both escalating wage claims and dislocation for its
own sake, had long been established in the Merseyside area, Most of the
Modern housing developments singled out for this treatment, however,
were prominent London schemes, which almost by definition incorporated
high blocks: these included the Cubitt developments at Worlds End and
Thamesmead, Crudens's schemes at Lewisham, Myton's Barbican Phase IV,
and Turriff's Ivybridge development, Hounslow. 'e
The situation was equally unstable in the direct labour forces which had
proliferated since Brooke's restrictions were lifted by Crossman's
Circular 50/65. Some soon slid into chaos. In Southwark LBC, for
instance, the DLO rapidly became the Achilles heel of Hayes's housing
development programme. Unlike his small Camberwell force, the new
London Borough's DLO was a separate department, under the command of the
newly-appointed William Rapier, previously the DLO Building Manager of
(ominiously) Dundee Corporation. Despite 'Mr. Rapier's do this, do
that, rushing here, rushing there', concern soon mounted that he had
failed to establish a firm grip on his unwieldy new Department. This
general concern was compounded by alarm over the matter of a Kango
hammer which, it was claimed, had been hired in June 1966 by Rapier,
lent 'for the weekend' to the son of the then Council Leader, and never
returned. Although the Town Clerk and Borough Architect manfully
attempted to extend their own project programming procedures to cover
DLO contracts, they were impeded by the sudden illness and retirement of
Rapier in August 1967, Matters were further complicated by the Labour
Group's bizarre decision (on NBA advice, needless to say), to set up a
second, autonomous DLO to build the large North Peckham project. Soon
that scheme, too, was in a state of turmoil. Ringing the changes, the
Council then abolished the main DLO and transferred its work to the
North Peckham force; finally Bovis was appointed management contractor,
with instructions to act as a kind of arbiter between the various
competing departments and officers. While the Labour Group blundered
from one half-baked plan to another, the North Peckham project architect
was stranded as 'piggy in the middle' , between the two rival DLOs, Bovis
and the members: ' It was an extremely unpleasant experience, and it went
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on for six years - like going through a tunnel without any light at the
end!' 17 (111. 148)
But the discrepancy between Modern rhetoric of technically and
organisationally advanced building, and disorganised practice, seemed
most glaring in the case of Glasgow* s Red Road development of 1962-9.
Here, behind Bunton*s soaring facade of steel-framed American scientific
prowess, there was the reality of a gigantic project in a continual
state of crisis, improvisation, and structural redesign, and locked into
the wider context of the institutionalised chaos of DLO work-practice.
The project architect, Sam Bunton Junior, recalls ruefully that 'on a
visit to Sweden, we saw blocks with parquet floors, where all the
workers who came in after the floor—layers had to wear sandals, and they
had a very nice restaurant they went to. At Red Road, we put in a small
canteen every ten floors that people could go to, but the workmen just
sat around in them, threw tea-bags out of the window, trod their pieces
into the floor, and wrecked the place. In Sweden and Denmark, they were
putting in electric controls to the doors - but at Red Road, you'd see
spring-loaded doors installed, and when you came back the next day, the
spring was out and the door had gone!' ie (111. 80)
On the building materials front, too, the changes of the late 1960s,
particularly architects' repudiation of concrete in favour of
'traditional' or hand-made brick as a facing material, brought their own
problems of organisation. This became clear even in the case of early
precursors of the main trend. For example, the design of Darbourne's
architecturally innovative Lillington Street development required use of
facing bricks from Guestlings Brickworks, Hastings, but the latter's
entire output later proved to be only just sufficient for this one
project. After mounting delays, Darbourne eventually had to substitute
slightly darker facing bricks on subsidiary elevations of Phase III.
But by the late 1960s, there had been some compensating improvements in
the productivity of brick construction, through organisational
rationalisation. 13
57/
148 DLO troubles In Southwark: the North Peckham Development Area
(built from 1967), 1989 view showing pitched roofs being added.
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By the early 1970s, a fresh commercial building boom had begun to
develop in the early 1970s, especially in the South-East of England.
Now, however, local authorities' dependence on brick construction and
low-height building types was firmly established. Therefore much
greater difficulty was experienced in getting tenders, even on a fully
fluctuating basis, than had been the case between 1960 and 1965; and
jobs in progress were increasingly subject to intractable shortages of
bricks and bricklayers. 2:0
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CHAPTER 10: ' NEW SLUMS' ?
'I remember going round the Heygate Estate in Southwark on the opening
day. I went to the highest flat in the highest block, and there was
this old lady there, who had ribbon all over her kitchen taps. I asked
her why, and she said, "It's the first tap I've ever had in my life!"
Previously, in Queen's Buildings, she'd had to share one with five other
families! It gave her a great deal of happiness - a lovely flat with
its own toilet, bathroom, it all looked fine on paper. A year later,
she came to me and begged me to get her rehoused - vandalism had broken
the lifts, muggings had started, she was virtually a prisoner in her own
flat!' Lord Mellish 1
It was shown in the previous chapter that the swing away from Modern
housing production towards housing rehabilitation took place in a
context of party-political controversy and accusations of 'failure' -
despite the fact that, in some ways, it resulted from a housing glut,
and thus from 'success' in its own terms, Perhaps the most powerful
argument contributing to this rejection was that which pointed above all
to the sudden rash of housing-management problems in newly completed
Modern blocks, citing these as evidence that the blocks themselves were
inherently defective, and indeed that their design contributed to the
management difficulties. This argument was taken to its highest pitch
of elaboration in a succession of sociological and architectural probes
into the pathology of new housing schemes: in the hands of writers such
as Alice Coleman, the arguments of Oscar Newman came to be used as a
kind of crude historical weapon to 'prove' that multi-storey flats, or
all flats, were a 'failure': 'the best blocks of flats are those that
are most like houses'. However, as will be explained in the Conclusion,
these arguments (especially those of recent date) fall outside the
strict bounds of this account. 2
In this chapter, only the beginnings of the ' new slums' argument can be
discussed - and in the context not of architectural theory but of
municipal housing management, What we are concerned with here is the
corrosive effect of housing management controversies on output: the
debilitating impact on the municipal 'production machine' of the growing
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143 'Old Slums'. View, c. 1959-60, of the Carnegie Street clearance
area, Edinburgh, showing Cllr. Pat Rogan and Mrs. Barclay from 35
Carnegie Street. Rogan wrote on the rear of the photograph:
'Services had been cut by vandals and Mrs. Barclay had to collect
water from a stand pipe in the street. The dog was her protector, '
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feeling among councillors that new housing might in itself contribute to
problems such as vandalism, and that the particular shape or equipment
of Modern flats, particularly multi-storey flats, might even themselves
be to blame. 2
Ever since the 19th century, the traditional, simple argument of housing
reformers (including postwar 'housing crusaders' such as Gibson) had
been to assert that old, squalid 'slum' dwellings cause social
deprivation and thus produce difficult tenants. On the other hand, the
notion was also widely held that some slum-dwellers were inherently a
group apart, a 'residuum' with its own unruly and incorrigible culture.
At first, the disparity between these two ideas seemed unimportant, as
the identity of stigmatised dwellings and stigmatised groups was total.
In the interwar years, however, when local authorities first began to
build new dwellings for slum-cleared tenants, such as Glasgow's
Rehousing tenements, it was held that not only the poverty, but also the
disorder of the old slums might be transplanted lock, stock and barrel
to these schemes. To counterbalance these problems, a comprehensive
framework of strict management and public health controls, whose
workings were not regarded as a subject for public debate or concern,
was maintained: the salubrious openness of the slum-clearance
developments was seen as an integral part of, even a precondition for,
this process of control. During and after World War II, delinquency and
social controversy began to spread to many more new schemes, even those
under construction. These problems were concentrated in traditionally
cosmopolitan industrial heartland areas, notably Merseyside and
Clydeside, where large, remote peripheral schemes of the 1950s such as
Kirkby and Easterhouse experienced severe management problems. 3 (111.
149, 150)
However, for as long as the need for new homes still seemed
overwhelmingly pressing, the idea that new or fairly new council houses
might themselves be, or become ' slums' , stood no chance of gaining any
political support as constituting a valid part of the general 'housing
problem'. As late as 1964 Sir Keith Joseph, for all his private
reservations about the 'numbers game', expressed this point very
ST7?
The wan on the left was a "Gerry" bomber in "Forty-two";
the wan on the right was Missus McDrool's weans in " Forty-six " !
150 'New Slums'? Cartoon from Glasgow Corporation Housing Department
newsletter (.Housing News), May 1947: drawn by Charlie Baird,
plasterer in Maintenance Section.
emphatically at a Housing Centre conference, even in relation to
interwar houses. A councillor from Newcastle-under—Lyme complained that
'his authority had 9,000 properties of which 3,000 were prewar. Without
special attention these houses would deteriorate into slums. In fact
local authorities throughout the country would soon be faced with the
same problems as private landlords'. In reply, 'Sir Keith suggested
that... if this was his worst worry he must be a lucky man. The worst
things must be dealt with first, and the improvement of prewar council
houses was not among the most urgent problems' A
The first significant changes to this situation occurred in the late
1960s, following the achievement of a very rough housing surplus in
Britain. Just as the years following any downturn in the private market
in the late 19th century were characterised by a high proportion of
'empties', concentrated especially in the most recently-built, remote
dwellings, so the end of the Modern housing boom seemed to take on a
'last in, first out' character, in management terms. As we saw in the
case of Southwark, the more active and forceful the authority in pushing
through grandiose late redevelopments (particularly for slum-clearance
purposes) in the teeth of tightening Government restrictions, the more
dramatic was the turn-around - concentrated in those very estates - from
urgent demand to letting difficulties and even dereliction. In schemes
let to large numbers of slum families at one time, such as Glasgow's
Springburn 'B' (rehousing the many people displaced by the 1968 'Great
Storm'), the beginning of letting difficulties and stigmatisation as
'new slums' might be immediate. (111. 74) At the same time, the
greater availability of new dwellings in the late 1960s and early 1970s
allowed waiting list applicants to become much more choosy, and so there
was also difficulty in letting large schemes not directly linked to
slum-clearance. It may have been in response to the 1960s 'success', in
the terms of Gibson and his fellows, in building unprecedented numbers
of new dwellings for direct occupation by slum-dwellers, that that
decade saw a sudden strengthening in the association of council housing
and indices of 'poverty'; a jump of a quarter in the proportion of
unskilled heads of households in England and Wales who were housed in
municipal dwellings, a leap of 110% in the percentage of public-renting
households with no income earner (compared to only 37% for all tenures).
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What was the cause of this sudden rush of housing-management controversy
regarding Modern flats? Could it have been that the 'crusade' of
councillors such as Gibson to rehouse slum-dwellers directly into large
developments of new dwellings at low rents - and not just the new but
spartan tenements of the interwar years, but Modern dwellings replete
with mod. cons. - carried with it some of the seeds of its own eventual
demise? Were the dwellings themselves partly to 'blame', or were the
characteristic ' 60s Modern blocks, such as deck-access housing, simply
victims of circumstance - the dwellings that happened to predominate in
new public-housing construction during the decade when council housing's
overall social status took a sudden nosedive? These questions, which go
to the heart of the subsequent debate about the alleged 'failure' of
Modern flats, will be very briefly touched on in the Conclusion to this
thesis. But at any rate, to the 'providers' at the time, this new
controversy, at the very moment of 'success', seemed both baffling and
infuriating. The completion of Sheffield's massive Park Hill Park Two
(Hyde Park) scheme in 1966, for instance, contributed substantially to
the solution of the city's 'housing problem' as defined up to then, yet
its very size seemed, in the opinion of some, to bring management
difficulties to the fore. (111. 114, 115) Harold Lambert, then Housing
Development Committee Chairman, recalls ruefully: 'Now, we'd broken the
back of the slum problem in Sheffield - and we'd brought a twelve years
waiting list down to six months, if you were prepared to take what was
building! But allocation of these big developments was difficult. If
you get one or two families in there that were not prepared to toe the
line, it's like putting the proverbial bad apple in the barrel!' *
The effect of these management controversies in newly-completed estates,
in sapping municipal political support for large-scale production, may
have been amplified by the severe damage caused to the traditional
structure of housing provision by the shock-tactics of a new generation
of housing reformers, who were prepared to make full use of the 'mass
media' and popular journalism in order to stir up political controversy
about housing. In the vanguard of this movement were Jeremy Sandford's
television programme 1 Cathy Come Home' , broadcast in November 1966, and
the initiatives of the housing charity Shelter, established the
following month. Ironically, the stated policy objectives of the new
reformers at first differed very little from the values of the
traditional municipal 'producers', and in no way questioned public
housing provision as such - at a time when some Conservative politicians
such as Horace Cutler were making far more unconventional proposals!
Shelter straightforwardly demanded that much more new public housing
should be made available, to those hitherto excluded by their inability
to pay high council rents - a category defined to include not only the
inhabitants of privately-rented 'slums' (whose landlords Shelter
lambasted in familiar terms) but also that newly-identified 1960s group,
the ' homeless' .
The policy prescriptions put forward by Shelter's Director, Des Wilson,
who closely controlled all the charity's campaigns, seemed like an
uncanny throwback to Gibson's 'crusade': lower rents, higher Government
subsidies, higher output by the big cities, all 'to be pushed through
with ruthless determination*. Only slightly later did Shelter discover,
and enthusiastically embrace, the radicalism of the emergent user-
participation and rehabilitation movements. However, it was the
campaigning techniques of these groups which were important in our
context - techniques which strongly paralleled the unconventional
methods of young architectural journalists such as Nicholas Taylor.
From the start, particularly in 'Cathy Come Home', the new reformer-
polemicists portrayed the official agencies of municipal housing
provision as clumsy and outmoded, fit only to be attacked and ridiculed,
if not bypassed altogether. It is at least arguable that this only
accelerated the demise of the established professional and political
structure of housing provision. 7
As was seen in the previous chapter, there was a particular vehemence
about the rejection of Modern flats in England and Wales - even by
former supporters, such as Karl Cohen - which cannot be entirely
explained by the lessening in the general impetus of public housing
production and provision. This rejection combined elements of the
traditional distrust of flats in those areas with new complaints common
to the whole of Britain, concerning the specifically Modern features of
the new blocks. It was claimed in Chapter 1 that some councillors in
the 1950s had opposed multi-storey blocks on grounds of their
unfamiliarity or the possible difficulties with children or loneliness
that young mothers might experience. Now, there was an equal concern
about delinquency and physical damage - particularly in relation to
those very 'luxury' fittings, derived from private blocks, that had
previously been seen among the most irreproachable manifestations and
achievements of Modernity. Gradually the older logic that vandalism was
caused by the moral deficiencies of the vandals or, perhaps, from the
influence of their previous slum conditions, began to yield to the idea
that the particular type or shape of new blocks might encourage
vandalism. As early as 1960, alarming levels of damage by teenagers
were being claimed in some new slum-clearance high flat schemes, such
Birkenhead CBC's Eldon Street/Oak Street development. 63 (111. 28)
Controversy concerning the fate of some Modern flats also spread to
Scotland. For instance, in Blocks 1 and 2 at Red Road, the high
proportion of children, combined with inadequate lift provision,
contributed to a reputation for juvenile delinquency which blighted the
entire scheme even before its completion. Block 2 <33 Petershill Drive)
became stigmatised as the 'worst' on the scheme by residents, management
and the police; one tenant, for example, complained to the Corporation
that an old lady's hat had been 'pulled from her head because she had
the temerity to check boys who were stoning the watchman' , (111. 151)
Similar problems occurred in Edinburgh's Martello Court, which, within a
year of its completion in 1964, was attracting 'continual police
attention' in response to complaints of hooliganism and prostitution,
and had become locally known as 'Terror Tower': 'This place will be a
slum in another month. None of them lives here. They come to Pennywell
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Street schemes, Glasgow.
every night. People up this court gives them tea and chips. As I
write, two men are at the foot of the balcony challenging those up on
the 17th floor to fight.' Whatever the real cause of controversies such
as these, they at any rate provided useful ammunition to those within
central and local government, such as SDD Planning Division, who were
beginning (with uneven success) to marshal arguments against high-flat
building in Scotland, •3'
Throughout Britain, the argument that design attributes were partly to
'blame' began, even in some active authorities, to affect the course of
building policy, during the late '60s and early '70s. For instance,
Glasgow Corporation's massive Darnley deck-access scheme, commenced in
1972, was subjected to drastic surgery during its construction: some
deck blocks were only built to a height of two storeys, while other
blocks were deleted even after their foundations had been built. The
1970s also saw the growth of controversy about the material conditions
of some blocks, focusing not so much on the question of progressive
collapse (despite the prominence of the Ronan Point incident in 1968)
than on more mundane concerns such as condensation and malfunctioning of
equipment; a few celebrated cases, such as that of the YDG Mark I
schemes or Glasgow's Hutchesontown ' E', sparked off vigorous debate as
to whether design, management, poverty or tenant lifestyle was the main
'culprit' . 10
Some authorities (including the Scottish Special Housing Association),
consciously attempted to protect their later multi-storey building
programmes from the corrosive effect on local-political support exerted
by uncontrolled management and maintenance problems. Motherwell's then
Housing Convener, Hutchison Sneddon, listed several policies which, in
his opinion, forestalled management problems in the Borough's high
flats, and made possible a second great push of high-flat construction,
well into the early 1970s: 'Firstly, a high standard of supervision - a
caretaker's office in every block. Secondly, no young children in
blocks and no flats bigger than three apartments [two bedrooms!.
Thirdly, a high standard of finish. We spent a bob or two on finish,
and it was successful - people polish their floors in Motherwell blocks!
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Whereas Glasgow would spend their money on the highest specification of
lifts, electrics, plumbing, things you couldn't see, then just leave the
blocks to the vandals! A man coming into one of my houses in Motherwell
didn't look and say, "My ballcock isn't stamped! My cylinder isn't a
grade 1 cylinder!" 11
Only one large municipality in the UK - the City of Aberdeen - managed
to completely 'buck the trend' of political and professional rejection
of high flats, and keep on constructing them right until the very end of
public housebuilding on any significant scale in this country. Although
several authorities (especially in Inner London) built isolated high
blocks after the early 1970s, Aberdeen was the only city to pursue a
systematic programme of multi-storey construction throughout the 1970s
and 1980s - linked to intensive management and a very strict letting
policy, designed to exclude 'problem' tenants from high flats. In
Aberdeen, during the late 1970s, the very buoyant demand for tenancies
in the City's existing high flats, and councillors' insistent clamour
for the erection of more of these (in their opinion) 'five-star hotels',
encouraged the Housing Committee, led by Councillor Robert Robertson, to
launch itself enthusiastically into the building of a new series of 10
and 11-storey point blocks containing old people's sheltered housing.
Aberdeen's most recent multi-storey project, an 11-storey point block at
Jasmine Place, was erected in 1985 by Wimpey - a year when many English
cities, such as Liverpool, were already frenziedly demolishing dozens of
supposedly 'unlettable' multi-storey blocks, while, on the other hand,
avant-garde London reformists or tenants' groups were venturing the
first positive reassessments of high flats from a housing-management or
habitation point of view, 1:2
Why was Aberdeen, a geographically isolated and culturally self-
contained industrial and commercial centre, able to achieve a seemingly
undramatic continuity of multi-storey building, while other areas of
Britain were locked into a violent cycle of enthusiasm, rejection and
tentative revival? Why, more generally, did some authorities encounter
severe problems of 'management', and others apparently avoid them,
sustaining, even expanding multi-storey building in the face of a
gathering national political consensus of hostility? Was this achieved
by some kind of balancing act between all the various constraints and
threats to the perceived 'success' of a housing scheme - a balance
between skilful management and letting, high-quality finish, and a local
culture of respect and care in the habitation of dwellings? These very
wide present-day issues cannot be addressed in an limited account such
as this, which has purposely steered clear of the history of habitation,
management and maintenance. However, the mere fact that these questions
are contentious and very complex should not, in itself, prevent
researchers in the future attempting a historically-based analysis of
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this thesis, as set out in the Introduction, was twofold:
to enquire into a prominent episode in the recent past, by investigating
why, by whom, and how the massed building of multi-storey blocks across
the various parts of Britain was undertaken in the late 1950s and 1960s;
and to vigorously contest the existing orthodoxy on this subject, which
seemed hostile, at times violently so, towards high flats. The initial
driving force was one of sheer historical curiosity: a sense that it
would be challenging and worthwhile to probe in detail a complex past
episode widely regarded today as, at best, a mystery, and, more often,
as a disastrous 'failure'; and a keenness to recover and present
comprehensively the thinking and motives of the period under study, and
to assign them as precisely as possible to various key agents. At this
stage, I had no definite ideas of my own as to the causes, and agents,
responsible for this dramatic story, other than the conventional view
that it was moulded mainly by overarching forces such as industrial
concentrations or the central State.
The resulting analysis was presented as follows. In the Introduction,
my own research method, together with the rationale underlying it, was
explained, and both were compared with those of other recent accounts of
the subject. It was found that the latter mostly fell into two
categories: those concerned to interpret past events as the result of
the exercise of political-economic or class power (and mostly seeing
Modern flats as the result of mis-application or abuse of such power),
and those dominated by the cyclical and polarised conventions of
architectural utopianism (in which Modern housing, since the 1970s, has
usually occupied the position of 'Dystopia'). It began to emerge, in
the course of the Introduction's survey of these accounts, that most
of them had not grounded their (on the whole) sharply critical
evaluations in a sufficiently rigorous and comprehensive correlation of
their own present-day values with primary evidence from the 1950s and
'60s. In an attempt to avoid falling into the same trap, the main body
of this account was based on a very intensive, yet broad research
programme, at both 'national' and 'local' levels: in the 'national'
case, 'British', English/Welsh and Scottish policies and debates were
differentiated from one another, and, in the 'local' case, an attempt
was made to survey the biggest authorities comprehensively, rather than
through 'case studies'. The main text related the story of the
malti-storey drive in two stages, covering its beginnings and its
fully-developed phase. This account was largely unaccompanied by
methodological commentary. However, it was made clear by periodic
reminders that a parallel process of testing was all the time in
progress, with the aim of recovering (through primary source-research)
the values of the period under study, and, at the same time, using these
discoveries to answer the three central questions of the thesis: high
flats - why? by whom? how?
What were the results of this investigation? As it progressed, it
became clearer and clearer that the copious evidence, much of it (such
as closed Government files) available for the first time, did not
substantiate the existing explanations for the building of high flats,
and indeed pointed to an almost diametrically opposed interpretation.
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At the most general level, this evidence suggested that the multi-storey
drive should not be seen so much as an act or idea which clothed the
exercise of power, as a powerful act resulting from an idea - or,
rather, from conflicts of ideas (such as: to overspill or not?). Then,
focusing more precisely on the key questions of this thesis, it became
clear that - again contrary to orthodoxy - the source of the dominant
idea, and the decisive power, which drove forward multi-storey building,
was not of a 'national' or impersonal class/economic nature, but was of
a local character, and was powerfully shaped by key individuals. High
blocks, far from being a baffling, alien apparition within, or
imposition on, individual cities, represented an absolutely clear,
logical expression and defence of municipal values and interests across
the urban areas of England and Scotland, as promoted by those tireless
and committed men and women, the 'housing crusaders'. Their most
immediate motive was the burning desire to maintain 'output' of new
dwellings and resist planning pressures for overspill; this was
reinforced, at a deeper level, by the defiant determination to protect
and bolster municipal pride and independence. The 'national' character
of the multi-storey building drive was found to derive not from
'top-down' influences but largely from the 'bottom-up' effect of
cumulative municipal initiatives.
As suggested above, the emergence of this new interpretation inevitably
involved the qualified rejection of others - above all, of the two
groups of accounts examined in the Introduction. The first and, in our
context, the less substantial of these two, was that which sought to
explain high flats as the result of the exercise of power by overarching
or 'structural' forces. While this might or might not be an effective
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tool for investigating other policies and events during this period, the
available evidence suggested that it had relatively little relevance to
the particular task of explaining the spread of high flats across
Britain. The impact of the ideas of municipal pride, and of
determination to oppose the interventions of local forces; the sheer
unabashed vigour of municipal leaders such as Gibson; and the confident
use of administrative power by officials such as Cross to bring
contractors running or toss 'national' opponents into oblivion - these
provided in themselves such powerful evidence as hardly to require any
commentary in the course of the narrative. The stentorian blast of this
'municipal crusade' stripped away almost all the ingenious
statistical-theoretical arguments of external domination or concealed
machination; what was left seemed somewhat naive or artificial. The
worry that it might not be possible to contest a 'top down'
interpretation with 'bottom up' evidence - that the two might not meet
in the middle - proved unfounded. If overarching forces were at work,
at least some repercussions should have been traceable at 'ground
level': this, after all, was Dunleavy's claim regarding his own case
studies. But, although there was plenty of evidence of the activities
of forces outside the municipal field - such as Central Government or
building firms - no significant evidence emerged that these groupings
exerted direct influence on key decisions to build high flats. It
should be once again emphasised that this account chiefly takes issue
with previous accounts not because of their academic 'world-outlook' in
itself (whether 'structuralist', 'Marxist' or whatever), but on grounds
of their at times self-confirming employment of the available evidence
concerning the particular case of high flats. This is exemplified by
Dunleavy's use of the vaguely-defined idea of '"normal" relations'
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(cited on p. 34 above) as a means of marginalising or discounting any
case-study evidence which conflicts with his own apparently
already-formed interpretation.
Much greater difficulty, however, was presented by the second prevailing
interpretation of the building of multi-storey blocks: that conceived
within a Utopian framework, under which phenomena within the 'built
environment', such as high flats, are assigned a strongly defined
place within various fluctuating and conflicting Utopias or 'Dystopias',
widely held among architects, journalists and allied groups - including
many historians. The trouble stemmed from the way in which successive
Utopias clash with each other, yet form a continuous and interwoven
succession stretching up to the present day - making it very difficult
for the historian to define and compare 'present' and 'past'
standpoints. Writing in a period when 'informed public opinion'
generally condemns large blocks of flats, how can the historian of 1960s
housing even begin to compare and connect the various cross-currents of
thought concerning flats at that time? What was the precise
relationship between the strong motivation among British municipal
'providers' to build high flats on the one hand, and, on the other, the
cultural distrust of flats, particularly in England (which might make
many of those same 'providers' nervous about building them)? Or the
lobbying of Osbornite diehards for the old 'Garden City English House'
ideal? Or, yet again, the pressure from avant-gardists such as Nicholas
Taylor for the newly-revived 'Terraced English House'?
Confusion also arose from the polarised character of Utopia, with its
ever-present underlying question: 'success or failure?' This again made
difficult the identification and careful separation of 'past' and
'present' discourses and values. In analysing the thinking of Modern
housing architects, one naturally all the time encountered the most
sweeping Utopian judgements of this or that design 'solution' as
successful or otherwise; and even among plain-speaking 'housing
crusaders', Utopian patterns of thinking exerted some influence.
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Gibson's or Rogan's quest to 'rehouse the people from the slums into new
Modern blocks' was, of course, a pursuit of numbers; but it was also a
kind of Utopia in its own right, irrespective of the fact that
later, different Utopias rejected and attacked the same blocks. The
sole purpose of Martello Court, in Rogan's eyes, was to get people out
of 'slums' and into new Modern blocks, and the possibility that it
itself might subsequently, within a very short time, itself become
labelled a 'new slum', would have seemed to him a secondary and somewhat
surprising problem. Only as part of a new Utopia, today's Utopia, could
this type of problem come to be seen as part of 'the' housing problem,
and become coupled with accusations of 'failure' and 'betrayal of the
people' by 'Them'. Equally, one may expect to witness an approximately
reverse process once the next Utopia begins to emerge. The 'failure' of
high flats may increasingly be forgotten, with the 'worst' examples
(like the Victorian 'slums' before them) either demolished or converted
to new uses and tenures; and the 'success' of these renovated blocks,
and others, may then soon be taken as the norm. The earlier vandalism
and management problems may increasingly be laid at the door of
inefficient managers and (even) anti-social tenants; and the mere fact
that they could ever have been cited as evidence of the 'failure* of
high flats will be ridiculed. You might (we may expect to hear) just as
well talk about the 'failure' of an expensive car driven over the edge
of a cliff! Not only might it be ridiculed, but also perhaps even
seized on as evidence of yet another 'betrayal'. Betrayal of 'good'
tenants by 'bad' tenants, perhaps - or betrayal of the stirring legacy
of the 'housing crusaders' by the cynicism of those 'enabling'
manipulators, the Community Architects? All highly entertaining, no
doubt - but this bewildering back-and-forth bandying of good and bad,
success and failure, will all the time further swamp and confuse any
attempts to discuss complicated historical issues, such as causes and
motives, at anything other than the level of crude slogans.
So - this account is opposed to analysis of the past within an exclusively utopia
framework. All very well, the sceptical reader may remark - but what
about the very telling arguments widely accepted today, that the
production of these blocks was indeed characterised by certain
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quantifiable flaws or errors - 'design disadvantagement', shoddy
workmanship, or lack of accountability on the part of the 'producers'?
Surely these accusations cannot be evaded merely by the device of
assuming some kind of cloak of historical inviolability, allowing the
researcher to glibly duck into and out of present-day issues at will?.
Firstly, one must point out that some criticisms still widely touted
about today, such as the idea that councillors were pawns of the
builders, or the planners' much-repeated Diminishing Returns argument
that high blocks used land 'irrationally', have been tackled directly
and, hopefully, rebutted in the course of this text. Other, seemingly
more substantial objections, such as 'design disadvantagement', have not
been dealt with in this thesis, since, although clearly bound up with
the way that the blocks were originally built by our ' producers', and
although anticipated to some extent in the early housing-management
tribulations of schemes such as Red Road, they were only truly
formulated, as concerted criticisms, after the effective end of the
in the 1970s.
Modern housing driv^ One very prominent exception to this rule - the
question of progressive collapse of high blocks - does spring
immediately to mind: the Ronan Point incident, in May 1968, did occur
(just) during our period. However, this was (and is) prominent
precisely because it was so exceptional, in contrast to the numbers of
'traditional' dwellings destroyed by gas explosions every decade, with
little or no 'national' news coverage (e.g. Guthrie Street, Edinburgh or
Putney, London, during the late 1980s alone). Since Ronan Point, with
its four fatalities, nobody has been killed in the progressive collapse
of multi-storey blocks in the UK, for the reason that none have in fact
collapsed. Many have been deliberately demolished by local authorities,
sometimes on the grounds (or pretext?) of structural deficiency -
although it might be worth reminding ourselves here that in at least two
cases (the GLC Trowbridge Estate in 1986 and Niddrie Marischal,
Edinburgh, in 1991) the detonation of over 2,000 charges of high
explosive failed to demolish supposedly 'badly built' blocks: the
Edinburgh blocks eventually had to be smashed down by a giant battering
ram.
But, undeniably, much more damaging accusations than this have emerged
since the end of the multi-storey boom. These were not directly
addressed in the research programme or the text of this thesis,
concerned as it was with the boom itself. After all, even if none of
the types of block which were to prove attestably controversial - large-
panel prefabricated blocks, deck blocks and so forth - had been built,
even if the multi-storey drive had been confined to types which were to
be, on the whole, socially and structurally uncontentious, such as
Wirnpey point blocks, even if no high flats had been let to families with
children, there would still have been a substantial multi-storey
building drive, whose origins it would have still been the task of this
thesis to explain. But the very fact that these problems have not been
systematically addressed in the main research and text in itself creates
an obstacle to any kind of independent evaluation, however brief, in
this Conclusion. Without direct research of one's own into these
questions, what alternative is there to accepting at face value the
imposing array of evidence now assembled - to the effect that, for
instance, specific features in the design of certain large-panel
'systems' did contribute to condensation, and that the layout of deck-
access complexes did facilitate crime? To seek to challenge even one of
these accusations would be a vast enough (although, as indicated in the
conclusion to the last chapter, not historically impossible) task of
investigation. Some of the accusations must therefore, by default, be
accepted for the purposes of this Conclusion - an assumption which
inexorably leads to the further conclusion that there must have been a
'failure' on the part of not just the design but also the production
process: a failure to anticipate the needs or characteristics of future
users, by providing, for instance, an inadequate number of lifts for
blocks destined to contain many children, or by putting those children
in high blocks at all. This harsh judgement, in turn, seems to rebound
on the main subject of our account, the endeavours of the 'crusaders'.
In what light does this 'failure' cast their 'crusade': folly,
incompetence, or conspiracy?
The only response to this is to return, once again, to the values of the
'crusaders' themselves, To one, such as Gibson, who was fervently
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preoccupied with the pathology of 19th-century 'slums', who was obsessed
with the sole aim of finally eradicating from his city the conditions
lambasted by generations of housing reformers, the emergent pathology of
new housing was, quite simply, incomprehensible. That is not just
speculation, but an attestable fact: for Gibson was confronted with some
of these new values, in embryonic form, when Red Road was being planned.
In 1962, the Scottish Development Department's Housing Administrators
had challenged the Convener concerning the possible housing-management
implications of Blocks 1 and 2 - 31-storey towers which were to contain
only 3-bedroom family flats, four on each floor, with only two lifts.
In response, Gibson freely conceded that there might be teething
problems, connected for instance with the use of the unfamiliar Modern
fittings and gadgets, and that guidance might be required: he agreed
that there was a need for a 'social welfare survey' of Glasgow high
blocks, to take in questions such as ' tenants' attitudes to specialised
fittings, e.g. ash-chutes, incinerators and the like'. But he simply
could not visualise that intrinsic, irremediable difficulties might
arise. The problem of children's play, for instance (already the
subject of cautionary 'national'-level social reports in the '50s), he
felt could be solved simply by the appointment of play wardens or
'rangers'. His general conclusion was straightforward: 'The
Corporation... had had no difficulties with children living in high
flats, and many families welcomed such accommodation'. 1 But as we saw,
in the last chapter, what happened in Blocks 1 and 2 at Red Road after
their completion, and after Gibson's death, was anything but uncontentious.
If we simply compare events then and now on an equal basis, ignoring key
differences in ideas such as housing pathology, are we doing anything
more than being 'wise after the event'? If there was a 'failure'
on the part of the 'crusaders' to anticipate the sea-change in values
and expectations which was to occur, then today's housing commentators
are, for their part, guilty of a 'failure' to acknowledge the burning
preoccupations of their predecessors: Pat Rogan observed with some
bewilderment that 'what they call slums now, with their muggings and
vandals and dampness and so forth, is not the same as what we thought of
as slums then: tenements literally crumbling to pieces, places with no
toilet, no water even, full of rats, with the roof falling off!' *
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The anachronistic tendencies in today's criticisms, when applied with
hindsight to the production process, emerge particularly clearly over
the issue of 'participation', where present-day critics have lambasted
the failure to allow the views of prospective 'users' to influence what
was built, and have highlighted the fact that all surveys of 'user
preferences' at the time indicated a preference for cottages over flats,
Space dictates that we leave aside here the general aspects of this
question, already touched on - the lack of evidence that anyone at the
time, 'users' or 'crusaders', saw an innate deficiency in the idea of
social 'provision' by Authority - and instead home in on the 'house
versus flat' issue, which superficially seems the Participationists'
most unchallengeable argument, On closer examination, however, even
this dissolves into a hopeless jumble of contradictions. To
have realised the 'house' ideal sought by tenants at the time - detached
Garden Suburb cottages in large gardens - would have required either
complete social and economic revolution (to allow total land and
'density' redistribution in existing urban areas), or a coercive policy
of mass overspill of population: and, in either case, a certain
consequence would have been wholesale demolition of the 'houses' now
praised by today's Participationists (at least in England and Wales):
Victorian terraces! From even the incidental evidence uncovered in the
course of this research, it seems abundantly clear that there was no
yearning among 'users' to preserve these English dwellings, or
their Scottish equivalents, the 19th-century tenements. The very
reverse seems to have applied, in fact - as acknowledged even by that
apostle of tenement 'rehab' in Glasgow, the Corporation's former House
Improvements Officer, Theo Crombie: 'The folk in the tenements longed
for the day when the demolition gang would arrive and they would be
allocated a nice wee flat in one of the new schemes' . 3 Even had the
original Garden Suburb/City ideal been realised within existing
municipal boundaries, it is by no means clear whether this, once
accomplished, would have been greeted as Utopia at last realised, or
merely blasted as yet another 'failure'. One need only point to the
1991 disturbances at North Shields's Meadowwell Estate, that model of
Colemanesque interwar cottage suburbia. A So, although it may seem to
be ducking the issue, one must finally conclude that the subject of this
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thesis is not an appropriate context for an overall evaluation of the
question of whether Modern flats were a 'success' or a 'failure' - or,
equally, the question of whether it should be evaluated in such terms at
all. Such a discussion can only be comprehensively pursued by means of
a systematic ' investigation of the attacks on Modern housing -
in other words, of the period which follows the subject of this account.
(111. 152, 153)
Finally - and inevitably, in the context of a Conclusion - it must be
asked: does this analysis have any direct lessons for those involved in
housing today? The first and foremost concern of this thesis has, of
course, been 'historiographical' - to combat investigations of the
housing provision of the past, which simply take the form of extensions
of present-day housing campaign rhetoric. The analysis of
pre-World War I housing, once the preserve of Engels-style denunciations
of 'Cruel Habitations' and 'slum landlords' s, has now largely been
purged of this tendency by writers such as Daunton and Gaskell; and
the same process is underway for the interwar period, Only the postwar
period still remains a 'free fire zone' for Utopian rhetoricians, with
their chaotic intermingling of present and past. This thesis argues
that it is high time that this period, too, should be freed
from the incubus of hackneyed slogans, and elevated into a fully-fledged
arena of historical analysis. Within the confines of this thesis, it
has only been possible to cover the subject of the production of Modern
housing; but of course the story of its habitation - whether in terms of
gender, urban culture, municipal decision-making, social class or
whatever - equally urgently requires a methodological shift of analysis.
But, even if this historiographical aim could be accomplished, what, if
anything, would be its wider repercussions? For a start, in the wider
debates about housing within British 'public opinion', it would
certainly be a novel departure if the subject could at last be discussed
without violent fluctuation of fashion, in conformity with the wide
assumption in non-Anglo-Saxon Western countries, that city-dwellers can
live in a flat in the centre or an Einfamilienhaus on the outskirts,
that both have advantages and disadvantages, but that neither is
inherently 'better' than the other. Could this country's entrenched
cultural polarisation between 'good' house and 'bad' flat survive, if
starved of its main source of sustenance - the clash of Utopias among
architects and their camp-followers, such as 'committed' historians?
The question of the influence of Utopianism is perhaps an aspect of the
wider 'culture' of housing. In the more particular area of municipal
housing policy, however - the present-day equivalent to the debates
traced in this account - it is more difficult to see how this thesis
could have any direct relevance. To tell a story of municipally-led
mass housing production, especially of high flats - the symbol of local-
authority independence - what relevance could that really have, at a
time when it seems unlikely that there will ever again be mass
'provision' of new public housing, and certainly not in the form of
large Modern blocks? Municipal building of multi-storey flats may have
continued for a time after the end of the main trend, but it has
nevertheless come to an end now: the last blocks were completed in 1985-
6 (in Aberdeen and Harlow). High blocks are still being built by
private firms and some housing associations, but their 'patronage'
context is quite different, as is their physical form (most usually
comprising elaborations on a tenemental theme, with Post-Modern
architectural trappings).
At a slightly more general policy level, there might at first sight seem
to be greater relevance in telling a story of forceful municipal
enterprise, at a time when local government fortunes in general are at a
crossroads. On^the one hand, there is now the prospect of some
restoration of lost municipal power across Britain, once the Abercrombie
juggernaut, already decapitated by the abolition of the GLC and the
English metropolitan counties, is finally dismembered and scattered to
the winds in the promised local-government reorganisation of the mid-
1990s. Yet the transfer elsewhere of key local-authority functions,
such as education, may make this victory Pyrrhic. What lessons could
even partly re-invigorated city authorities learns from the 'crusade' of
Gibson and his fellows? In the field of housebuilding, as stated above,
little or nothing. But what about other areas of municipal initiative?
Here, of course, the spectre of local-government finance immediately
rears its head. The Gibson 'crusade' took place in a context where
large authorities were able to pursue major policies with relatively
little Government regulation, and could draw on their local taxation
base - the hard-pressed ratepayer - almost unhindered, while all the
time taking for granted substantial Government subsidies. Although some
relics of this 'golden age' of municipal largesse and patronage - such
as the Glasgow DLO - have up to now managed to preserve themselves, the
general difference from today's position, whether for good or for bad,
is so striking that it hardly even needs to be pointed out! So, in this
area too, the relevance of this study seems very limited.
In the end, the pursuit of 'relevance' only brings us back to that more
narrowly-defined 'historical' issue, which we have singled out above as
the central 'bias' of this account: the concern to analyse this
dramatic past episode, as far as possible, on its own terms,
rather than as an appendage to today's debates. Irrespective of any
bearing that this study might or might not have on housing policy or
municipal policy, there is still one way in which its subject - multi¬
storey housing - is 'relevant' to urban life now: by its sheer physical
presence. Modern blocks of flats, although their extent and impact has
been reduced or modified in some cities by the craze for demolition or
bright Post-Modern veneering, are still very prominent. Yet because
such a long time - 25 years or so - has now elapsed since 'informed
public opinion' turned against them, there is very little understanding
of their original context. Now, multi-storey blocks stand like
inscrutable prehistoric monoliths, baffling to all who pass by them.
While some historical projects, such as the re-assessment and re-re¬
assessment of the dictatorship of Caesar or the Peloponnesian War, can
now never have anything other than an academic significance, to
explain why and how these enormous blocks carne to be erected throughout
Britain, in the middle of the present century, seemed an altogether
different matter - even if the results of this investigation were
initially to take the form of an academic thesis.
This, then, seemed to be the main relevance of this project: to take
hold of a historical subject which, in its physical aspect, still
dominates much of our cities, yet whose origins are now little-
understood; and to unearth and present explicitly the social forces and
values which made it possible. Not only that, but - perhaps most
important of all - to reach that understanding not decades or centuries
after the event, but while the main 'actors' were still alive, and able
to recollect and convey the human motives and passions which fuelled
this most spectacular realisation of municipal pride and independence.
 
153 'User': Kitty Horsey (4)
floor of Martello Court,
enjoys the view from Flat 79, on the 20th
1991.
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2 Int. Rogan.
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Shropshire County RO (Min of Wellington RDC)
Stafford BC Committee Clerks (Min of Stafford MBC)
Stoke-on-Trent LHL (Min of Stoke-on-Trent CBC)
Walsall LHL/A (Min, pamphlets and papers of Brownhills UDC, Darlaston
UDC, Walsall CBC, Willenhall UDC in part)
Wolverhampton LHL (Min of Bilston MBC, Wednesfield UDC,
in part, Wolverhampton CBC)








Leicester LHL (Min of Leicester CBC)
Northampton LHL (Min of Northampton CBC)
Nottingham City RO (Min of Nottingham CBC)
Yorkshire and Humberside:
Barnsley LHL (Min of Barnsley CBC)
Bradford LHL (Min of Bingley UDC, Bradford CBC, Keighley MBC)
Doncaster LHL (Min of Doncaster CBC)
Halifax LHL (Min of Elland UDC, Halifax CBC, Sowerby Bridge UDC)
Kingston upon Hull LHL (Min of Kingston upon Hull CBC/City Council)
Leeds City Council, City Architect's Department (microfilmed YDG plans)
Leeds City Council, Town Clerk's Department (Min and papers of Leeds
CBC)
Rotherham LHL (Min of Rotherham CBC)
Sheffield City RO (Min and papers, Sheffield CBC; Min, Wortley RDC)




Blackburn LHL (Min of Blackburn CBC)
Blackpool LHL (Min of Blackpool CBC)
Bolton LHL (Min of Bolton CBC)
Burnley LHL (Min of Burnley CBC)
Cheshire County RO (Min of Chester CBC, Ellesrnere Port MBC, Runcorn UDC)
Crewe LHL (Min of Crewe MBC)
Knowsley DC, Building Control Department (microfilmed plans, Kirkby UDC)
Liverpool City RO (Mins, PPs, files, pamphlets, photographs of Liverpool
CBC)
Liverpool City Council Building Control and Planning Departments (files
and microfilmed plans, Liverpool CBC)
Macclesfield LHL (Min of Macclesfield MBC)
Manchester City Council Building Control and Housing Departments
(microfilmed plans, Manchester CBC)
Manchester LHL (Min and pamphlets, Manchester CBC)
Oldham LHL (Min of Chadderton UDC, Oldham CBC)
Preston BC Architects Department (files and statistics, Preston CBC)
Rochdale LHL (Min of Rochdale CBC)
Salford LHL (Min of Eccles MBC, Salford CBC)
Sefton LHL (Min of Bootle CBC, Crosby MBC)
Tameside LHL, Ashton and Stalybridge (Min of Ashton-under-Lyne MBC, Hyde
MBC, Stalybridge MBC)
Stockport LHL (Min of Stockport CBC)
Trafford LHL, Sale (Min of Sale UDC)
Trafford LHL, Stretford (Min of Stretford MBC)
Warrington LHL (Min of Warrington CBC)
Wigan LHL (Min of Wigan CBC)
Wirral LHL, Birkenhead (Min of Birkenhead CBC and Wallasey CBC)
Northern:
Gateshead LHL (Min of Gateshead CBC, Whickham UDC)
Newcastle upon Tyne LHL (Min, including verbatim debates, of Newcastle
CBC and City Council)
Newcastle upon Tyne City Council Building Control Department
(microfilmed plans, Newcastle CBC)
North Tyneside Borough A (Min of Longbenton UDC and Wallsend MBC)
Sunderland LHL (Min of Sunderland CBC)
Teesside County RO (Min of Billingharn UDC, Middlesbrough CBC, Teesside
CBC, Thornaby MBC)




Cardiff LHL (Min of Cardiff CBC)
Gwent County RO (Min of Cwmbran NTDC, Pontypool UDC)
Merthyr Tydfil LHL (Min of Merthyr CBC)
Newport LHL (Min of Newport CBC)
South Glamorgan County RO Min of Cardiff RDC)
Swansea LHL (Min of Swansea CBC)
Scotland:
Aberdeen District Council Planning Department (plans, statistics and
files)
Aberdeen LHL (Min of Aberdeen BC and DC)
Clydebank DC Building Control Department (plans and statistics,
Clydebank BC and SSHA)
Clydebank LHL (Min of Clydebank BC)
Cumbernauld NTDC Architect's Department (statistics, Cumbernauld NTDC)
Cunninghame DC Building Control Department (DG plans and records, Irvine
BC and Saltcoats BC)
Dumbarton LHL (Min of Dumbarton BC)
Dundee DC Building Control Department (DG microfimed plans and records)
Dundee City A (files, Dundee BC)
Dundee LHL (Min, pamphlets, newspapers, Dundee BC)
Dunfermline DC Building Control Department (DG records, Dunfermline BC)
Edinburgh City Archivist (files and DG plans, Edinburgh BC)
Edinburgh LHL, Central Library (Min and pamphlets, Edinburgh BC)
Falkirk DC Building Control Department (DG records, Falkirk BC and
Grangemouth BC)
Fife Regional Council A (Min of Fife County Council)
Glasgow, Mitchell Library, Glasgow Room (Min and pamphlets, Glasgow BC)
Grampian County RO (Min of Aberdeen County Council)
Hamilton DC Building Control Department (DG records, Hamilton BC)
Inverclyde DC Department of Administration and LHL (Min of Gourock BC,
Greenock BC, Inverclyde DC, Port Glasgow BC)
Kirkcaldy DC Architects Department (DG plans and records, Buckhaven BC
and Kirkcaldy BC)
Kyle and Carrick DC Building Control Department (DG records, Ayr BC)
Monklands LHL (Min of Airdrie BC and Coatbridge BC)
Motherwell DC Building Control Department (DG plans and records,
Motherwell BC)
Motherwell LHL (Min of Motherwell BC)
Perth LHL (Min of Perth BC)
Renfrew DC Building Control Department, Johnstone (DG records,
J ohnstone)
Renfrew DC Building Control Department, Paisley (DG records, Paisley BC
and Renfrew BC)
Renfrew LHL, Paisley (Min of Barrhead BC, Paisley BC)
Strathclyde Regional A, Mitchell Library, Glasgow (DG plans/records,
files, photographs, Glasgow BC; Min of Lanark County Council and
Rutherglen BC)





S. Bunton Jnr, (loan of photographs)
Lady Denington (books, pamphlets)
S. Fagan (old photographs)
Mrs S. Gibson (loan of papers relating to the work of her late husband,
Cllr. D. Gibson)
Mrs E. Gullick (loan of file relating to World's End, Chelsea)
N. Hambleton (loan of articles on Stoke-on-Trent brick point blocks)
P. Rogan (loan of old photographs)
T. Dan Smith (material on Newcastle housing)
Cllr. E. Smythe (loan of file on EDLO)
W. Solman (material on North Peckham)
R. Stones (pamphlets on work of Manchester Development Group)
(2) SECONDARY SOURCE MATERIAL
BIBLIOGRAPHIES AND DIRECTORIES
Housing Centre Bookshop, Catalogue of British Housing Books in Print,
1978
MPBW, R&D Bulletin, Directory of Construction Statistics, 1968
MPBW, R&D Bulletin, Survey of R & D for the Construction Industry,
1968
T. Newson (ed. ), A Housing Bibliography, Birmingham University Centre
for Urban and Regional Studies, 4th. ed. 1982
J. G. 0116, An Introduction to British Government Publications, 1973
RIBA, Library Bulletin/Annual Review of Periodical Articles (to 1973)
RIBA, Architectural Periodicals Index (quarterly, from Feb. 1974)
J. M. Stewart (University of Lancaster Department of Social
Administration), Housing Bibliography: Subject Class!fication, 1976
Town Planning Institute, Planning Research, various editions/dates
ul
MODERN HOUSING ARCHITECTURE AND PUBLIC ARCHITECTURE
AR special issues, November 1967 and September 1970
CHAC Design of Dwellings Subcommittee and Ministry of Town and Country
Planning Study Group, Report ('Dudley Report'), 1944
h.t W. Cleeve Barr, Public Authority Housing, 1958
A. Coleman, Utopia on Trial, 1985
E. W. Cooney, 'High Flats in Local Authority Housing in England and
Wales since 1945', in A. Sutcliffe (ed. ), Multi-Storey Living, 1974, pp.
151-80.
N. M. Day, The Rise of the Architect in State Housing, 1988 (PhD,
Warwick University)
DHS/SDD, Scottish Housing Handbook (various parts)
A. N. F. Marmot, How High Should They Live?, 1984 (PhD, University of
California)
R. Mc Cutcheon, High Flats in Britain 1945-1971, M Sc Sussex University
1971; also (same title) in M. Edwards et al. (eds.), Political Economy
and the Housing Question, 1975.
MHLG, Design Bulletins (from 1962)
MHLG, Flats and Houses 1958, 1958
MHLG, Homes for Today and Tomorrow (report by CHAC: 'Parker Morris
Report'), 1961
G. R, Owens, Mixed Development in Local Authority Housing in England and
Wales 1945-70, 1987 (PhD, University College London)
A. Ravetz, Model Estate, 1974
RIBA, Directory of Practices, various dates
RIBA, Symposium on High Flats, 1955 (also see JRIBA March/April 1955)
A. Saint, The Image of the Architect, 1983
A. Saint, Towards a Social Architecture: The Role of School Building in
Post-War England, 1987
P. A. Scoffharn, The Shape of British Housing, 1984
SHAC, Planning our New Homes, 1944
University of Manchester School of Architecture, Access in Dwellings,
1974
HOUSING AND TOWN PLANNING
W. Burns, New Towns for Old, 1963
L. Esher, A Broken Wave, 1981
F. Gibberd, Town Design, 1953
/
D. Heap, Encyclopedia of Planning Law and Practice, 1959 (Sweet and
Maxwell Local Government Library)
P. Johnson-Marshall, Rebuilding Cities, 1966
MHLG, Density of Residential Areas, 1952
MHLG and Ministry of Transport, Planning Bulletins, (from 1962)
A, Ravetz, Remaking Cities, 1980
P, A. Stone, Urban Development in Britain, vol. 1, 1970
HOUSING CONSTRUCTION/BUILDING ORGANISATION
Cement and Concrete Association, Housing from the Factory, 1962
A. F. L. Deeson (ed.), The Comprehensive Industrialised Building Systems
Manual, 1965
Ri M. E. Diarnant, Industrialised Building (vols. 1, 2), 1964, 1965
B. Finnimore, Houses from the Factory, 1989
W. S. Hilton, Building by Direct Labour, 1954
C. G. Powell, An Economic History of the British Building Industry, 1980
B. Russell, Building Systems, Industrialization and Architecture, 1981
6xp
HOUSING POLICY/STATISTICS
J. Bassett and J. Short, Housing and Residential Structure, 1980
I, Begg, 50 Special Years, 1987
Bowley, Housing and the State, 1945
J, Burnett, A Social History of Housing 1815-1970, 1978
DHS/SDD, Housing Return for Scotland, various dates
P. Dunleavy, The Politics of Mass Housing in Britain 1945-75, 1981 (and
PhD, Oxford University, 1981)
GLC, Greater London Research (Quarterly; from 1967)
P, Lamb (ed, ), Encyclopedia of Housing Law and Practice, 1958 (Sweet and
Maxwell Local Government Library)
S. Lowe and D, Hughes (eds. ), A New Century of Social Housing, 1991
S. Merrett, State Housing in Britain, 1979
MHLG, Housing Return for England and Wales (to 1966), Housing Statistics
(from 1967)
MHLG, New Houses for Old, 1954
MHLG, Old Houses into New Homes, 1968
SSHA, Annual Reports (various dates)
SDD, The Older Houses in Scotland, 1968
SHAC, Council House Communities, 1970
SHAC, Modernising our Homes, 1947
D. C. Stafford, The Economics of Housing Policy, 1978
K. Young, P. L. Garside, Metropolitan London, 1982
K. Young, J. Kramer, Strategy and Conflict in London Housing, 1978
i>2-1
PUBLIC HOUSING ABROAD
S Backstrdm, S Aalund (eds.), Fyrtiotalets Svenska Bostad, Uppsala 1950.
D. Bowly, The Poorhouse, Subsidised Housing in Chicago, Carbondale 1978
E. Hiort, Housing in Denmark since 1950, 1952
/
Hong Kong Housing Authority, Annual Reports (various dates)
E. G. Pryor, Housing in Hong Kong, 1983 (2nd ed. )
W. Rietdorf, Neue Wohngebiete sozialistlscher Lh'nder, Berlin (DDR), 1976
Union Internationale des Architectes, Habitation 1945-1955, 1955 (and
later editions)
GOVERNMENT: CENTRAL AND LOCAL
S. Brittan, The Treasury under the Tories 1951-64, 1964
D. N. Chester, Central and Local Government, 1951
C. Cockburn, The Local State, 1977
/
Directory of Official Architects and Planners (various dates)
Management and Personnel Office, Civil Service Yearbook (previ
Imperial Calendar; various dates)
Municipal Yearbook (various dates)
Scottish Government Yearbook (various dates)
Scottish Municipal Annual (various dates)
J. H. Warren, The English Local Government System, 1946
J. H. Warren, The Local Government Service, 1952
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES (followed by key positions held)
F. J. C. AMOS City Planning Officer, Liverpool CBC
CLLR, J. ARMITAOE Housing Committee, Oldham CBC
I. ARNOTT architect, RMJM
J. E, BEDDOE senior Administrator, MHLG
B. BERCOTT private architect, Glasgow
D. BLACK senior DHS/SDD architect, DHS/SDD
W. BOR senior planner, LCC; City Planning Officer, Liverpool CBC
G. BOWIE Chief Architect, Crudens Ltd
H. BRANNAN Housing Convener and Leader, Lanark County Council
R.. BROWN planner, Glasgow BC
L. C. H, BUNTON son of Sam Bunton
S. BUNTON JNR, job architect, Red Road development
W. BUNTON brother of Sam Bunton (sen.)
H. BUTEUX Chief Technical Officer, SSHA
* K. CAMPBELL Principal Housing Officer, LCC
E. CARPENTER architect, Hounslow LBC
* A. W. CLEEVE BARR senior architect, LCC/MHLG/NBA
H, CORNER senior architect, Edinburgh BC
* 0. J. COX senior architect, LCC/MHLG
R. D. CRAMOND senior administrator, DHS/SDD
* T. CROSBY private architect, London
* SIR H. CUTLER Housing Chairman and Leader, Harrow MBC and GLC
J. DARBOURNE private architect, London
* LADY E. DENINGTON Housing Vice-Chairman, LCC; Chairman, GLC
F. DIXON WARD Town Clerk, Southwark LBC and Lambeth LBC
R. DRON City Architect, Dundee BC
bit-
* J. C. EASTWICK FIELD private architect, London
A. F. G. EDWARDS member, West Ham CBC and Newham LBC
S. FAGAN Development Committee Chairman, Lambeth MBC/LBC
J. B. FLEMING senior Administrator, DHS/SDD
R. P. FRASER senior Administrator, DHS/SDD
RT. HON. R. FREESON Leader, Willesden MBC; DoE Housing Minister
CLLR. D. E. GABB Housing Committee, Leeds CBC
S. GEORGE City Architect, Leicester CBC
MRS. S. GIBSON widow of Cllr. David Gibson
A. GILMOUR architect, LCC/RMJM/Edinburgh University ARU
SIR R. GRIEVE senior planner, DHS/SDD
MRS. E. GULLICK fFormerly Stockwell) Housing Chairman, Chelsea MBC
J. GUNN senior quantity surveyor, Glasgow BC/DC
* MRS. F. HARTLEY Housing Chairman, Norwich CBC
A. C. HARVEY senior manager, Bryant Ltd
E. HEFFER MP, Works Committee Chairman, Liverpool CBC
* E, E. HOLLAMBY senior architect, LCC; Borough Architect, Lambeth LBC
PROF. P. JOHNSON-MARSHALL senior planner, LCC
LORD JOSEPH Minister of Housing and Local Government
A. G. JURY City Architect, Glasgow BC
J. KERNOHAN Depute Housing Officer/City Architect, Glasgow BC
CLLR. A. KING Development Committee Chairman/Leader, Hounslow LBC
D. KO senior architect, Hong Kong Housing Authority
CLLR. H. LAMBERT Housing Development Committee Chairman, Sheffield CBC
* D, LASDUN private architect, London
R. LENNOX Housing Convener and City Treasurer, Aberdeen BC
* A. LING principal planner, LCC; City Architect, Coventry CBC
I, IS
J. LITTLEWOOD social researcher, MHLG/DoE
P. LORD senior manager, Wates Ltd
* B. LUBETKIN private architect, London/Bristol
K. LUND Borough Architect, Newham LBC
Rl\ HON. DR. J. DICKSON MABON junior Minister in charge of SDD
LORD MELLISH junior Minister, MHLG
D. C. MILEFANTI senior Administrator, MHLG
A. MITCHELL senior manager, Concrete Scotland Ltd
T. MORGAN Housing Chairman, Edinburgh BC
R. W. NAISMITH senior architect, DHS/SDD
* L. NEWTON Housing Chairman, Norwich CBC
* NEYLAN AND UNGLESS private architects, London
P. E. NIXON senior architect, Liverpool CBC/NIHT
PROF. R. E. NICOLL senior planner, Glasgow BC and SDD
DR. J. A. OLIVER senior Administrator, NI Government
* J. PARTRIDGE architect, LCC
J. L. PATERSON architect, RMJM
* D, PERCIVAL senior architect, Coventry; City Architect, Norwich CBC
F. PERRY private architect, Edinburgh
* G. POWELL private architect, London
* SIR P. POWELL private architect, London
N, RAITT architect, Edinburgh University ARU
W, REED Deputy City Architect/City Architect, Birmingham CBC
J. REID senior planner, East Lothian County Council
P. C. RENDLE senior Administrator, DHS
£ XG
* M. RICHARDSON architect, LCC; development architect, YDG
PROF. C. ROBERTSON architect, Spence Glover Ferguson
CLLR. R. ROBERTSON Housing Convener and Leader, Aberdeen BC/DC
P. ROGAN Housing Chairman, Edinburgh BC
D. H. ROSS senior architect, Wimpey (Scotland)
I. M. T. SAMUEL planner, Glasgow BC; senior architect, RMJM
C. SAWYER Housing Chairman, Southwark LBC
LORD SEFTON Leader, Liverpool CBC
* A. G. SHEPPARD FIDLER City Architect, Birmingham CBC
K. SMIGIELSKI City Planning Officer, Leicester CBC
PROF. I. SMITH architect, Sheffield CBC
* M. SMITH social researcher, London
T. DAN SMITH Housing Chairman and Leader, Newcastle upon Tyne CBC
* A. SMITHSON private architect, London
T. SMYTH Principal Architect (Scotland), Wimpey Ltd
CLLR. E. SMYTHE Housing Vice-Chairman/Chairman, Edmonton MB/Enfield LBC
H. SNEDDON Housing Convener and Leader, Motherwell BC
W. SOLMAN senior architect, Southwark LBC
* L. STEVENSON Housing Chairman, Norwich CBC
R. STJERNSTEDT senior architect, LCC/Lambeth LBC/MHLG
D. STONEHAM senior architect, Wimpey Ltd
R. C. STONES senior architect, Manchester CBC
W. TAYLOR Planning Convener and Leader, Glasgow BC
G. A. THEURER Housing Chairman, Edinburgh BC
T. TYSLER senior architect, Wimpey (Scotland)
A. C. VINSON Housing Chairman, Ealing LBC
CLLR. J. WALSH Housing Chairman, Leyton MBC
T. WATSON City Architect, Aberdeen BC
C. WEGG-PROSSER Housing Committee, Paddington MBC
* H. J. WHITFIELD LEWIS Principal Housing Architect, LCC
J. D. WINN Housing Chairman, Walsall CBC
J? WOLLKIND Deputy Town Clerk, Stepney MB/Town Clerk, Tower Hamlets LBC
C. J. P. WOOD Housing Committee, Walsall CBC
R. YOUNG private architect and Housing Corporation architect, Glasgow
Notes:
(1) * = joint interview with S. Muthesius of E. Anglia University
(2) Only positions significant in context of this account are listed;
dates are not supplied.
TABLE 1 UK PUBLIC HOUSING COMPLETIONS, 1945-75:
countries/regions, selected authorities
Each column lists dwelling totals followed by (in brackets) totals per
1,000 population
1945-50 1951 -5 1956- 60
COUNTRIES:
UK public housing 676869 (13. 6) 1119393 (22.0) 769714 (14. 7)
EW public housing 577864 (13. 3) 940413 (21. 2) 622319 (13.6)
Sc public housing 85478 (16. 8) 153834 (29. 9) 129482 (24. 9)
NI public housing §13526 (10.0) 25146 (18.2) 17913 (12. 7)
SCOTLAND/NORTHERN IRELAND:
Glasgow BC 12965 (11. 9) 23006 (21.2) 18635 (17.7)
Edinburgh BC 3306 (7. 1) 7129 (15.2) 5688 (12. 1)
Dundee BC 1972 (11. 1) 4366 (24. 5) 5439 (29. 7)
Lanark CC 4711 (15. 4) 7362 (23. 9) 8622 (25.8)
SSHA 12636 (2. 5) 20470 (3. 9) 14110 (2. 7)
NIHT 1944-55 total: - 15172 (11.2) 7075 (5. 0)
ENGLAND/WALES PROVINCES:
Newcastle CBC 2628 (8. 9) 7020 (25. 0) 5369 (20.0)
Sunderland CBC 4377 (24. 2) 6182 (34.0) 4837 (25.7)
Leeds CBC 3548 (7. 0) 8565 (16. 9) 9794 (19. 0)
Sheffield CBC 4389 (8. 5) 8960 (17.9) 7756 (15.5)
Manchester CBC 6405 (9. 1) 11357 (16. 4) 6808 (10.2)
Salford CBC 480 (2. 7) 1246 (7. 4) 2327 (14. 4)
Liverpool CBC 5600 (7. 0) 13814 (17. 7) 11265 (14. 9)
West Bromwich CBC 1862 (21. 4) 2228 (24. 9) 1978 (21. 1)
Wolverhampton CBC 2959 (18.5) 3036 (19.5) 2164 (14.9)
Birmingham CBC 6073 (5. 5) 19021 (17.0) 11689 (10. 7)
GREATER LONDON:
Greater London 79712 (9. 9) 116188 (14. 2) 82294 (10.3)
LCC 30033 (9. 3) 45740 (13.8) 25297 (7. 9)
County of London 43897 (13. 6) 71969 (21. 7) 48798 (15. 3)
Middlesex 16543 (7. 3) 19664 (8. 7) 11575 (5. 1)
Shoreditch MBC 552 (12. 3) 1562 (34.0) 1291 (30.1)
Camberwell MBC 345 (1. 9) 1457 (8. 1) 1791 (10.2)
W Ham CBC 1248 (7. 2) 1951 (11. 6) 2737 (16, 7)
Croydon CBC 1555 (6. 2) 2757 (11. 0) 2576 (10.3)
GLC n/a n/a n/a
Southwark LBC n/a n/a n/a
Newham LBC n/a n/a n/a
Hackney LBC n/a n/a n/a
Croydon LBC n/a n/a n/a
all Met. Bs 13864 (4. 3) 26229 (7. 9) 23501 (7. 4)
all LBCs n/a n/a n/a
1961-5 1966-70 1971-5
COUNTRIES:
UK public housing 723793 <13,3) 954612 <17. 1) 688273 (12. 3)
EW public housing 579538 (12. 1) 752303 <15. 4) 546495 (11. 1)
Sc public housing 117727 (22. 6) 164596 <31. 7) 108202 (20.8)
NI public housing 26528 (18. 3) 37713 (25. 1) 33576 (21. 8)
SCOTLAND/NORTHERN IRELAND:
Glasgow BC 16134 (16. 1) 18581 (20.5) 12784 (15. 3)#
Edinburgh BC 8281 (17. 5) 9934 (21.4) 4782 <10. 7)#
Dundee BC 4533 (24. 5) 9514 (52. 4) 4434 (24. 5)#
Lanark CC 6852 <24. 0) 9535 (33. 1) 4410 (14. 5) *4
SSHA 7735 (1. 5) 12843 (2, 5) 10254 (2. 0)
NIHT 8826 (6. 1) 14045 (9. 1) n/a
ENGLAND/WALES PROVINCES;
Newcastle CBC 4417 (17. 1) 6344 (26. 8) 4052 (19. 1)#
Sunderland CBC 5251 (27. 9) 4962 <22.8) 1078 (5. 0)#
Leeds CBC 9020 (17. 7) 10619 <21. 1) 6900 (13. 7)#
Sheffield CBC 9657 (19. 8) 11137 (21.2) 8713 <17. 0)#
Manchester CBC 15383 (24. 1) 13879 (23. 5) 15223 <28.7)#
Salford CBC 1884 (12. 7) 4581 (33.8) 4481 <35.8)#
Liverpool CBC 11922 <16. 5) 15215 (22. 8) 11122 <19. 4)#
West Bromwich CBC 2183 (22. 3) 5076 (29.3) 667 <4. 1)*3
Wolverhampton CBC 1660 (11. 1) 4252 <16. 1) 2230 (8. 3)
Birmingham CBC 12227 (11. 1) 34923 (32.2) 11706 (11. 7)
GREATER LONDON:
Greater London 70888 (8. 9) 115084 (15. 1) 96498 <13. 3)
LCC 15506 (4. 9) *4 n/a n/a
County of London 31908 (10. 0) *4 n/a n/a
Middlesex 8031 (3. 6) *4 n/a n/a
Shoreditch MBC 857 (20. 0) *4 n/a n/a
Camberwell MBC 1179 (6. 7) *4 n/a n/a
W Ham CBC 2135 (13. 1) *4 n/a n/a
Croydon CBC 1787 <7. 2) *4 n/a n/a
GLC n/a 27104 (3. 6) 24036 (3. 3)
Southwark LBC n/a 3292 (11. 6) 6565 (26. 5)
Newham LBC n/a 4942 <20. 0) 4805 (20. 8)
Hackney LBC n/a 4352 (18, 6) 3685 (17. 3)
Croydon LBC n/a 3467 (10. 6) 1359 (4. 1)
all Met. Bs 16402 (5. 1) *4 n/a n/a
all LBCs n/a 87980 (11. 6) 72462 (10. 0)
NOTES: *: incomplete period (no of years)/#: includes post-1974/5 reorg.
figures/§: 1944-50 figures. Population used for each 5yr period is that
at/near end of period. Under 'countries', 'public hsg' includes LAs,
NTDCs, SSHA/NIHT, hsg assocs, Govt depts. Source: Govt Hsg Retns/Stats.
TABLE 2 POSTWAR MULTI-STOREY APPROVALS/STARTS
Prel948 1948-52 1953-7 1958-62 1963-7 1968-72 Post 1
REGIONS/
COUNTRIES:
E Anglia - - - 132 722 65 -
E Midland - - 39 255 4321 1374 -
Northern - - - 3846 7289 2125 53
N Ireland - - - 188 2428 877 -
N West - - 935 10932 27805 7137 156
Scot land - 396 563 10887 36858 13396 2052
S East (ex. GL) 316 828 4076 1 1965 2770 770
S West - - 594 2814 2886 391 221
Wales - - 225 1111 807 309 -
W Midland - 806 4225 10604 27016 4688 288
Yorks/Humbs - - 3214 8157 16089 3566 280
Gtr London # 3212 12652 20830 24052 62291 28925 7299
UK total 3212 14170 31453 77054 200477 65623 11119
CITIES/CITY AUTHORITIES:
Cty of Lon 2538 11413 18249 17960 15056* n/a n/a
GL out/cty 674 1239 2581 6092 7325* n/a n/a
LCC 355 3857 7592 8747 7179* n/a n/a
GLC n/a n/a n/a n/a 9270* 8422 1448
Birm. CBC - 806 3204 5031 12381 2892 -
Glasgow BC - 308 - 5937 15354 4444 947
* incomplete period (to/from April 1965 only)
# area defined according to post-1965 boundary
TABLE 3 POSTWAR MULTI-STOREY PUBLIC HOUSING IN THE UK:
REGIONS/COUNTRIES: DWELLINGS (PER 1000 POP. > BLOCKS (AV. SIZE)
East Anglia 919 (0. 6) 19 (48)
East Midland 5989 (1.8) 93 (64)
Northern 13313 (4. 0) 188 (71)
Northern Ireland 3493 (2. 5) 59 (59)
North West 46965 (7. 0) 692 (68)
Scot land 64152 (12. 3) 863 (74)
South East (exc. Gtr Ldn) 20725 (2. 3) 328 (63)
South West 6906 (1.9) 107 (65)
Wales 2452 (0. 9) 37 (66)
West Midland 47627 (9. 6) 848 (56)
Yorks. /Humbs. 31306 (6. 6) 512 (61)
Greater London 159261 (20.0) 2789 (57)
United Kingdom
approvs/starts pre-1948 3212 (0. 1) 81 (40)
1948-52 14170 (0. 3) 324 (44)
1953-7 31453 (0. 6) 694 (45)
1958-62 77054 (1. 4) 1309 (59)
1963-7 200477 (3. 7) 2935 (68)
1968-72 65623 (1. 2) 1037 (63)
post-1972 11119 (0. 2) 155 (72)
total 403108 (7. 4) 6544 (62)
CITIES/CITY AUTHORITIES:
County of Lon. ( pre-1965) 65216 (20. 6) 1279 (51)
G. L. out-county (pre-1965) 17911 (3. 7) 381 (47)
London County Council 27730 (8. 7) 549 (51)
Greater London Council 19140 (2. 4) 339 (56)
Birmingham CBC 24314 (22. 0) 458 (53)
Glasgow BC 26990 (26.5) 261 (103)
Source: Gazetteer.
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TABLE 4 PROPORTION OF ALL POSTWAR MULTI-STOREY PUBLIC HOUSING:
<a> IN BLOCKS OVER 20 STOREYS IN HEIGHT
(b) BUILT IN PREFABRICATED CONSTRUCTION
REGIONS/COUNTRIES: PERCENTAGE IN PERCENTAGE
BLOCKS OVER 20 PREFABRICATED
STOREYS HIGH CONSTRUCTION
East Anglia 0 0
East Midland 19. 4 40. 0
Northern 9. 1 13. 9
Northern Ireland 0 9. 3
North West 7. 8 26. 8
Scotland 20, 9 29. 0
South East (excluding Greater London) 3. 2 13. 2
South West 0 0
Wales 3. 3 15. 9
West Midland 4. 4 17. 2
Yorkshire and Humberside 1. 7 15. 8
Greater London 13. 5 19. 8
United Kingdom
(approved/started) Pre-1958 0 3. 1
1958-62 5. 0 5. 3
1963-7 16. 1 26. 2
1968-72 11. 4 36. 9
Post-1972 6. 2 10. 2
Total 11. 0 20. 5
CITIES/CITY AUTHORITIES:
County of London (pre-1965) 7. 6 2. 8
Greater London out-county (pre-1965) 10. 3 14. 1
London County Qouncil 11. 4 5. 1
Greater London Council 19. 5 17. 6
Birmingham CBC 2. 3 23. 9
Glasgow BC 41. 3 26. 5
Source: Gazetteer, other primary local authority sources,
TABLE 5 COUNTY OF LONDON: HOUSING COMPLETIONS 1/4/45 TO 31/12/64
(last complete year before local-government reorganisation)
AUTHORITY COMPLETIONS COMPLETIONS PER 1,000
POPULATION
Metropolitan Boroughs:
Battersea 1887 18. 3
Bermondsey 2370 46. 9
Bethnal Green 2158 46. 9
Camberwell 4772 27. 3
Chelsea 866 17. 8
Dept f ord 1446 21. 1
Finsbury 1802 56. 0
Fulham 1899 17. 3
Greenwich 2282 27. 1
Hackney 4902 30. 0
Hammersmith 1497 13. 9
Holborn 578 27. 9
Islington 4163 18. 3
Kensington 1795 10. 4
Lambeth 4920 22. 1
Lewisham 4475 20. 1
Paddington 1436 12. 6
Poplar 1865 27. 4
St. Marylebone 1293 19. 2
St. Pancras 5497 44. 5
Shoreditch 4244 110. 8
Southwark 2220 25. 8
Stepney 2847 31. 7
Stoke Newington 2176 41. 2
Wandsworth 6319 18. 1
Westminster- 2210 25. 5
Woolwich 5491 36. 8
Total Met. Boroughs 78853 24. 8
Ci ty of London 1143 248. 4
London County Council 116576
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CO1 cn! vji
! i
COUNTY TOTAL (inc. LCC) 196572 61. 8
Source: MHLG Housing Returns
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TABLE 6
GREATER LONDON: LOCAL AUTHORITY HOUSING COMPLETIONS 1/4/65-31/3/68
LOCAL AUTHORITY HOUSING UNDER CONSTRUCTION 31/3/68
Each column lists firstly London Borough, then GLC dwelling totals in
each borough area, followed by <in brackets) totals per 1,000
population.
HOUSING COMPLETIONS HOUSING UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Barking 1354 <8. 0) 30 (0. 2) 1037 (6. 1) -
Barnet 961 (3. 0) - 680 (2. 2) -
Bexley 933 <4. 3) 175 <0, 8) 566 (2. b> 1557 (7. 2)
Brent 1048 <3. 6) - 1794 (6. 1) -
Bromley 1125 <3. 7) 77 (0. 3) 1145 (3. 8) 12 (0. 1)
Camden 1735 (7. 3) 123 <0. 5) 1455 (6. 1) 62 <0. 2)
Croydon 3206 <9. 8) 32 (0. 1) 797 (2. 4) -
Ealing 1807 (6. 0) 323 (1. 1) 1394 (4. 6) 33 (0. 1)
Enfield 2824 <10. 6) - 1332 (5. 0) -
Greenwich 1568 <6. 8) 1807 (7. 8) 1633 <7. 1) 172 (0. 7)
Hackney 1476 (5. 9) 1177 (4. 7) 1525 (6. 1) 1675 <6. 7)
Harnmersmith/F 924 (4. 4) 242 (1. 1) 538 (2, 5) 96 <0. 5)
Haringey 1445 <5. 7) - 2266 <8. 9) -
Harrow 553 (2. 7) 45 <0. 2) 124 (0. 6) -
Havering 1731 <6. 9) 99 <0. 4) 665 (2. 6) 307 <1. 2)
Hillingdon 1575 <6. 7) 44 <0. 2) 998 (4. 3) -
Hounslow 1608 <7. 8) 12 <0. 1) 1733 (8. 4) -
Islington 1529 <6. 0) 666 <2. 6) 1691 (6. 6) 738 (2. 9)
Kensington/Ch. 306 <1. 4) 107 (0. 5) 279 (1. 3) -
Kingston 476 <3. 3) - 133 (0. 9) -
Lambeth 861 <2. 5) 1834 (5. 4) 1155 (3. 4) 1037 <3. 1)
Lewisham 1133 <3. 9) 2526 (8. 7) 1369 (4. 7) 579 (2. 0)
Merton 672 <3. 7) 9 (0. 1) 204 (1. 1) -
Newham 3514 (13. 7) 221 (0. 9) 1762 (6. 8) —
Redbridge 648 <2. 6) 18 <0. 1) 738 (3. 0) 164 (0. 7)
Richmond 929 <5. 2) - 228 (1. 3) -
Southwark 2443 <8. 1) 2062 (6. 9) 3973 <13. 2) 1767 (5. 9)
Sutton 667 (4. 1) - 718 (4. 3) 951 (5. 8)
Tower Hamlets 1161 <5. 9) 2042 (10. 3) 1173 (5. 9) 2239 (11. 3)
Waltham Forest 2834 (11. 9) 29 (0. 1) 1482 (6. 2) 22 (0. 1)
Wandsworth 1822 (5. 5) 1415 <4. 3) 1781 (5. 4) 161 (0. 5)
Westminster 541 (2. 1) 292 (1. 1) 893 (3. 4) 777 (3. 0)
City of London 151 (33.5) - 2225 (494. 4) -
TOTAL LBC/GLC 45570 <5. 8) 16243 (2. 0) 39486 (5. 0) 12903 (1. 6)
(LBC total includes City of London; GLC total includes out-county)
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FRONTISPIECE: Glasgow's Housing Crusader: Councillor David Gibson,
Housing Committee Convener 1961-4, seen in 1962.
PART I: INTRODUCTION
1 The Scottish production tradition. Glasgow, Castlemilk Unit 1,
Area 0: view (1989) of type T/6/4 tenement, built 1954.
2 Castlemilk, Unit 1: plans of type T/6/4, 1953.
3 Late '40s block dwellings built by Metropolitan Boroughs:
Shoreditch MBC, Bracklyn Street Area Block 1 (Linale House),
erected from 1948.
4 Wandsworth MBC, Notre Dame Estate 3rd Stage: two 8-storey blocks,
and lower ranges, built from 1949.
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5 The Clyde Valley Regional Plan 1946: section of Master Plan
(redrawn 1989 by M. Oglethorpe), showing Green Belt overlapping
Glasgow's city boundary and building land. At bottom right is East
Kilbride New Town.
6 Dame Evelyn Sharp seen opening the Broadhall Community Centre,
Stevenage New Town, in 1956: Jane McKay (aged 5) presents Dame
Evelyn with a bouquet of red roses.
7 The LCC's Warwick Crescent development, Paddington (21-storey
blocks built from 1961 by Wates): 1989 view.
8 The LCC's Tidey Street and Spanby Road developments, Poplar,
including two 19-storey towers built from 1962 (the Council's
highest to that date): 1989 view.
9 Hackney MBC's Paragon Road scheme: three 15-storey blocks built
















Croxteth Drive development, Liverpool: a line of 15-storey blocks
built by Townson from 1963 along the north edge of Sefton Park.
The first multi-storey development adjoining the park was Aigburth
Drive (Belem Tower), built from 1958.
Lincoln Green redevelopment, Leeds, seen in 1989, showing standard
10-storey point blocks built by Shepherd and Wimpey in 1958-60.
Manzoni 'mud pies' in Birmingham: 6-storey and 3-storey Wimpey
blocks built at the Bath Row (later Lee Bank) redevelopment area,
Unit 301, from 1952.
Sheppard Fidler's 'architectural' housing ideal: general view of
western section of Lee Bank, c. 1968. An example of the landscaped
mixed developments favoured by the City Architect for slum-
clearance and suburban sites.
Glasgow's City Architect, A. G. Jury, seen in 1964.
1950s peripheral tenement schemes in Glasgow: Drumchapel, seen from
west, 1989.
Moss Heights, Glasgow (built from 1950): 1953 view of newly-
completed Block C. One of only two prototype multi-storey schemes
built in the City before the late '50s.
R. E. Nicoll, seen in 1964 (including caption from article in AJ,
May 1964).
Hutchesontown-Gorbals redevelopment area, model of 1953 proposals.
Hutchesontown-Gorbals, 1953 perspective of proposed point block, by
James Rae (Housing Architects Section).
Hutchesontown-Gorbals, 1953 perspective by Rae of proposed slab
block. These point and slab blocks, very similar to LCC patterns,
were not in fact built.
Hutchesontown-Gorbals, aerial view in 1956 from south-east before
start of clearance.
Hutchesontown-Gorbals, view from south-east (from same viewpoint as
ill. 21) during redevelopment in 1965. The four Area ' B' blocks
are seen completed at right, the two Area ' C' blocks at centre, and
the SSHA's four Area 'D' blocks under construction at front left.
Hutchesontown-Gorbals Area 'B' development: model made and
photographed in 1959 by job architect John L. Paterson. Paterson
also devised the roof-mounted floodlighting on the high blocks - an
idea, inspired by Hieronymus Bosch, which was used on many
subsequent Scottish multi-storey schemes.
View of Hutchesontown-Gorbals Area ' B' scheme as built (1986).
25 Hutchesontown-Gorbals Area ' C', laying of foundation stone (1961).
From left to right: Jean Roberts (Lord Provost), Bailie David
Gibson (Housing Convener), Alice Cullen MP, Archibald Jury (City
Architect), George Campbell (DLO Manager), Councillor George
Robertson (Planning Convener), and the Queen.
26 Hutchesontown-Gorbals Area ' C' development, cladding panel seen
during construction, c. 1963.
27 The Manchester 'Slum Belt': from E. D. Simon and J. Inman" s The
Rebuilding of Manchester (1935).
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28 Multi-storey building for slum-clearance in the 'fifties.
1959 perspective of Birkenhead CBC's Eldon Street/Oak Street
development: two 10-storey blocks built from 1956 by Thornton in
'Prometo' construction.
29 Cranes Park development, Birmingham, seen in 1987. Two 6-storey
Wimpey 'mud pies', built 1953-4: one of Birmingham's two test-cases
for the application of 'discretionary expensive sites subsidy' to
outer-suburban multi-storey developments.
30 Fore Street Redevelopment, Edmonton (subject of the dispute between
Thomas Joyce and MHLG, related in Chapter 2): early 1960s view.
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31 'Family Houses I' scheme, Ravenscroft Road, West Ham; designed by
MHLG Development Group. 1989 view.
32 LCC Morris Walk development (built from 1963 by Taylor Woodrow-
Anglian); 1989 view, showing type 'MW' 10-storey blocks.
33 LCC Brandram's Works Site, Bermondsey (1962 onwards;
block types designed by Colin Lucas's group); 1989 view.
34 Walterton Road/Rodborough Mews Site development, Paddington,
designed by the LCC and built from 1965 by the GLC; seen in 1989.
35 Walterton Road, detail of 'SF1' (Indulex) steel-frame plastic-clad
22-storey point block.
36 Walterton Road, detail of 'SF1' steel-frame plastic-clad 22-storey
point block.
37 1971 view of 'YDG Mark 1' scheme at Bransholme Area A3, Kingston
upon Hull, built from 1969 by Shepherd; in the distance, one of two
17-storey point blocks erected at Bransholme by L. H. Beal and
Robinson,
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38 Official opening of Angel House, Edmonton, on 24 July 1965, by
Robert Mellish. From left to right: Mr. and Mrs. Henry Green (New
tenants of 3 Angel House), Councillor E. J. C. Smythe (Chairman,
Enfield LBC Housing Committee), R. J. Mellish (MHLG Joint
Parliamentary Secretary), and Councillor Miss Kit Harvey (Mayor,
Enfield LBC). Angel House (or Block A of the Angel Road South
development), was EDLO's first battery-cast multi-storey block.
39 Official opening of Enfield LBC's 10,000th new postwar dwelling
(131, Bounces Road, Edmonton), on 14 January 1967, by the Minister
of Housing, Anthony Greenwood. From left to right: Councillor
Charles Wright (Mayor, Enfield LBC), Mr. and Mrs. Edward Robertson
(new tenants), Anthony Greenwood (Minister of Housing), and
Councillor Eric Smythe (Chairman, Enfield LBC Housing Committee).
40 Seaton Areas B, C, and D development, Aberdeen, seen in 1989.
Phase 1 (comprising three 10-storey blocks in in-situ construction)
was built from 1971 by a local contractor, P. Cameron; this firm
also acted as main contractor for the seven 19-storey Bison Wall-
Frame blocks of Phase 2, built from 1972.
CHAPTER 5
41 Whitfield Central Precinct, Dundee: two 16-storey Crudens slab
blocks (built from 1967), each comprising, in modified form, two of
the company's original Gracemount-type towers. On the right, the
honeycomb layout of the Whitfield Industrialised Phase I (Skarne)
scheme, built from 1968.
42 10-storey large-panel Reema tower under construction, Leeds, 1958.
43 The main French prototype scheme for Camus's first multi-storey
projects in Britain, including Liverpool's 22-storey blocks and
subsequent contracts by authorities such as Hackney: 54 Avenue de
la Libert^, Maisons Alfort, a 21-storey block containing 120 flats.
44 Liverpool's prototype Camus block, at Classic Road.
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45 Another French prototype for a large-panel 'system' used in
Britain, in this instance for 'Tracoba' blocks ordered from 1963 by
the SSHA and West Bromwich CBC: six 16-storey slabs and three 23-
storey towers at the Cit6 Pierre Collinet, Meaux.
46 Castle Bromwich Airfield (Castle Vale), Area 1, Birmingham: 16-
storey Bryant in-situ concrete blocks under construction, c. 1965.
47 A 'standard' point block type designed by Sheffield's City
Architect and built here by Gleeson: Lansdowne development (1963).
48 Wellington Hill Stage I, Leeds: 1960 perspective by Frank Weemys
for Wimpey. This scheme was the first to include the 'standard'
12-storey point blocks designed by Sheridan Shedden's architects.
A fourth block was added to the site in 1963-4.
49 Wellington Hill, living-room of show flat in 'Barncroft
Court', the first block to be completed (1962).
50 Invitation cards for opening of 'Barncroft Court' in July 1962.
51 The Glasgow DLO at work. Cartoon in staff newspaper by Charlie
Baird, plasterer in Maintenance Section (1947).
52 Glasgow Corporation Housing Department Canteen, Pollok (1947).
53 Holly Street development, Hackney LBC - including four 20-storey
Camus blocks, part of a bulk order by the Borough, built from 1966
by Fram Higgs Hill.
54 Bramley Hill, Croydon: 11-storey point block, built 1964 as part of
the Wates Croydon III bulk order. The structure of this block was
erected, for demonstration purposes, in the exceptionally fast time
of ten weeks.
55 Hurley Road development, Lambeth, seen in 1989. These three 22-
storey prefabricated point blocks were built from 1966 as part of a
bulk order from Wates. Wates's managing director recalls the heavy
loss the company made on this contract: 'Those were very, very
complex designs - they should never have been built in system!'
56 Detail of Bison deck-access block, Chalkhill Redevelopment Area
(Claw F), Brent, built 1968 by Farrow (the Bison contractor
allocated to Brent).
57 Wimpey Type 1001/6 point block: perspective, model and plans:
published in Wimpey Rationalised Planning In No-Fines Construct Ion,
c. 1963.
58 Muirhouse Phase II development, Edinburgh, seen in 1989. From left
to right: two 11-storey slab blocks built from 1960 by Scotcon; a
23-storey point block (Martello Court) built from 1962 by W. Arnott
McLeod; two 15-storey point blocks and two 9-storey slab blocks
built from 1960 by Wimpey. In the foreground are tenements of the
1950s. The Muirhouse II scheme was one of the largest of
Edinburgh's prefab-site redevelopments.
59 Bermondsey MBC's Cranham Road/Parfitt Road development, erected
from 1963. Virtually the whole of Bermondsey's vigorous slum-
clearance housing drive was built by direct labour.
60 Stage I of EDLO's Edmonton Green redevelopment (three 26-storey
blocks and shopping centre) seen under construction in 1968.
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61 David Gibson, seen c. 1950.
62 David Gibson (standing, at top right) and his wife Sadie (at bottom
left), seen on a Renfrew ILP Guild of Youth ramble in 1930.
63 David Gibson (centre), seen c. 1935.
64 Shettleston and District Casualty Service First Aid Party, c. 1940:
Gibson (at centre), a lifelong pacifist, served in this unit as a
conscientious objector.
65 Glasgow Corporation Housing Committee, seen in 1962: Gibson
(Convener) and E. D, Clark (Sub-Convener) are third and fourth from
right.
66 Aerial view (1989) of Wimpey multi-storey developments,
Knightswood. From foreground to background: Lincoln Avenue (1962),
Kirkton Avenue (1965), Scotstoun House (1962), Blawarthill (1964).
67 Royston Area 'A': before clearance (January 1960).
68 The same view in August 1960.
69 Royston Area 'A': topping out the first point block, 1960. In
foreground (left to right), A. G. Jury (City Architect), R. W.
Marwick (Manager for Scotland, George Wimpey), Cllr. W. S. Campbell
(Convener of Housing). At right background, Cllr. E. D. Clark.
70 Postwar housing output and demolitions in Glasgow: the two major
'peaks' represent the tenement-building push of the 'fifties and
Gibson's multi-storey drive of the 'sixties. Gibson's success in
uncoupling housebuilding from the CDA programme is indicated by the
way in which his drive preceded the biggest spurt of clearance.
71 Lewis Cross, seen in 1950.
72 A. A. Wood (left) and two Planning Division colleagues inspect a
model of the Corporation's Inner Ring Road proposals in 1964.
73 Model of Springburn CDA Area ' B' (1963). Here, at the instigation
of A. A. Wood, most of the site was taken up by a newly designed
type of deck access block, up to six storeys in height; point
blocks were confined to one end.
74 Springburn Area 'B': deck access blocks (photographed 1987).
75 Pollokshaws CDA Unit 2 during construction (1965): Concrete
Limited's first really large contract for 'Bison' multi-storey
construction. This scheme, built from 1961, was a precursor to the
firm's Wall-Frame 'system'.
76 Pollokshaws CDA, seen in 1989. Unit 2 occupies the foreground;
Unit 1 (four point blocks, background) was built from 1966 in full
Wall-Frame construction.
77 Councillor David Gibson and George Bowie, Chief Architect of
Crudens Ltd., inspect a model of Cranhill Extension development in
1962. This scheme, comprising three 18-storey blocks and low
flats, was built from 1963. Development of the site, a former
industrial wasteground acquired by Crudens, was rapidly pushed
through to compensate for delays in the preparation of the much
larger Sighthill site.
78 Gibson examines proposed and existing views of Sighthill at his
home, 5 Cardowan Road (1961). The vast and desolate Tennant 'soda
waste' was redeveloped in 1963-9 with 10 massive, parallel 20-
storey slabs (instead of the point blocks originally envisaged),
and several lower buildings, containing a total of almost 2, 500
dwellings.
79 Aerial view of Sighthill in 1989.
80 Red Road development, seen almost completed in 1969.
81 William Taylor (Planning Convener and Labour Group Leader from
1963), seen in 1964.
82 Muirhouse Area development, Motherwell: 18-storey point blocks and
low flats built from 1964 by Wimpey; photographed in 1989. The
most ambitious achievement of Hutchison Sneddon's period as Housing
Convener and leader of the Burgh Council. Also visible at left are
several blocks of the Flemington Area development, built by Wimpey
from 1966. The Ravenscraig steelworks is seen in the background.
83 Motherwell, Parkhead Street/Macdonald Street development, seen c.
1963. A 17-storey steel-framed slab block, built by Crudens (with
a local steel consortium, MSC, as structural subcontractors).
84 Councillor Pat Rogan, Edinburgh Corporation Housing Committee
Chairman, seen c. 1965 in front of St. Margaret's Church, Arthur
Street clearance area. This redevelopment, Rogan's own brainchild,
was delayed by wrangling with SDD over the size of blocks, and with
the Cockburn Association concerning the demolition of this church.
85 Tour of slum housing at Jamaica Street, Edinburgh, by Harold Wilson
(when Leader of the Opposition), on 2 April 1964: walking beside
Wilson is Pat Rogan (then Housing Chairman).
86 Housing Progress Chart 1959-71, Edinburgh Corporation. The central
peaks of contracts let, and (2 years later) completions, directly
reflect the impact of Rogan's housing drive in the City.
87 Wester Hailes, Edinburgh's last major peripheral site, developed
from 1967: 1987 view of Contract 4 (staircase access Bison blocks),
built from 1969.
88 Cumbernauld New Town, view from east c. 1967. At centre, Town
Centre Phase 1 almost completed, Phase 2 under construction. In
background: low housing and Bison point blocks, Seafar and
Ravenswood areas.
89 Aberdeen: view of Seaton (1989).
90 1988 aerial view of Dundee inner-area redevelopments: at lower left
the four 15-storey blocks of the Dallfield CDA (built from 1964 by
Scotcon), at centre the four 23-storey slabs of Maxwelltown CDA
(from 1965; Gray).
91 Whitfield Industrialised (Skarne) development, Dundee, built from
1968 by Crudens: 1967 perspective prepared by contractor.
92 Whitfield Industrialised (Skarne) development: 1989 view.
93 Dr. J. Dickson Mabon, Minister of State for Scotland, opens the
first house completed by Irvine Development Corporation (18
Ardmillan Square, Pennyburn) on 15 August 1969. Here Dr. Mabon is
seen with the first tenants, Mr. and Mrs. Taylor and Helen Taylor
(aged 5 months), and with the General Manager of the Development
Corporation.
94 'I had belled the cat!' SDD chief planner Robert Grieve, seen in
1964.
95 Knightswood, 1989 aerial view: Kirkton Avenue at top, Lincoln
Avenue at bottom.
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96 Castle Brorawich Airfield (Castle Vale) Group 1 and Area A,
Birmingham: 16-storey in-situ blocks under construction by Bryant
in 1965; Bryant Low Rise housing in foreground.
97 Bell's Lane development, Birmingham: seven 13-storey Bison Wall-
Frame point blocks and Bryant Low Rise housing under construction
in 1965.
98 Bell's Lane development seen immediately after completion in 1966.
99 Bryant Low Rise blocks under construction, c. 1965, probably at
Bell's Lane.
100 Chelmsley Wood in course of development in 1968: ' the size of a
Mark I New Town - but built in five years!' Almost all dwellings
in this view, covering Areas 6 and 7, were built by Bryant: the
negotiated contracts for high and low blocks were let separately.
The M6 motorway is visible under construction at left.
101 The Sentinels, Holloway Circus: view of Cleveland Tower, 1989.
Birmingham's highest flats: two 32-storey point blocks, built by
Bryant from 1967.
102 'Logan Towers' , Boundary Street, Liverpool, seen in 1989. One of
the Corporation's bulk-order Camus blocks, built by Unit from 1964.
103 View of 'Logan Towers' from north, showing existing maisonettes and
cottages, probably built in the late 1950s.
104 Liverpool, Netherley development: deck-access blocks up to 8
storeys in height, built from 1967 by Wimpey and Unit. 1989 view
during demolition.
105 Manchester turns to high flats: St George's Redevelopment Area
Stage 2 (13 and 16 storey blocks built from 1961 by Laing).
106 Rusholme Road Redevelopment Area 1st Stage, Manchester, built from
1964: photographed in 1989, Robert Stones recalls: 'That nine-
storey slab, you banged it down in Wythenshawe, you banged it down
elsewhere, I got sick of seeing it! There it was in the drawer and
you just kept reusing it!'
107 Hulme Stage 3 North, Manchester: 1989 view, showing Hornchurch
Court, one of three 13-storey Laing Sectra blocks built in 1964-5
to get immediate dwelling gain, and later deck-access blocks built
by Simms Sons and Cooke from 1967 as part of the planners' scheme
for the area.
108 Longsight CRDA Stage 1 (Gibson Street development), 1989 view of
outer facade of 10-storey barrier block (facing line of unbuilt
expressway). 573 dwellings designed by Manchester Housing
Development Group in 1966 in a highly inventive megastructural
style, and built from 1968 by Drury and Concrete Northern (Bison).
HDG members involved in the design of Gibson Street included Robert
Stones (Group Leader), Wolf Pearman, Terry Kennedy, and David
Millard.
109 Gibson Street, view of inner facade of barrier block and lower
'spur' blocks to south, 1989.
110 Hulme Stage 5, Manchester; linked crescents of 7-storey deck-access
housing built from 1967 by Fram Russell; in the left distance are
visible the 15-storey point blocks of Stretford MBC's Clifford Ward
Redevelopment, built in three stages (1962-9) in a 'salient'
jutting into Hulme.
111 Official opening of Chapel Lane development (Stretford House),
Stretford, on 20 April 1968: group photograph on roof of block.
Third and fourth from left are: Councillor David W. Homer, Housing
Committee Chairman, and Councillor Mrs. Anne Kirkbright, JP, Mayor
of Stretford. This 25-storey point block, nicknamed 'Perry's
Folly' after a former Borough Engineer, was built from 1965 by
Matthews and Mumby.
112 Newcastle upon Tyne's Council Leader, Councillor T. Dan Smith, seen
in 1961 with Dame Evelyn Sharp, inspecting a model of the City's
standard point block: these blocks were then under construction at
Cruddas Park and several other sites.
113 Scotswood Road Redevelopment Area (Cruddas Park) seen in 1989.
114 Park Hill Part Two (Hyde Park) development, Sheffield: deck blocks
up to 19 storeys in height, built from 1962 by direct labour. 1989
view.
115 Hyde Park: 1989 view of topmost deck in 19-storey block.
116 Sheffield's standard 'twin tower' block of the 1960s: 1989 view of
one example, built at the Hanover development by Gleeson in 1965-6.
117 Invitation to opening ceremony at Whinmoor development, 1966:
Leeds's last major outer-suburban site.
118 W. Konrad Smigielski, seen at home in 1973, a short time after his
retirement as Leicester City Planning Officer (including caption
from local newspaper article).
119 Smigielski's Gibberdian aesthetic: 24-storey point blocks built
from 1965 at the St. Matthews Phase II development by Laing.
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120 Highfields North (St. Peter's Area) Redevelopment, Leicester: 18-
storey towers and low blocks built from 1970 by Wimpey following
the closure of the DLO.
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121 Mrs. Evelyn Denington seen at the House of Lords with her Herald,
Croix Rouge Pursuivant, Hubert Chesshyre, before her ennoblement to
Baroness of Stevenage on 19 July 1978.
122 Kingsland and St. Mary's Estates, Shoreditch: 1990 view, showing
the first built example of the Borough's 11-storey 'standard' point
block (21-64 Laburnum Court, commenced 1955), and other flats
constructed in the mid and late 1950s.
123 The Corporation of London's Barbican development, built from 1963
and including three point blocks of 43-45 storeys height.
124 Westminster City Council's Brunei Estate, built from 1969 by
Gilbert Ash on the Mileage Yard site previously disputed between
the LCC and Paddington MBC.
125 West Chelsea Extended Area Redevelopment (World's End): 1989 view
showing, at left, the chimneys of Lots Road Power Station, whose
emissions were cited by LCC planners in a last-ditch attempt to
stop the scheme.
126 World's End: close-up view of outer facade, 1989.
127 Finsbury MBC's Galway Street development, built by Wates from 1958,
including two 17-storey blocks delayed by a dispute with LCC
planners and MHLG: 1989 view.
128 LCC Tidey Street/Spanby Road developments, Poplar: two 19-storey
blocks, built from 1962 by J. and M. Hill: view in 1989.
129 The slum-clearance programme of Woolwich MBC and Greenwich LBC:
view of the Glyndon Redevelopment Area (including 11-storey blocks
built by the DLO and Wates for Woolwich from 1961, and 24-storey
Bison blocks built from 1966 by J. M. Jones for Greenwich).
130 Bede Road development, Stepney, seen in 1989. Stepney MBC's one
and only point-block scheme: the contract was awarded in 1964 to
local ship-repairing firm Rye-Arc, but the latter subsequently
withdrew and was replaced by Tersons.
131 Chalkhill Redevelopment Area, Brent: over 1, 250 Bison deck-access
dwellings built by Farrow from 1966. This view, taken in 1989,
shows Claw F (an extension contract, built from 1968) and one of
the two multi-storey car parks.
132 The Indian summer of GLC point blocks: three 25-storey blocks built
from 1968 (by Sunley) at the Bow Locomotive Works Site development,
Tower Hamlets, adjacent to low terraces decked over a railway line
<1989 view). A more grandiose group of similar point blocks was
"
under construction at the same time at the Downs Road site,
Hackney.
133 The GLC's Kidbrooke Depot redevelopment, Greenwich, built 1967-72
in two stages by Wates. A vast and awesomely rectilinear layout of
linked deck-access and 12-storey point blocks, designed by Colin
Lucas's group. 1989 view.
134 Wandsworth LBC*s Doddington Road scheme, built from 1967 by Laing
(12M Jespersen): 1989 view. Doddington Road was envisaged by
Sporle as the springboard of an audacious drive to tear down the
'twilight areas' of Battersea; but it eventually proved to be both
his crowning monument and his undoing, owing to Labour's loss of
the Borough in 1968 and his own imprisonment on corruption charges
arising out of this contract.
135 Model of Hounslow LBC's Brentford Waterworks Stage I development,
built from 1967 by Wates: six 23-storey point blocks. The
borough's prestige scheme, proudly lining the M4 motorway.
136 Barbot Street Redevelopment, Enfield: four 23-storey battery-cast
blocks built by EDLO from 1966. In the foreground, Block A
(Lancelot House), opened by Robert Mellish in April 1968.
Photograph taken in 1989.
137 Opening of ' Tomorrow's Lambeth Today' Exhibition at the Royal
Festival Hall on 9 November 1965 by the Minister of Housing and
Local Government, Richard Crossman. Seen here inspecting a model
of the Clarence Avenue development: (from left to right) Marcus
Lipton, MPj Councillor Ewan Carr; Richard Crossman, MP; Mrs. Betty
Carr; Councillor Spencer Fagan; E. E. Hollamby (Borough Architect).
138 Lambeth Road development (Lambeth Towers), built from 1966: 1989
view. 'The very first site that landed on my desk when I started
at Lambeth!' (Hollamby).
139 Bonamy-Delaford Development Area, Camberwell and Bermondsey: 1989
view. This scheme, an extreme example of the architecturally
complex, medium or low height developments favoured by Hayes and
Trenton, was built from the early 1960s on a large fragmented site
straddling the two boroughs' boundaries: a foretaste of Hayes's
'imperial' approach at the 1964-5 reorganisation.
140 Four 14-storey point blocks approved by Southwark Metropolitan
Borough Council in 1965 for construction at Portland Street. The
erection of identical blocks was proposed at the Aylesbury
redevelopment, but Hayes (by then designated architect to the
London Borough of Southwark) secured their cancellation, to allow
his own deck-access scheme to go ahead.
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141 Aylesbury Development Area, Southwark, built by Laing from 1967:
view in 1989.
142 1989 view of Lambeth LBC's Central Hill scheme.
143 Dawsons Hill development, Southwark, built from 1968 by Sir Lindsay
Parkinson: seen in 1989,
PART III: INTRODUCTION
144 The Breakdown of 'Production': 1971 illustration from Municipal
Review (source: S. Muthesius).
CHAPTER 9
145 Multi-storey survival in the London Boroughs. Brent LBC's South
Kilburn Redevelopment Area, Extended Area Stage II Phase I: two 18-
storey and four 6-storey Bison Wall-Frame blocks built from 1971 by
Concrete Southern at the conclusion of this very complicated multi¬
stage scheme.
146 Deck-access survival at the GLC. The Gloucester Grove development,
Southwark, comprising roughly 1,000 dwellings in blocks up to 10
storeys high, built from 1972 by Gleeson in calculated brickwork
construction: 1989 view.
147 Tenement survival in Scotland. Wester Hailes: aerial view from
east in 1989. Several thousand dwellings, almost entirely
comprising staircase-access flats: at centre are the 9-storey
Crudens blocks of Contract 7 and at bottom right the 10-storey
Bison blocks of Contract 4 - both built in 1969-71.
148 DLO troubles in Southwark: the North Peckham Development Area
(built from 1967), 1989 view showing pitched roofs being added.
CHAPTER 10
149 'Old Slums'. View, c. 1959-60, of the Carnegie Street clearance
area, Edinburgh, showing Cllr. Pat Rogan and Mrs. Barclay from 35
Carnegie Street. Rogan wrote on the rear of the photograph:
' Services had been cut by vandals and Mrs. Barclay had to collect
water from a stand pipe in the street. The dog was her protector.'
150 'New Slums'? Cartoon from Glasgow Corporation Housing Department
newsletter (.Housing News), May 1947: drawn by Charlie Baird,
plasterer in Maintenance Section.
151 'New Slums'? 1991 picture of (left) Red Road and (right) Coll
Street schemes, Glasgow.
CONCLUSION
152 'Crusader': Pat Rogan revisits Martello Court, Edinburgh, 1991.
153 'User': Kitty Horsey (4) enjoys the view from Flat 79, on the 20th




1) Total public housing completions in various UK areas/cities, over
successive 5-year phases between 1945 and 1975
2) Numbers of multi-storey approvals in various UK areas/cities
3) Postwar multi-storey public housing: level of building/block heights
in various UK areas/cities
4) Proportion of all postwar rnulti-storey housing in various areas of UK
(a) in blocks over 20 storeys in height
(b) built in prefabricated construction
5) County of London: local authority housing completions 1/4/65-31/12/64
6) Greater London: local authority housing completions 1/4/65-31/3/68




1) Central Clydeside, pre-1975 administrative boundaries
2) West Midlands, pre-1966 and 1966-74 administrative boundaries
3) Merseyside, pre-1974 administrative boundaries
4) South East Lancashire, pre-1974 administrative boundaries
5) West Yorkshire, pre-1974 administrative boundaries
6) Tyneside, pre-1974 administrative boundaries
7) Greater London, pre-and post-1965 administrative boundaries
8) Greater London and environs, showing pre-and post-1965 boundaries
within Greater London and pre-1974 boundaries outside Greater London.
